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I. INTRODUCTION

If one were to forecast the areas involving the greatest technological breakthroughs for the new
millennium, the genetic engineering made possible by biotechnology1 would be at or near the top of the
list. It is entirely possible that over the next fifty years thousands of novel, genetically modified bacteria,
viruses, plants and animals could be developed and released into the global environment for
pharmaceutical, agricultural, medical, environmental remediation, alternative fuel, and other purposes.
For some internationalists, this is extremely good news, especially for the developing world. For
instance, recent estimates indicate that around 790 million people in developing states are chronically
undernourished (meaning their food intake is insufficient to meet basic energy requirements on a
continuing basis) and millions more experience under nutrition (meaning they lack essential vitamins and
minerals in their diet) leaving them underweight and stunted.2 Absent biotechnology developments, one
might doubt that current plant-breeding techniques could increase the world’s food supply enough to

1

“Biotechnology” encompasses a variety of techniques, such as selecting natural strains of
organisms that carry desirable traits, making hybrids by fusing cells from different parental sources,
using chemicals and radiation to create mutant strains, or genetically engineering plants, animals, and
micro-organisms to contain specific phenotypic characteristics. At its most general level, biotechnology
concerns techniques for using the properties of living things to make products or services. The principal
focus of this article is on recent, controversial developments in biotechnology relating to genetic
engineering.
2

U.N. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 1999 at 1011 (1999).
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feed an estimated 9.4 billion people by the year 2050.3
Yet the dawn of the biotechnology world is generating serious transnational concerns that pose
an enormous challenge for the international law and structures of our new century. Concerns arise over
whether the genetic resources of the world, once manipulated, should be reducible to property rights,
allowing a few companies of technologically-rich states to control access to food, medical, and other
resources essential to the health and welfare of billions of people. Concerns arise over whether states
should be notified first before any genetically modified products are exported to them, and once
informed, on what grounds they may refuse to permit the export to occur. Already a trade impasse has
developed between the United States and the European Union over genetically modified food, fueled
by consumer demands for labeling schemes or even outright bans. To the extent that widespread bans
on exports among developed states emerge, they may inhibit the ability of developing states to obtain
the fruits of biotechnology for their own urgent needs, and close off markets for exports of genetically
modified products from developing states to the developed world. Further concerns arise if genetic
engineering causes transnational catastrophic harm. Although no such harm has occurred to date (such
as by destabilizing a state’s biosphere through “genetic pollution”), such an outcome is feared, and
raises questions as to responsibility if such an event occurs. Finally, there are long-term concerns about
the decline in global biological diversity, which may be accelerated by the widespread use of genetically
modified products.
The purpose of this article, broadly stated, is to assess the strengths and limits of existing

3

U.N. POPULATION FUND, THE STATE OF WORLD POPULATION 1998 at 2-3, fig. 1 (1998).

5
international law and structures designed to address these concerns, and to suggest a means for
augmenting current structures to make them more effective. Part II begins with a discussion of the
science of biotechnology, which is useful background for understanding its promises and perils, and
then proceeds to briefly relate recent applications of the science and some general concerns about
those applications. Part III clarifies and analyzes six specific concerns about biotechnology in the
transnational sphere and associated international law and structures. As will be seen, there is no single
treaty regime addressing these concerns but, rather, a segmented and at times conflicting network of
intellectual property, trade, and environment treaties, accompanied by ambiguous customary law or
principles. The few legal studies to date in this area tend to focus on just one of these several concerns,
which results in an inability to see connections among them that suggest cross-sectoral opportunities for
bargaining and cooperation among relevant state and non-state actors.
Prior scholarly studies in this area also tend to focus on state-to-state negotiations as the means
for addressing transnational biotechnology. Yet, as discussed in Part IV, international law develops and
regulates transnational behavior in a manner that goes well beyond the development treaty regimes.
International law is driven in large part by the self-interest of states, but they also arise from the social
interaction of states and non-state actors, and they ultimately must become grounded in national laws
and society in order to become effective. While Part III emphasizes the need for coordination across
different treaty regimes, Part IV emphasizes the need for coordination at different levels of state and
non-state behavior as the law develops over time. While states should continue to grapple with
concerns in the area of biotechnology through incremental tinkering of existing treaty regimes—seen
most recently in the adoption of a Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity—this

6
article argues that the principal emphasis of the global community on episodic and segmented
intergovernmental negotiations as a means for addressing these concerns is misplaced, especially since
the science in this area is changing rapidly, the behavior to be regulated is highly commercial and private
in nature, and transnational regulation affects a wide variety of state and non-state actors who have
complex motivations that change over time.
Rather, as advanced in Part V, there is value in coordinating and augmenting traditional treaty
regimes by the coalescence of an “epistemic community” of scientists, environmentalists, multinational
businesses, trade organizations, development experts, academic groups, and others that transcend
sectors. The many issues raised by biotechnology in the transnational sphere need to be addressed by
international society as a whole, rather than left to the vagaries of the market, to governments alone, or
to the initiatives of a few well-financed interest groups, such as biotechnology companies and
environmentalists. One approach would be to establish a transnational forum on biotechnology, which
could serve as a relatively informal and non-binding means for the transnational “bargaining” of views
among a wide range of relevant non-state actors. Such a forum ultimately may be instrumental in
achieving consensus on a coherent and effective legal regime to address concerns with transnational
biotechnology, one that balances the tremendous opportunities of biotechnology against its potentially
severe and adverse transnational effects.
Moreover, if successful, such a forum might provide a template for resolving the recurrent
problem seen in reconciling other problems in the field of trade and environment, as well as clashes
among other fields of international law. The structure of international society grows ever deeper in the
ways in which non-governmental actors operate and cooperate across borders. Traditional methods of

7
developing international law affecting private behavior must give way to newer approaches, ones that
recognize the indispensability of cooperation among non-governmental actors in advance of the
formation of new international legal regimes and in advance of major reforms of existing regimes.
Otherwise, the development of international law in such areas will prove increasingly ineffective and
unsatisfactory in responding to the demands of international society.

II. THE SCIENCE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, ITS APPLICATIONS, AND ITS CRITICS

The Science4

The term “biotechnology” can be applied to pre-twentieth century methods of producing dairy
products, bread, or wine, as well as selective breeding of animals or cloning of plants by grafting. As
such, the field has been around for centuries without creating any significant problems for national
regulation, let alone international regulation. However, the genetic engineering of modern
biotechnology—whereby a firefly can be crossed with a tobacco plant to produce a glowing

4

The information contained in this section may be found in a variety of standard works on
biotechnology. Non-scientists seeking more information may find accessible SUSAN ALDRIDGE, THE
THREAD OF LIFE: THE STORY OF GENES AND GENETIC ENGINEERING (1996); SUSAN R. BARNUM ,
BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION (1998); ERIC S. GRACE, BIOTECHNOLOGY UNZIPPED (1997);
BIOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (Frederick B. Rudolph & Larry V. McIntire, eds. 1996). For standard scientific textbooks
on genetics and biotechnology, see BERNARD R. GLICK & JACK J. PASTERNAK, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
(2d ed. 1998); BENJAMIN LEWIN, GENES (6th ed. 1997); JOHN E. SMITH , BIOTECHNOLOGY (3d ed.
1996).
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plant—moves well beyond anything previously seen. Traditional cross-breeding involves selectively
breeding for desired genetic traits, usually within a single species or species complex, while the genetic
engineering that began in the 1970's allows genes to be transferred between distant species that would
never interbreed in nature, raising new issues, questions, and problems in both the national and
transnational sphere.
How is genetic engineering done? Each cell of an organism typically has a nucleus containing
threadlike bodies known as chromosomes. Each chromosome contains tightly packed sequences of
nucleotides, a compound consisting of a base, a phosphate group, and a sugar. These nucleotides
arrange themselves structurally as two complementary chains wound in a helix, to form
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). A sequence of nucleotides on a chromosome contains within it a
particular piece of information about the organism’s parent: that sequence is known as a gene. Different
sequences of nucleotides provide codes for the creation of specific amino acids, which in turn dictate
what cells are created. Why do the cells of a firefly egg develop so as to create a new firefly instead of,
for example, a tobacco plant? The sequences of nucleotides in the chromosomes of the parent fireflies,
when combined to create the off-spring firefly, dictate the arrangement of specific macromolecules,
which results ultimately in the creation of a new firefly.5
By combining genes from the DNA of one species with that of another, is it possible to create a
tobacco plant with leaves that glow like a firefly? There are various techniques for transferring genes;
one of the first and still central techniques involves the use of bacteria and viruses. While the DNA of

5

See generally GRACE, supra note 4, ch. 1.
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most cells is found on chromosomes located within a cell nucleus, bacteria do not have nuclei; their
DNA is found on a single chromosome in the shape of a large, closed loop or a plasmid. These loops
can pass readily from one cell to another. By contrast, a virus is simply a molecule of DNA (or its
cousin, ribonucleic acid, or RNA) covered with a protective protein coat. Thus, while they have genetic
instructions for making new versions of themselves, viruses do not have the biochemical capability to
reproduce independently; they rely on other living organisms to do so. A virus can take over a bacterial
cell by settling on the bacterium and injecting its nucleic acid into the cell (when it does this, it is known
as a bacteriophage or phage). Once injected, the viral nuclear acid instructs the bacterial cell’s
biochemical machinery to produce more viral nucleic acid and protein coats, and then ruptures the cell
membrane to allow the new viral particles to disperse.6
When attacked by a virus, however, bacteria will also counterattack by generating a group of
enzymes, known as restriction endonucleases or restriction enzymes, that try to chop up the invading
DNA. Different restriction enzymes recognize specific sequences of nucleotides and chop up the
invading DNA at these points. Researchers have identified hundreds of restriction enzymes possessing
unique recognition sites and therefore can use them as cutting tools. Because of the structure of DNA,
any two fragments of DNA—from any biological source—cut by the same restriction enzyme can be
joined together.7 So, if the relevant genes whose product emits light were chopped off from the DNA of
a firefly and joined to relevant genes of a tobacco plant seed, the result would be a tobacco plant that

6

See generally GRACE, supra note 4, ch. 1; see also SMITH , supra note 4, at 38-43.

7

Id.
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grows.8

The Applications

Using such techniques, scientists are capable of joining DNA fragments from different sources
to create novel DNA (known as recombinant DNA or rDNA) so as to take a valued quality of one
organism and join it with the valued quality of a second organism. Although today’s science is not
advanced enough to know what fragments of DNA to combine in order to cross complex organisms
without seriously disrupting the normal development of the embryo,9 there already exist many less
complex applications of this new biotechnology.
In the medical field, scientists are developing plants genetically engineered to contain drugs that
can then be extracted (or delivered by simply eating the plant), a process called molecular farming or
“biopharming” that is far less costly process than current laboratory techniques.10 Scientists also
envisage treating (and perhaps even curing) diseases through “gene therapy,” by infusing a patient who

8

The feat was accomplished in 1986. See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY at 14

(1998).
9

The control of genes in multi-celled organisms is highly complex. Scientists do not yet
understand how undifferentiated cells within an embryo express different genes to produce different
body tissues and organs. It is not enough to transfer genes that create the structure of an organ; one
must also transfer the genes that regulate the sequence of events by which the structure is created.
Modifications that have worked the best are the simplest, introducing just one or a few foreign genes
into an organism.
See Andrew Pollack, New Ventures Aim to Put Farms In Vanguard of Drug
Production, N.Y. TIMES , May 14, 2000, at 1.
10
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has missing or defective genes with corrective doses of DNA.11 Genetic diseases such as cystic fibrosis
ultimately may be cured through such applications, as well as more complex conditions involving the
interactions of various genes that lead to heart disease, cancer, and Alzheimer’s disease. Ultimately,
gene therapy might result in longer living, more intelligent humans.12
To date, however, success with gene therapy has been minimal. 13 Greater success exists in use
of genetic engineering for the mass production of therapeutic proteins that would otherwise be difficult

See generally ANDREW KIMBALL, THE HUMAN BODY SHOP: THE ENGINEERING AND
MARKETING OF LIFE (1993); JEFF LYON & PETER GORNER, ALTERED FATES : GENE THERAPY AND
THE RETOOLING OF HUMAN LIFE (1995). Scientists currently mapping the multi-billion-unit human
DNA sequence hope that it will lead to an ability to identify and manipulate human genes responsible
for aging and disorders, leading to treatments for cancer, heart disease, and other maladies. See Karl
Lenhard Rudolph et al., Longevity, Stress Response, and Cancer in Aging Telomerase-Deficient
Mice, 96 CELL 701 (1999). As of July 2000, two entities—a private company named Celera
Genomics Corporation and a multi-national consortium of educational centers named the Human
Genome Project—are on the verge of completing a total sequencing of genes of a human cell. See Rick
Weiss & Justin Gillis, DNA-Mapping Heralded, WASH . POST, June 27, 2000, at A1. As each gene
sequence is uncovered by the Human Genome Project, there is complete and continuous public
disclosure, which has the effect of blocking private patents on the uncovered gene sequence. For the
consortium’s Internet site, maintained by the U.S. National Center for Biotechnology, see
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genome/seq>. Although public and private ventures are already seeking
patents for various segments of the human genome, in all but a handful of these instances, the applicant
does not yet understand the function, usefulness or commercial value of the genetic material.
11

12

Scientists have already manipulated the DNA sequence of mouse genes so as to make a
smarter mouse. See Ya-Ping Tang et al., Genetic Enhancement of Learning and Memory in Mice,
401 NATURE 63 (Sept. 2, 1999).
See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Biotech Death of Jesse Gelsinger, N.Y. TIMES , Nov.
28, 1999, §6 (Magazine), at 136 (describing the unsuccessful seven-week University of Pennsylvania
gene therapy experiment on a teenager suffering from a rare metabolic disorder); Philip J. Hilts, A
Second Death Linked to Gene Therapy, N.Y. TIMES , May 4, 2000, at A21; but see Marina
Cavazzana-Calvo et al., Gene Therapy of Human Severe Combined Immunodeficiency (SCID)-X1
Disease, 288 SCI. 669 (2000) (describing an apparently successful gene therapy experiment on infants
born with a life-threatening immune system disorder).
13

12
or costly to produce, or even unavailable by conventional means.14 Animals are being engineered with
special genetic traits from human genes, so that the animals can produce human proteins for making
drugs to combat disease.15 In the future, engineered animals might even produce entire organs useable
by humans by xenotransplants.16 Moreover, once engineered, such animals can be duplicated ad
infinitum through cloning (i.e., using a gene from an ancestor to produce a genetically identical
organism).17 Current U.S. policy, however, disfavors use of biotechnology to clone humans, largely out
of ethical, moral, religious and legal concerns.18

14

For instance, antibodies (proteins created by certain white blood cells to fight infection) have
been very difficult to create in the laboratory using traditional methods, since white blood cells do not
survive easily outside the body. Using techniques of biotechnology, however, the antibody-producing
qualities of white blood cells have been fused with cancer cells, which have the property of unstoppable
growth, so as to turn out a continuous supply of antibodies. Other therapeutic proteins replicated using
genetic manipulation include insulin, alpha interferon, and human growth hormones, some of which have
purely animal applications. One advantage of using human genes to produce the drugs for humans is
that they are less likely to generate adverse side-effects.
See Justin Gillis, Down on the High-Tech Pharm, WASH . POST, Jan. 17, 2000, at A1;
Justin Gillis, Cows and Clones on a Va. Pharm, WASH . POST, Feb. 28, 1999, at A1.
15

See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Could This Pig Save Your Life? N.Y. TIMES , Oct. 3,
1999, §6 (Magazine), at 46 (describing efforts to insert human genes into pig embryos, so that the
organs of the grown pig, when transplanted into the physiologically similar humans, will not be rejected
by the human immune system); ANDREW KIMBRELL, THE HUMAN BODY SHOP: THE ENGINEERING
AND MARKETING OF LIFE (1993).
16

17

In 1996, Scottish scientists successfully cloned a lamb from an adult sheep, by taking the
nucleus of an adult sheep’s cell and transferring it into another sheep’s unfertilized egg. The
“reconstructed” embryo was placed in the womb of a foster mother and brought to term. Thus, was
born Dolly. See I. Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells,
385 NATURE 810 (1997).
See Remarks Announcing the Prohibition on Federal Funding for Cloning of Human Beings
and an Exchange with Reporters, Mar. 4, 1997, 1997 PUB. PAPERS: WILLIAM J. CLINTON 230-32
(President Clinton urging “the entire scientific and medical community, every foundation, every
18

13
The transnational implications of these biotechnology applications are significant; if made widely
available, such pharmaceuticals and medical treatments can potentially improve the health and wellbeing of millions of people worldwide afflicted with treatable diseases and conditions. Moreover,
certain applications could be targeted to the needs of the developing world. For instance, scientists may
be within striking distance of plants that would produce edible vaccines and insulin, a highly practical
means of distribution to developing states that would obviate the cost of transportation, the need for
refrigeration, and the dangers of using needles.19 Separately, scientists are trying to reengineer insects so
that they cannot spread major diseases, such as malaria, yellow fever, trypanosomiasis and dengue,
which afflict millions of people each year, particularly in developing states. Insects harmful to the
agricultural economies of Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Japan, Mexico, Tanzania, and the United States
are already breed in captivity to be sterile, so that when released they diminish the overall population;
university, every industry that supports work in this area to heed the Federal Government's example”
and to undertake a voluntary moratorium on the cloning of human beings “until our Bioethics Advisory
Commission and our entire Nation have had a real chance to understand and debate the profound
ethical implications of the latest advances”). The National Bioethics Advisory Commission was
established by Exec. Order No. 12,975, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §6601 (Supp.
II 1996).
In January 1998, the FDA asserted that it had January 1998 that it had statutory authority to
regulate human cloning. See Gregory J. Rokosz, Human Cloning: Is the Reach of FDA Authority
Too Far a Stretch? 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 464 (2000). Meanwhile, some U.S. states have banned
human cloning. See, e.g., CA L. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §24185 (West Supp. 2000).
On ethical, social, religious, and legal concerns regarding cloning of humans, see generally THE
GENETIC REVOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Justine Barley ed., 1999); NA T ’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY
COMMISSION , CLONING HUMAN BEINGS : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION (1997) (concluding that the inefficiency and risk of known cloning
techniques made research on human cloning inappropriate); DANIEL J. KEEVLES & LEROY HOOD, THE
CODE OF CODES : SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (1992).
See Anne Simon Moffat, Toting Up the Early Harvest of Transgenic Plants, 282 SCI.
2176 (1998).
19
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with biotechnology this process may become simpler and more effective.20
Next to applications of biotechnology in the medical field rank those in the field of agriculture.21
Genetically modified microorganisms might be developed that, when released into the environment, may
help control soil acidity/alkalinity or salinity, thereby increasing the geographic range of crops. Already,
“transgenic crops” can be genetically modified to do better at surviving drought or frost,22 to stay

See David A. O’Brochta & Peter W. Atkinson, Building the Better Bug, SCI. AM ., Dec.
1998, at 90.
20

See generally Maurizio G. Paoletti & David Pimentel, Genetic Engineering in Agriculture
and the Environment, 46 BIOSCIENCE 665 (1996). For an analysis of ethical and social issues that
reaches conclusions favorable to continued development of biotechnology, see NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES (1999),
<http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org>.
21

22

The first genetically engineered micro-organism for use in agriculture authorized by the U.S.
Government to be field-tested concerned a frost-inhibiting bacteria, known as “ice minus.” Ice minus
was developed by taking bacteria that promoted ice formation (formally called pseudomonas
syringae), isolating the ice-promoting protein within it and, through use of recombinant DNA
techniques and restriction enzymes, creating a new bacterium lacking in the protein (other methods of
creating the mutant strain were also used). Once sprayed on crops, it was hoped that the engineered
strain of bacteria would delay frost formation at least until the temperature dropped below -10B C. The
field tests on ice minus that began in 1987, however, ultimately revealed that some naturally occurring
strains of pseudomonas syringae were just as effective as ice minus, leading to the abandonment of
further research, testing and development of ice minus. See SHELDON KRIMSKY & ROGER P. WRUBEL,
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 154-65 (1996).
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fresher longer,23 to resist insect pests and diseases (viruses),24 and to tolerate herbicides, which allow
farmers to spray weedkiller on fields without damaging crops.25 The same biotechnology tools can be
applied to livestock, so as to improve the quality and quantity of milk, eggs, meat, and wool, and to
produce healthier, faster-growing animals.26

23

The first genetically modified product for food use to receive U.S. Government approval was
the Flavr-Savr tomato, developed by Calgene. Approved in May 1994, the tomato had been
genetically engineered so that it could stay on the vine until fully ripe, picked, but then delay ripening
(and hence rotting) further. See Calgene, Inc., Availability of Letter Concluding Consultation, 59 Fed.
Reg. 26,647 (Dep’t Health & Human Services 1994). The Flavr-Savr tomato proved less successful
than hoped, as it cost more and did not taste as good as competing tomatoes.
24

The first genetically modified, insect-resistant crop to receive U.S. Government approval for
commercial sale was the Monsanto’s NewLeaf potato. Approved in 1995, the genetic structure of the
potato was modified to contain genes from a natural soil bacterium (Bacillus thuringiensis, or Bt) which
emits organic toxins that, when ingested, kill certain insects. The same bacterium, however, is quickly
broken down into harmless chemicals when ingested by humans due to the highly acidic conditions of
human stomachs. Ironically, Bt is the principle insect-controlling spray used by organic farmers, since it
is an organic insecticide. Many genetically modified, insect-resistant crops currently used contain the Bt
gene. See Michael Pollan, Playing God in the Garden, N.Y. TIMES , Oct. 25, 1998, §6 (Magazine),
at 44.
25

The first herbicide-tolerant transgenic plant approved for commercial use was a type of
cotton that could tolerate the herbicide bromoxynil. One of the most extensively used herbicidetolerant, genetically modified crops in the United States are Monsanto’s “Roundup Ready” canola,
corn, cotton, and soybeans. “Roundup” is a Monsanto herbicide that has been used commercially for
more than twenty years. It contains glyphosate, which kills weeds by interfering with an enzyme in their
growth mechanism (a mechanism not found in animals). Through biotechnology, tolerance to
“Roundup” has been transferred to desirable crops, allowing farmers to spray fields with “Roundup” to
eliminate weeds without harming their crops. See Rick Weiss, Seeds of Discord, WASH . POST, Feb. 3,
1999, at A1. Monsanto argues that farmers can spray “Roundup Ready” crops less often than normal
crops. See Monsanto Press Release on Environmental Benefits Of Crops Developed Through
Biotechnology (July, 1997),
<http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/mediacenter./background/97jul_EnvBenefits.html>.
26

For example, in February 1994, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved for use in
the United States a bovine growth hormone to increase a cow’s milk yield by up to twenty percent. The
hormone, known as bovine somatotropin (BST), occurs naturally in cows, but can also be produced
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All told, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has approved some 50 varieties of
genetically modified crops. In 2000 in the United States, 52 percent of approximately 75 million acres
of soybeans, 56 percent of approximately 15.5 million acres of cotton, and 25 percent of approximately
78 million acres of corn are planted with genetically modified crops.27 Those crops are used to produce
a wide range of products consumed worldwide. For example, soy is present in an estimated 60 percent
of all processed foods (mostly in the form of flour, oil and lecithin), including breads, baby foods, salad
dressings, and ice cream. 28
Again, the transnational implications of these agricultural biotechnology applications are
significant; they can help farmers worldwide minimize the enormous amounts of chemical fertilizer,
pesticide, water, machinery and fuel necessary to produce food. Food can be produced at lower costs
and with less use of chemicals considered harmful to human health and the environment.29 That

cheaply by inserting genes associated with the pituitary gland of cattle into bacteria, which then
manufacture the hormone. Once produced, the hormone can be either injected in the cow or added to
the cow’s feedstock. See KRIMSKY & WRUBEL, supra note 22, at 167-90; SMITH , supra note 4, at
175-76.
See NATIONAL AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP ’T OF AGRIC., PROSPECTIVE PLANTINGS
4, 12, 18, 23-24 (2000), <http://jan.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/nassr/field/pcp-bbp>. Most of the
transgenic plants currently being developed in the United States are to tolerate chemical herbicides or
weedkillers. See JANE RISSLER AND MARGARET MELLON, THE ECOLOGICAL RISKS OF ENGINEERED
CROPS 14-15 (1996).
27

28

See Seeds of Change, CONSUMER REP ., Sept. 1999, at 41.

See Robert B. Horsch, Biotechnology and Sustainable Development, in BIOTECHNOLOGY
AND BIOSAFETY 25 (Ismail Serageldin & Wanda Collins eds., 1999). A study by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture found that the farm-level impacts of genetically crops on pesticide use, yields, and net
returns vary with the crop and technology examined. For instance, adoption of herbicide-tolerant cotton
led to significant increases in yields and net returns, but was not associated with significant changes in
herbicide use, while increases in adoption of herbicide-tolerant soybeans led to small but significant
29

17
possibility is of particular interest to the lesser developed states: China and India, for example, can only
feed their growing populations through continuous improvements in crop yields.30 By using crops
genetically modified to have beneficial characteristics, developing states may find that they can meet
increasing demand, while practicing even more environmentally benign agricultural methods. Not only
might the supply be increased, but foods could be engineered to have a higher nutritive value,
possessing more vitamins, healthy fats and oils, or could be engineered to stay fresh longer in tropical
states.31
Although there are concerns about the adverse environmental effects of manipulating nature
increases in yields, no changes in net returns, but significant decreases in herbicide use. See JORGE
FERNANDEZ -C ORNEJO & WILLIAM D. MCBRIDE, U.S. DEP ’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. ECON. REP . NO. 786,
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS FOR PEST MANAGEMENT IN U.S. AGRICULTURE (2000),
<http://www.ers.usda.gov/epubs/pdf/aer786/>.
See Anne Kathrine Hvoslef-Eide & Odd Arne Rognli, Environmental Issues for Plant
Biotechnology Transfer: A Norwegian Perspective, in PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 37, 38-39 (David W. Altman & Kazuo N. Watanabe eds., 1995) (arguing
that biotechnology “will probably provide the key for producing more food and other agricultural
commodities from less land and water in the twenty-first century, without the adverse ecological
implications associated with the expression of the full yield potential of high-yielding crop varieties
through high-input agriculture”).
30

See generally AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
(Catherine L. Ives & Bruce M. Bedford eds., 1998). For example, scientists have now created a strain
of genetically altered rice carrying beta-carotene, a compound that is converted into vitamin A within
the human body. Vitamin A deficiency is the world’s leading cause of blindness, creates susceptibility to
a host of diseases, and is the source of a malaise that affects as many as 250 million children. Millions of
those suffering the deficiency cannot be reached through distribution of pills, leaving genetically modified
crops a low-cost yet effective option. See Xudong Ye et al., Engineering the Provitamin A (ßCarotene) Biosynthetic Pathway into (Carotenoid-Free) Rice Endosperm, 287 SCI. 303 (2000). It
is estimated that every year some 500,000 children become blind or partially blind from vitamin A
deficiency. See TRANSGENIC PLANTS AND WORLD AGRICULTURE 10 (July 2000),
<http://bob.nap.edu/html/transgenic> (collaborative report of eight national academies of science,
including the U.S. National Academy of Sciences).
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through biotechnology, it is important to note that there are several potentially positive uses of
biotechnology, such as through genetically engineering crops to require less inputs (land, water,
pesticides). One potential benefit relates to environmental clean-up. For decades tiny bacteria (or
microbes) have been used to treat domestic sewage, industrial waste water, or other environmental
pollutants, by essentially feeding upon large, complex, harmful molecules, and thereby breaking them
down into smaller, harmless ones. After the 1990 oil spill by the Exxon Valdez off the coast of Alaska,
Exxon used microbe-enhanced fertilizers to help clean beaches and shorelines of the oil debris.32 This
process, referred to as bio-remediation, has one principle drawback: unpredictability. At any given
waste site, various factors (such as climate and soil) can effect the speed and effectiveness of the bioremediation. For that reason, scientists are currently studying how such bacteria can be genetically
engineered for greater reliability and to expand the number of pollutants that can be treated.33

General Criticisms

With the advent of genetic engineering has come a host of concerns both nationally and
transnationally. While U.S. biotechnology companies, their trade associations, U.S. government
officials, and others interested in using biotechnology (such as farmers, doctors, and industrial waste
managers) assert that current U.S. regulation is sufficient to protect human health and the environment,
many U.S. consumer and environmental groups believe that genetically modified products are inherently
32

See Janet Raloff, An Alaskan Feast for Oil-Eating Microbes, 143 SCI. NEWS 253 (1993).

33

See GRACE, supra note 4, at 138-39; see also SMITH , supra note 4, at 154-55.
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dangerous and should not be developed further absent extensive long-term testing, if at all. In particular,
critics note that unlike hazardous chemicals or wastes, genetically modified organisms are potential
hazards “with legs,” capable not just of spreading but of proliferating.34 Reviewing the scientific
literature shows that scientists can be found to support both positions, with molecular biologists tending
to see little risk in genetically modified organisms, and ecologists tending to see more. The widespread
introduction in the United States of bioengineered products, from food to fabric, initially provoked little
reaction from the public at large, but that now may be changing, and may result in greater attention by
politicians to the means by which biotechnology is regulated.
Fears have arisen over various potential aspects of the new biotechnology: unknown toxins,
antibiotic resistance, religious infringements, allergic reactions, counterfeit freshness, “genetic pollution,”
and other adverse effects from the introduction of exotic organisms into ecosystems. For instance, with
respect to medical applications of biotechnology, critics note that xenotransplants may allow for a
plentiful supply of engineered organs for thousands of needy human recipients, but they also may create
the potential for the contamination of humans with viruses or retroviruses (viruses that integrate their
genetic code into the cells they infect).35 With respect to the agricultural field, critics detected in taco
See generally M. CHIARA MANTEGAZZINI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS FROM
BIOTECHNOLOGY (1986); RIFKIN, supra note 8; V.E.A. RUSSO, GENETIC ENGINEERING: DREAMS AND
NIGHTMARES (1995).
34

35

Some critics fear that the genetically modified pig organ transplanted into a human could
carry with it the porcine endogenous retrovirus (PERV). See, e.g., Stolberg, supra note 16, at 49. As
for the consequences of infecting humans with such retroviruses, most AIDS researchers now believe
that the HIV retroviruses are really primate viruses that somehow jumped into humans, with one theory
focusing on polio vaccines grown from monkey kidneys that were fed to Africans in Burundi, the
Congo, and Rwanda in 1957-60. See EDWARD HOOPER, THE RIVER: A JOURNEY TO THE SOURCE OF
HIV AND AIDS (1999); Helen Epstein, Something Happened, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 2, 1999, at
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shells sold in grocery stores a form of genetically modified corn approved as an animal feed, but not for
human consumption because of allergy concerns, prompting a voluntary recall by a major U.S. food
company.36
Critics of bio-engineering argue that genetically modified products destined for human or animal
consumption are inadequately regulated by national authorities,37 including the U.S. Government.38 In
the United States, there is no comprehensive statute addressing the testing and monitoring of genetically

14. On the likely acquisition by humans throughout history of viruses from domesticated animals, see
JARED M. DIAMOND , GUNS, GERMS & STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 196-97, 207-09
(1997).
See Marc Kaufman, Biotech Critics Cite Unapproved Corn in Taco Shells, WASH . POST,
Sept. 18, 2000, at A2; Marc Kaufman, Biotech Corn Fuels A Recall, WASH . POST, Sept. 23, at A1.
Genetic engineering in the pharmaceutical context has raised fewer concerns, largely because it is often
amenable to chemical synthesis, so that commercial production need not involve the original biological
source material. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND GENETIC RESOURCES 28-29 (1996) [hereinafter OECD REPORT ].
36

37

For an analysis of regulations in various states relevant to emergent biotechnology
applications, see OECD, Compendium of National Food Safety Systems and Activities, OECD
Doc. SG/ADHOC/FS(2000)5/ANN/FINAL (June 8, 2000); Judy J. Kim, Out of the Lab and Into
the Field: Harmonization of Deliberate Regulations of Genetically Modified Organisms, 16
FORDHAM INT ’L L.J. 1160 (1992-93).
For criticisms of U.S. regulation, see generally Mary Jane Angelo, Genetically Engineered
Plant Pesticides: Recent Developments in the EPA’s Regulation of Biotechnology, 7 U. FLA . J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 257 (1996); David J. Earp, The Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants: Is
Peter Rabbit Safe in Mr. McGregor’s Transgenic Vegetable Patch? 24 ENVTL. L. 1633 (1994);
Diane E. Hoffmann, The Biotechnology Revolution and its Regulatory Evolution, 38 DRAKE L.
REV. 471 (1988-89). For an early suit against the U.S. Government by environmental groups, see
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (forcing the U.S.
government to engage in greater environmental assessment of release of genetically modified
organisms). Part of the problem is that the lines drawn between the mandates of regulatory agencies are
blurred when faced with genetic engineering; is a potato engineered to kill pests that seek to eat it to be
regulated as a food or a pesticide? See Pollan, supra note 24, at 50.
38
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altered products; indeed, such products have never been tested for long-term effects on human health.
Rather, genetically altered products are regulated under existing statutes relating to food, drugs,
agriculture, or the environment principally39 by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),40 the
USDA, 41 and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).42 Although as yet there is no scientific

39

Other federal entities, such as the National Institutes of Health, the National Science
Foundation, and the Department of Energy also play a role in federal regulation of the biotechnology
industry. In fact, the earliest U.S. regulations concerning biotechnology arose with NIH’s effort to
address contained testing in laboratories and greenhouses that developed during the 1970s. See
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 45 Fed. Reg. 77,384 (1980). For the
White House’s interagency coordinating guidelines, see Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986). Those guidelines make clear that existing laws will
regulate biotechnology, that the products of biotechnology (rather than the process) will be regulated,
and that the safety of a biotechnology product will be decided on a case-by-case basis.
40

The FDA regulates biotechnology products under statutes relating to food (except for meat,
poultry, and egg products), feed, drugs, and medical devices. See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FFDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§301-95 (1994); 21 C.F.R. §§171.1-571.1 (2000). In May 1992, the
FDA published a policy statement regarding food derived from new plant varieties. In it, the FDA
concluded that food and feed derived from genetically modified organisms should be regulated in the
same manner as food and feed derived from traditionally bred plants, which leaves with the producer
the responsibility to assure the safety of the food. See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New
Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (1992). For the FDA’s Internet site on biotechnology, see
<http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/biopolcy.html>. Ensuring that the commercial supply of meat, poultry, and
egg products is safe and correctly labeled and packaged is not regulated by the FDA but, rather, by the
USDA.
41

The USDA considers biotechnology applications as part of its mandate for ensuring the
purity, potency, efficiency, and safety of agricultural products. Relevant statutes include the VirusSerum-Toxin Act, 21 U.S.C. §§151-59 (1994), the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §606
(1994), the Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§451-70 (1994), the Plant Quarantine Act, 7
U.S.C. §§151-67 (1994), and the Federal Plant Pest Act, 7 U.S.C. §§150aa-150jj (1994); 7 C.F.R.
§§340.0-340.9 (2000); 9 C.F.R. §§309.17 & 381.75 (2000). For the USDA’s Internet site on
biotechnology, see <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech>.
42

The EPA regulates genetically modified organisms primarily under statutes relating to toxics
and pesticides. See Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§2601-2629 (1994)
(regulating toxic substances); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
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evidence of any harm to humans from eating genetically modified food,43 critics charge that more
extensive studies should be conducted by independent scientists regarding the risks to human and
animal health from consumption of genetically modified food.
Further, critics worry about the environmental effects of genetically modified crops.44 Critics
doubt industry claims that use of genetically modified crops will decrease the use of conventional
pesticides, since crops engineered to be resistant to herbicides arguably will result in far greater use of
herbicides by farmers (since there is no concern with hurting the crop itself). Moreover, critics fear that

§§136-136y (1994) (regulating pesticides). The EPA also has responsibilities under the FFDCA, 21
U.S.C. §§346a(a)-(o) (1994) (regulating tolerances or exemptions for the requirement of a tolerance
for pesticide residues in foods). Relevant regulations may be found at C.F.R. §§152.1-152.500,
172.1-172.59, 180.1-180.1206, & 725.1-725.1000 (2000). For the EPA’s Internet sites on
biotechnology, see <http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/biotech/index.html> (for bio-toxics);
<http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/activity.htm#bio> (for bio-pesticides)
See COMMITTEE ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND
REGULATION (2000), <http://books.nap.edu/catalog/9795.html>. One controversial study, however,
has found that rats fed with genetically modified potatoes experienced a thickening of their intestines.
See Stanley W.B. Ewen & Arpad Pusztai, Effect of Diets Containing Genetically Modified
Potatoes Expressing Galanthus Nivalis Lectin on rat Small Intestine, 354 LANCET 1353 (1999).
Various scientists charged that this study was severely flawed. See Richard Horton, Genetically
Modified Foods: “Absurd” Concern or Welcome Dialogue? 354 LANCET 1314 (1999); Rick
Weiss, Gene-Altered Food Study Fuels a Fire, WASH . POST, Oct. 15, 1999, at A3.
43

See generally Miguel A. Altieri, The Environmental Risks of Transgenic Crops: An
Agroecological Assessment, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND BIOSAFETY, supra note 29, at 31; Rebecca J.
Goldburg, Environmental Concerns with the Development of Herbicide-Tolerant Plants, 6 WEED
TECHNOLOGY 647 (1992); James Kling, Could Transgenic Supercrops One Day Breed
Superweeds? 274 SCI. 180 (1996); RISSLER & MELLON, supra note 27. The critics, of course, have
their detractors. See, e.g., Bryce W. Falk & George Bruening, Will Transgenic Crops Generate New
Viruses and New Diseases? 263 SCI. 1395 (1994) (doubting that genetic engineering creates a greater
risk of new viruses than exists naturally). For a review of the debate, see H.J. Rogers & H.C. Parkes,
Transgenic Plants and the Environment, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL BOTANY 467 (1995).
44
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transgenic plants will alter the balance of an eco-system in ways that cannot be predicted and, in the
long-term, can be very harmful to the environment. For instance, genetic engineering might inadvertently
generate new, more virulent strains of virus or pathogenic bacteria harmful to the environment or, at a
minimum, might threaten genetic diversity by promoting uniform crop systems. Herbicide-resistant traits
of a transgenic plant could transfer by pollination to weeds, creating uncontrollable “superweeds.”45
Increased use of insecticides made possible by insecticide-resistant plants could lead insects to mutate
into insecticide-resistant “superbugs.” Further, by genetically manipulating crops so as to poison insects,
it may be inevitable that harmless insects or beneficial insects (i.e., insects that feed on pests) are
poisoned, thus actually increasing the pest population and decreasing biological diversity among
insects.46 For that reason, the U.S. Government encourages (but does not legally require) growers of
most genetically modified crops to maintain a certain amount of acreage planted with non-genetically
modified crops, for the purpose of allowing some non-mutated insects to survive and, by breeding with
any mutating insects, decrease the likelihood (or at least the speed) of mutation. 47

For a recent example, see Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Squash With Altered Genes Raises Fears
of “Superweeds,” N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 3, 1999, at A1.
45

See, e.g., Allison A. Snow & Pedro Morán Palma, Commercialization of Transgenic
Plants: Potential Ecological Risks, 47 BIOSCIENCE 86, 93 (1997).
46

See Rick Weiss, Corn Seed Producers Move to Avert Pesticide Resistance, WASH .
POST, Jan. 9, 1999, at A4. Even though the soil bacterium Bt is already used to spray crops, see supra
note 24, critics charge that crops genetically modified to contain Bt add much more of the toxin to the
environment and are less apt to degrade, thus threatening insects far more with extinction, and in turn
prompting greater mutation.
47
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III. PROBLEMS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE

The advent of modern biotechnology is already generating various concerns in the transnational
sphere which the global community is struggling to address through disparate and largely uncoordinated
treaty regimes.48 Although some success has been achieved, the rapid development of biotechnology
applications will place increasing stress on traditional regulatory regimes. For instance, as
xenotransplants become more common, national regulations may be developed in some states to
prevent animal viruses from jumping into humans, but what if comparable regulations do not exist in
other states, leading to the risk of such viruses originating elsewhere and then traveling to the highly
regulated states? Even if cloning of humans is banned by some states, how should international
law—including human rights law—handle humans that are cloned or hybrid mammals (part human, part
non-human) created in other states?49 Suppose the United States genetically engineers a microbe
48

For Internet sites dealing with biotechnology in the transnational sphere, see listings that
appear at the Internet site operated jointly by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the U.N. Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO),<http://www.oecd.org/ehs/biobin>. The U.S. Information Agency also maintains an Internet
site on global biotechnology issues at <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/biotech>.
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45
VAND . L. REV. 313 (1992); Stevan M. Pepa, International Trade and Emerging Genetic
Regulatory Regimes, 29 LA W & POL’Y INT ’L BUS. 415, 443-46 (1998) (suggesting that a hybrid
creature could be regarded as a person with full legal rights, as a patented life form owned by its
creator, or something in between). Some relevant rules of international law already exist, such as those
prohibiting slavery, but the central question is how the international community defines a “person.”
As a first step toward addressing ethically questionable applications of biotechnology in the field
of medicine, twenty-three European states have signed the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being With Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine:
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, done Apr. 4, 1997, Eur. T.S. 164, reprinted in 36
I.L.M. 817 (1997), which addresses issues such as gene therapy, genetic discrimination, and organ or
49
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capable of destroying all coca plants in Columbia as a means of eliminating drug trafficking; is it for
those governments alone to decide on its deployment, or do other groups or governments have a legal
entitlement to speak to the issue?50 Indeed, if biotechnology succeeds in generating new, revolutionary
capabilities, the global community will have to confront the degree of transnational cooperation that is
desirable (whether for economic, political or moral reasons) either to regulate those capabilities or to
help finance those capabilities so as to make them available to those in need.51
Concerns with potential biotechnology applications in the transnational sphere are too numerous
to address fully within the scope of this article. Consequently, this section focuses on concerns that have
tissue transplantation. See also Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being With Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the
Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, Jan. 12, 1998, Eur. T.S. No. 168, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1415
(1997).
The U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has adopted a nonlegally binding declaration stating that human cloning is “contrary to human dignity” and “shall not be
permitted”. UNESCO, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997),
<http://www.unesco.org/ibc/uk/genome/projet/index.html>. Similarly, the World Health Organization
(WHO) has adopted a resolution affirming “that the use of cloning for replication of human individuals is
ethically unacceptable and contrary to human integrity and morality.” WHO Doc. WHA50.37 (May
14, 1997). No doubt further steps will need to be considered on a global level.
50

One can imagine a host of other potential problems of the future. In the field of immigration
and refugee law, if the use of biotechnology for medical treatments in one group of states vastly
outpaces in development in other states, there may emerge a new category of persons known as
“medical refugees.” Or, if scientists can some day screen individuals genetically for their disposition to
engage in criminal behavior, legislators may be tempted to use the information to deny the admission of
refugees on grounds of national security or safety. U.S. law currently calls for refusal of asylum or for
removal when an alien is shown to have engaged in a “serious nonpolitical crime” prior to the alien’s
arrival in the United States, see, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999), regardless of
whether the alien has completed his or her sentence, presumably on grounds that the prior act is
predictive of future behavior.
See Michael J. Malinowski, Globalization of Biotechnology and the Public Health
Challenges Accompanying It, 60 ALB. L. REV. 119 (1996).
51
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arisen with existing biotechnology applications in the field of pharmaceuticals and agriculture, in the
hope that the ensuing analysis will prove useful in addressing concerns about potential applications in the
future. The principal contemporary concerns may be placed in six general categories: (1) equitable
concerns regarding the patenting of genetically modified products; (2) the need to notify an importing
state of genetically modified products and the degree of detail provided in such notification; (3) the
circumstances under which the importing state may refuse to permit genetically modified imports
consistent with international trade rules; (4) liability for the adverse effects of genetically modified
exports upon human health or the environment of the importing state; (5) liability for the adverse effects
of genetically modified products that, while wholly produced and consumed in the originating state,
nevertheless have adverse effects on the human health or environment of adjacent states; and (6) the
potential loss to present and future generations from the long-term decline in global biological diversity
caused by the release of genetically modified products into the environment. The efforts of existing
global treaty regimes to grapple with each concern is briefly discussed in turn.

Equitable Concerns Regarding the Patenting of Genetically Modified Products

Particularly in the area of pharmaceuticals and agriculture, there are important concerns that
arise in the patenting of genetically modified products. Those concerns largely play upon two themes.
First, developed states argue that intellectual property in genetically modified products must be
protected so as to promote the costly research and development of such products, while developing
states counter that such protection will make access to the products very expensive if not prohibitive for
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developing states, and in any event is inappropriate for life forms. Second, developed states desire
relatively unrestricted access to the rich genetic diversity found in developing states as source material
for genetic engineering, while developing states argue that the fruits of genetic resources uncovered in
developing states should be equitably shared with them.52 Each theme is addressed in turn.
With respect to the first theme—concerning whether to grant and protect intellectual property
rights in genetically modified products—U.S. intellectual property law generally does not acknowledge
ownership or use of naturally occurring or socially maintained materials or information in the public
domain, such as genetic resources. Consequently, access to such genetic resources is generally
unrestricted. However, once novel products or processes are developed from genetic resources, then
U.S. law may provide intellectual property protection. Thus, a naturally occurring substance, whether
living or inanimate, in principle can be patented if it is isolated from its surroundings, identified and made
available for the first time, and has a useful purpose. Further, patents may be issued for chemical
compounds corresponding to genes or nucleotide sequences when isolated and made available for a
useful purpose.

52

Developing states can try to dedicate resources to develop biotechnology applications
themselves, but the costs and expertise required make widespread biotechnology research and
development prohibitive. For instance, of thirty-four states conducting field trials of transgenic crops
from 1986 through 1995, more than half (eighteen) were developed states, while only three were states
that were formerly centrally planned and thirteen were developing states. Of the 3,647 tests conducted
during that period, more than half (1,952) were in the United States and more than a fourth in Belgium,
Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (1,082). In Africa, only twenty-five field
tests were conducted in three African states: Egypt, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. See CLIVE JAMES &
ANATOLE F. KRATTIGER, GLOBAL REVIEW OF THE FIELD TESTING AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF
TRANSGENIC PLANTS, 1986 TO 1995: THE FIRST DECADE OF CROP BIOTECHNOLOGY 4-5 (Int’l Serv.
for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications Briefs No. 1, 1996).
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Under this rationale, U.S. intellectual property protection has been extended to include microorganisms, as well as genetically modified plant and animal breeds. Although the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office initially had doubts about the ability to patent micro-organisms, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided in 1980 that it is possible to issue a patent for such a product under U.S. law53 so long
as it could be said that someone had invented or discovered a new and useful “manufacture” or
“composition” of matter having a distinctive name, character, and use.54 Similarly, new plant and animal
breeds traditionally have been protected in the United States under intellectual property laws, and this
protection extends to genetically modified plants and animals.55

53

35 U.S.C. §101 (1994).

54

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (finding that a genetically engineered
bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil could be patented). See generally John M. Czarnetzky,
Note, Altering Nature’s Blueprints for Profit: Patenting Multicellular Animals, 74 VA . L. REV.
1327 (1988). Interestingly, the oil eating bacterium at stake in Chakrabarty was never
commercialized. See KRIMSKY & WRUBEL, supra note 22, at 158. On the generally favorable
disposition of U.S. courts and of the policy decisions of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office toward
genetic innovation, see Timothy Caulfield et al., Patent Law and Human DNA: Current Practice, in
LEGAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN GENETIC MATERIAL 117 (Bartha Maria Knoppers et al. eds., 1996).
See, e.g., Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. 1987), aff’d, 846
F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (allowing patent of an oyster egg with a genetically altered number of
chromosomes); Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. of Pat. App. 1985) (allowing
patent of a genetically altered type of maize seed). For a recent decisions, see Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (patentability of “antisense technology,” meaning
technology used to control expression of a gene in an organism); Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. v.
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (patentability of certain hybrid plants).
In 1987, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office promulgated a rule that permitted the patenting
of higher organisms. 1077 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PA T . & TRADEMARK OFF. 24 (1987). In 1988, the first
genetically modified animal patent was issued to Harvard University for a mouse engineered with a gene
that made it susceptible to cancer and therefore useful in testing for carcinogens. See Malcolm
Gladwell, Harvard Scientists Win Patent for Genetically Altered Mouse; Award Is First to Be
Issued for an Animal, WASH . POST, Apr. 12, 1988, at A1.
55
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The case of agricultural seeds helps illustrate the significant transnational consequences that can
flow from the recognition of such patents on genetically engineered products. At one time, farmers
retained seeds from prior harvests to sow new ones, as well as purchased or shared seeds locally. In
recent decades, farmers began purchasing seeds nationally and transnationally from large companies
but, even then, the fact that plants grown from the seeds produced a second generation of seeds largely
left the various strains of seeds available to all farmers for use and experimentation. With the advent of
modern biotechnology, however, the control of agricultural seeds may shift from farmers worldwide to
just a few multinational biotechnology companies.56 When seeds for genetically modified plants are
exported by a U.S. company, 57 the foreign importer must enter into a license agreement, whereby the
importer is licensed to grow a crop for a single generation. That crop, once produced, is the property
of the licensee. The genes of the crop, however, remain the property of the U.S. company and are
protected under U.S. patents. If the importer attempts to produce a second generation of the crop, the
importer violates the license agreement and U.S. patent law. The asserted reason for the patent
protection is to recoup developmental costs.58
56

Principal companies holding patents on newly engineered agricultural products and services
include AgrEvo, Agrigenetics, Cargill Seed, Dupont, Hoechst-Roussel, Monsanto, Novartis
Agribusiness Biotechnology, and Pioneer Hi-bred International. As an example of the scale of these
companies, Monsanto maintains the largest biotechnology research center in the world; a 210-acre
complex outside St. Louis, Missouri featuring 250 separate laboratories, 100 room-sized plant growth
chambers, and two acres of greenhouses arrayed on its roof. See Rick Weiss, supra note 25.
57

In 1999, the United States produced approximately 72% of the world’s commercially
produced transgenic crops, followed by Argentina (17%) and Canada (10%). See Robert Paarlberg,
The Global Food Fight, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2000, at 24, 26.
58

Monsanto estimates that it can take ten years and several hundred million dollars to create a
commercially viable seed. See Weiss, supra note 25. The same development costs are associated with
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How does the U.S. company know that a plant grown abroad was derived from its genetically
modified seeds? Typically, in addition to genetically modifying the seed to make a better plant, the U.S.
company also introduces into the seed a “marker” gene that allows the company to identify its plants
and any offspring.59 Further, the license agreement, sometimes referred to as a “technology use
agreement,” allows the U.S. company to perform tests in the importer’s fields at will to determine
whether there is patent infringement. For example, Monsanto has hired retired Canadian Mounted
Police to conduct random DNA tests on its Canadian customers, and has begun suing (and settling
with) those found non-compliant, as well as suing non-customers on whose land plants with marker
genes are found.60 Moreover, it now appears possible to bio-engineer seeds so that their plants
produce sterile seeds (“terminator” genes), thus precluding the possibility of a second generation,
although this technology is still several years from widespread commercial application.61

developing pharmaceuticals or drugs. For instance, studies of the bovine growth hormone discussed
supra, note 26, reportedly involved more than three hundred studies on more than twenty-two
thousand dairy cows. See KRIMSKY & WRUBEL, supra note 22, at 166.
59

Use of marker genes has also been criticized on other grounds. The most commonly used
marker is a bacterial gene for antibiotic resistance. Widespread use of such a gene, it is feared, could
exacerbate the problem of antibiotic resistence by moving from the genetically modified organism into
the environment generally, making disease-causing bacteria resistant to antibiotics.
60
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See Weiss, supra note 25.

The system, called a “technology protection system,” forces plants to produce a toxin that is
fatal to their own seed but harmless to humans. Critics charge that pollen from these plants might
transmit the gene to other plants, making them sterile as well. Supporters note that the technology can
be used for self-pollinating plants that rarely mate with other plants; further, even if other plants are
made sterile, they would not pass along the gene and would die out. See Robert F. Service, SeedSterilizing ‘Terminator Technology’ Sows Discord, 282 SCI. 850 (1998); Rick Weiss, Sowing
Dependency or Uprooting Hunger?, WASH . POST, Feb. 8, 1999, at A9. Opposition to such
technology led Monsanto in 1999 to announce that it would make no effort to market “terminator”
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With respect to intellectual property laws in other developed states, there appears to be
consensus that intellectual property protection cannot be extended to genetic resources merely as found
in nature, and to which there has been no intervention of human ingenuity, such as by isolating the
resource in a pure form.62 Further, most developed states have followed the U.S. approach in allowing
patents for micro-organisms and genetically modified plants and animals, as well as for nucleotide
sequences.63 To that end, several states have adopted a treaty designed to harmonize the amount of
disclosure necessary to obtain a patent of a living organism.64 Like the United States, these states favor
strong intellectual property protections for genetically modified products in both the exporting state and
the importing state, since this is seen as a key basis for technology transfer agreements and foreign
investment in technology-importing states.65 Most attention is paid to the ability to patent products or
information derived from genetic resources, although other protections, such as plant breeders’ rights

seeds, but other companies are continuing related research. See Barnaby J. Feder, Monsanto to Bar a
Class of Seeds, N.Y. TIMES , Oct. 5, 1999, at A1.
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PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS , PHARMACEUTICALS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
213-14 (1999).
OECD REPORT , supra note 36, at 20; GRUBB, supra note 62, at 227. For the European
Union, see Parliament/Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions 98/44,
1998 O.J. (L 213) 13; Robin Nott, “You Did It!”: The European Biotechnology Directive at Last,
20 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 347 (1998).
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See Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for
the Purposes of Patent Procedure, Apr. 28, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 1241, 17 I.L.M. 285. The Budapest
Treaty entered into force in 1980 and as of 1998 has been ratified by 42 states. The treaty establishes a
list of international depositary authorities where a patent applicant may make a single deposit of the new
genetic material. Once deposited, the material is available to the public so that others may determine
whether a genetic material they have invented is novel.
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OECD REPORT , supra note 62, at 8.
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and trade secret, can be invoked as well.
Developing states are well aware of the benefits of genetically engineered products, whether
they be insect-resistant sweet potatoes in Vietnam, or disease-free, vaccine-laced bananas in eastern
and central Africa or papayas in southeast Asia. Yet many developing states have resisted recognition
of intellectual property rights in such products.66 This resistance turns in part on an ethical or moral
belief that life forms, as a general matter, should not be treated like an invention. Life forms are special
and different and not reducible to property rights that may be possessed by some and denied to others.
To the extent certain property rights are accorded to life forms, many developing states perceive an
imbalance in Western intellectual property regimes, which deny intellectual property rights for medicinal
or agricultural knowledge, skills, and materials which have been handed down over generations.
Arguably the new biotechnology “invention” is just a further step (albeit a radical one) in our
comprehension of a genetic evolution spanning millennia.
Moreover, developing states are concerned that granting intellectual property rights for
genetically engineered products will allow just a few multinational, biotechnology companies in the
developed world to command extraordinary license fees for products and services of critical need to
the developing world.. They note that such multinational corporations have vastly superior capital and
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A state is generally free to develop its own policy towards patents and their enforcement,
subject to obligations arising under international agreements. Those agreements principally prevent a
state from discriminating against foreign nationals in the application of its patent laws and clarify priority
filing dates for patents or trademarks filed abroad. See The Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1883, revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1630 &
24 U.S.T. 2140, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Patent Cooperation Treaty, June
19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
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other resources in the race to patent genetically modified products. Even now, before the biotechnology
revolution is in full swing, twenty percent of the world’s population in the developed states have
seventy-four times as much income as the poorest 20 percent of the world’s population, up from thirty
times as much in 1960.67 While ideally biotechnologies would be developed in a manner that would
allow returns on investment across the globe, various factors instead presage a widening biotechnology
gap between developed and developing states: the narrow genetic base of biotechnology innovations;
the increasing privatization of biotechnology research and development (and concomitant decline in
public sector support for agricultural research); the extensive capital requirements of biotechnology
research and development; and the need to recoup those costs through pricing strategies built on
intellectual property protections.68 It may be that only the wealthier developing states or developing
states with large national markets—such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand—will be able
to pursue biotechnological development.
If multinational companies of the developed world win the race and obtain exclusive control
over the most successful genetically modified products, developing states envisage two possible
scenarios unfolding. In one scenario, a new age of “bio-colonialism” emerges, where the nationals of
developing states become dependent on those products, resulting in their meager earnings being
siphoned off to the developed world in the form of expensive license fees. While this is of concern to

See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999
at 36 (1999), <http://www.undp.org/hdro/>.
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See David R. Lee, A Perspective on Socioeconomic Research on Plant Biotechnology
Transfer for Developing Countries, in PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES , supra note 30, at 58.
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developing states, it should be of concern to the developed world as well; economic distress inevitably
leads to conflict.69 In the other scenario scenario, even if developing states are willing to pay expensive
license fees, they may not be able to afford them, given the difficulty developing states already have in
paying for traditional, non-engineered products. Moreover, if unable to pay, products of the greatest
use for the developing world may not even be invented by developed countries. Indeed, while the
notion of feeding the world resonates well for those favoring biotechnology, why would biotechnology
companies undertake the costs of genetically engineering crops such as cassava and cowpea, little
known in the developed world, but critical for a number of the world’s poorest states? Genetic
engineering may have a role to play in “feeding the world” or “curing the world,” but it is not clear
whether the role will be a major one absent incentives and structures beyond typical market forces.70
Consequently, while developing states recognize that intellectual property rights may be necessary in the
developed world to help recoup the research costs of biotechnology companies, they believe that
denying such rights in the developing world would make it easier for them to obtain the benefits of
biotechnology.
As a result of these attitudes, developing states initially tried to have genetic material declared

See Ethan B. Kapstein, Distributive Justice As an International Public Good: A
Historical Perspective, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 88, 112 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999).
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See TRANSGENIC PLANTS AND WORLD AGRICULTURE, supra note 31, at 23-24. Similar
problems arise in the context of pharmaceuticals. North America, Europe and Japan account for 80%
of world drug sales, while Africa accounts for 1%. Thus, a drug capable of treating advanced sleeping
sickness—one of the historic scourges of Africa—was recently deemed unprofitable and discontinued
by its Western manufacturer since it is useless against cancer, the target of interest to the developed
world. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Drug Makers and the Third World: A Case Study in Neglect,
N.Y. TIMES , May 21, 2000, at 1.
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part of the common heritage or province of all mankind,71 in the spirit of instruments relating to the deep
seabed, space, and geographical/cultural landmarks.72 Those attitudes pervaded discussions at the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the U.N. agency charged with overseeing global
intellectual property conventions.73 In recent years, however, developing states have come to see
ownership of genetic materials located within their territory as a means for extracting benefits from those
who use them for biotechnology applications. Consequently, attitudes have shifted in favor of viewing
rights in genetic material as in some sense restricted, making it more difficult for biotechnology
companies and universities to obtain genetic supplies from foreign sources.74
Differences among states over whether to accord intellectual property rights in genetically
engineered products were aired during the course of the negotiations that led to the 1994 Uruguay
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In 1983, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) developed a non-binding
undertaking dealing with access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture that declared genetic
resources to be “a heritage of mankind to be preserved, and to be freely available for use, for the
benefit of present and future generations.” International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture, pmbl., FAO Res. 8/83, 22nd Sess. (1983). For background, see Harold J.
Bordwin, The Legal and Political Implications of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources, 12 ECOL. L.Q. 1053 (1985). Some 113 states have adhered to the Undertaking, which is
currently under revision at the FAO.
See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, art.
136, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39, at 140 (1994), 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1293; Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, art. 1, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2412, 610
U.N.T.S. 205, 207; Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov.
23, 1972, pmbl., 27 U.S.T. 37, 40, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151, 152.
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See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property Protections
for Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the Exception for Agriculture,
27 CASE W. RES . J. INT ’L L. 83, 107 (1995).
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See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
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round agreements. Unfortunately, the hard-fought language developed in those negotiations leaves does
not expressly address the treatment of genetically engineered products and thus leaves many questions
still unanswered. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights provides
that all parties are to accord protections for “any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application.”75 However, patents may be prohibited to protect ordre public or morality, provided there
is a justification exceeding the mere prohibition in national law.76 Further, “plants and animals other than
micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants and animals other
than non-biological and microbiological processes” may be excluded from protection, provided that
plant varieties are protected by patents and/or by an effective sui generis system.77
75

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement],
Annex 1C, art. 27(1), LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M.
81, at 1208 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (emphasis added). The Paris Convention
established the principle of non-discriminatory treatment of foreign nationals with respect to whatever
intellectual property protection a state party may provide, but does not establish any minimum
standards for the protection of intellectual property.
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TRIPS Agreement, art. 27(2).

Id., art. 27(3)(b). The requirement for protection of plant varieties can probably be met by a
state joining the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961,
revised Nov. 10, 1972, Oct. 23, 1978, & Mar. 19, 1991, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (UPOV
convention). The UPOV convention protects plant breeders’ exclusive marketing rights where a plant
variety satisfies requirements of novelty, distinctness, uniformity, and stability, but the protections are
different from the patenting of genetic material. First, while the UPOV convention precludes resale of
seeds from harvested crops, it allows a farmer to reuse them in future seasons, subject to express
authorization of the breeder, although a government may exempt the breeder from obtaining such
authorization so long as the “legitimate interests of the breeder are protected” (arts. 14 & 15). Second,
the UPOV convention only protects a variety from further change if that change is so small as to leave
the new variety “essentially derived” (art. 14). Based on the language of Article 14, this protects a plant
77
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Since the language does not expressly address genetically modified products, it seems likely
that states may interpret it in different ways. On the one hand, patents for living organisms in all
likelihood will remain prohibited in some states, and the TRIPS Agreement allows the exclusion of
organisms from protection provided that plant varieties are protected. For those states, they will likely
interpret the TRIPS Agreement as also allowing the exclusion of patent protection for a newly
engineered gene.
On the other hand, that engineered gene can be new, can involve an inventive step, and can be
capable of industrial application, and thus apparently can be an invention that, once patented, must be
protected under the TRIPS Agreement unless there is an applicable exclusion. It would seem that the
patent cannot be excluded from protection solely on the grounds that it is a life form, since the exclusion
in the TRIPS Agreement does not cover micro-organisms and genes are not whole organisms. States
wishing to deny such protection alternatively might seek to argue that it may do so to protect ordre
public or morality. Yet it is unclear whether such a denial can be justified under the TRIPS Agreement
with respect to, say, the gene used to create vitamin-enriched rice, where there is no scientific basis for

variety from being further transformed by genetic engineering. What is less, clear, however, is whether it
protects genes within a variety. In other words, a biotechnology company might find it difficult to fully
protect their product using plant breeders’ rights, since those rights probably are not violated if another
company removes the gene of a genetically modified variety of rice and transfers it to another variety of
rice or other product. Only by also patenting the gene itself could the transfer be prohibited.
Provisions similar to those of the TRIPS Agreement appear in the Convention on the Grant of
European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199, art. 53. Interpretation of those provisions has
been complex, with the European Patent Office issuing seemingly inconsistent opinions on the ability to
patent genetically engineered plants and animals. See Darrell G. Dotson, Comment, The European
Controversy Over Genetic-Engineering Patents, 19 HOUS. J. INT ’L L. 919 (1997). A recent
decision clarifying that patents are available is Novartis II/Transgenic Plant, Case G0001/98 (Eur. Pat.
Off. Enlarged Bd. App. Dec. 20, 1999).
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regarding the gene or the rice as harmful to human health or the environment.
Thus, while the TRIPS Agreement may not force states to implement strong intellectual
property protection for genetically modified organisms, it may force states to achieve the same result by
protecting patented genes. This interpretation, however, is not free from challenge and will likely lead to
difficulties in implementation. In the final analysis, the negotiators of the TRIPS Agreement, burdened
with the enormous task of addressing the wide range of issues concerning trade and intellectual
property, fell short in providing clear guidance on how to reconcile the competing interests of states and
private actors in the field of transnational biotechnology. The resulting ambiguous treaty norms may
influence transnational behavior, but appear to fall short of adequately regulating it.
With respect to the second theme introduced at the beginning of this section, further concerns
have arisen regarding the access to genetic source material from which genetically engineered products
are developed, as well as the distribution of benefits (in the form of financial or technology transfers) to
those traditionally associated with the genetic source material. This issue typically arises when genes are
appropriated not from the state that manipulates, patents, and sells the genetically modified product but,
rather, from some other state. Biotechnology companies wish to “bio-prospect” in the ecologically
diverse systems often found in the developing world, while developing states charge that their genetic
resources, including the knowledge of their indigenous people, are being “stolen” by foreign private
companies to engineer new products.78 In recent years, the rights of indigenous people have received

See Andrew Jacoby & Charles Weiss, Recognizing Property Rights in Traditional
Biocultural Contribution, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 74 (1997); Solomon R. Benatar, A Perspective
from Africa on Human Rights and Genetic Engineering, in THE GENETIC REVOLUTION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 159, 170 (“Attempts to patent products developed with
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extensive international attention;79 allowing them to share in the benefits of genetic resources that they
have used as medicines and food for generations is considered of high priority within the developing
world. Raw genetic source materials and their derivatives can command prices ranging from just a few
cents to millions of dollars per kilogram; yet once manipulated, they inevitably command far higher
information derived from the practices of indigenous healers, and eagerness to patent components of
the human genome for exclusive economic gain are seen as new forms of exploitation that exclude
considerations of the humanity of those living in economic misery.”) The oft-cited example of this is the
U.S. patent by W.R. Grace Company on a process for extracting a chemical from the seeds of the
neem tree, a botanical cousin of the mahogany tree that is found in India and has been used for
centuries for medicinal and other purposes. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEEM : A TREE FOR
SOLVING GLOBAL PROBLEMS (1992); John Tanner, India: U.S. Giant, Peasants Battle for “Blessed
Tree”, INTER PRESS SERVICE GLOBAL INFO. NETWORK, Oct. 12, 1993, available in 1993 WL
2534808.
79

There are more than 200 million indigenous people in the world, many of whom live in
ecosystems considered rich depositories of unexploited resources. See ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH
SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LA W 178 (2d ed. 2000). Various conventions and
“soft-law” instruments acknowledge and promote these rights. See Agenda 21: Program of Action for
Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, ch. 26 (3 vols. 1992); Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development (June 14, 1992), principle 22, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992); International Labour
Organization Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989) (this convention currently has 14 parties);
International Labour Organization Convention (No. 107) Concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, 328 U.N.T.S. 247
(this convention currently has 27 parties). An open-ended inter-sessional working group of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights currently has under consideration a draft declaration on indigenous
peoples. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
1301-04 (2d ed. 2000).
In addition, there are various relevant instruments that ascribe to the “right to development” the
ability of peoples both to “full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources,” U.N. General
Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, annex, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1987), and the ability to enjoy the benefits of
scientific and technological processes. See Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), Nov. 17, 1988,
art. 14(1)(b), O.A.S. T.S. 69, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 156 (1989) (corrections at 28 I.L.M. 573 &
1341 (1989) (this protocol currently has 11 parties).
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prices.80 As noted above, while international intellectual property regimes protect patents in many
genetically modified products, they largely do not protect the underlying genetic resource, or the
knowledge and innovations of indigenous people, which are deemed to be in the public domain. 81
The negotiators of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (Biodiversity Convention)82
attempted to grapple with these concerns about ensuring access to genetic source material while at the
same time promoting a fair distribution of the benefits that might accrue from genetically engineered

See KERRY TEN KATE & SARAH A. LAIRD, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF BIODIVERSITY 2
(1999); see also Walt Reid et al., A New Lease on Life, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING
GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 18 (Walt Reid et al. eds., 1993) (“even a
relatively small share of net profits may amount to extremely large revenues for a developing country.”).
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An analogue to this may be seen in California law with respect to genetic information
obtained from humans. California law provides that a person from whom genetic information is taken
has no property rights to that information, even if used to produce a commercially viable product,
absent a contract to that effect. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d
479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990). In Moore, the plaintiff had unique genetic qualities that were obtained
by a doctor from diseased material removed from the plaintiff. The doctor then developed a
commercially viable product. The court found that the plaintiff had no property interest in the product,
but found that the doctor may have breached a fiduciary duty by failing to advise the patient of his intent
to use the genetic material commercially. Consequently, new products made from the genetic material
may be patented and the person from which the genetic material originated has no property rights in that
patent.
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Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 823. As of October 2000,
178 states have ratified or acceded to the Convention, an extraordinary level of adherence by any
measure. The overall objectives of the Convention are:
the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by
appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies,
taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate
funding.
Id., art. 1.
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products based on that material. In addition to articles in which Parties commit to try to preserve
biological diversity through various means, the Convention contains an article on access to genetic
resources,83 an article on access to and transfer of technology, 84 and an article on the handling of
biotechnology and distribution of its benefits.85
Unfortunately, formal negotiation of the Convention began in 1991 and was completed
hurriedly in time for the 1992 Rio Summit. The hurried pace left insufficient time for the disparate views
of states to converge, resulting in a text that is often times unclear, ambiguous or even contradictory,
including on the issues of intellectual property and sharing of benefits. The United States declined to sign
the convention at 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro,

83

Article 15 confirms the sovereign right of states over their natural resources, including the
authority to determine access to genetic resources by national legislation. Each Contracting Party “shall
endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources for environmentally sound uses
by other Contracting Parties” on mutually agreed terms and subject to prior informed consent of the
Contracting Party. Id. art. 15, at 828.
84

Under Article 16, each Contracting Party undertakes “to provide and/or facilitate access for
and transfer to other Contracting Parties of technologies that are relevant to the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of genetic resources,” so long as they do not cause
significant damage to the environment. Moreover, such transfer of technology to developing states “shall
be provided and/or facilitated under fair and most favorable terms, including on concessional and
preferential terms where mutually agreed,” although only where “consistent with the adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights.” Id. art 16, at 829.
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Under Article 19, each Contracting Party shall “provide for the effective participation in
biotechnological research activities by those Contracting Parties, especially developing countries, which
provide the genetic resources for such research,” as well as “take all practicable measures to promote
and advance priority access on a fair and equitable basis by” such parties “to the results and benefits
arising from” such resources. Id. art. 19, at 830.
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ultimately citing among its concerns the treatment of intellectual property and benefits.86 The initial
resistance of U.S. industry to the Convention turned in large part on a belief that the Convention failed
to recognize the positive role of intellectual property in facilitating technology transfer (as well as its role
in promoting cooperative research and development by private entities), and requires too much
government interference in those private transactions. From their perspective, the objective of
intellectual property rights (promoting costly research and its commercialization) should not be
undermined by governments forcing private actors to relinquish their rights; rather, it should be left to
private transactions between private actors and those providing the genetic resources to negotiate an
equitable arrangement, which will occur in conditions where intellectual property is protected.87 Other
See DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN, & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 957-58 (1998).
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In particular, U.S. industry has pointed to the final provision of Article 16 of the Convention,
which appears to allow a Contracting Party to insist that intellectual property rights cannot interfere with
the transfer to it of technology and profits that are within the scope of the Convention. Article 16(5) of
the Convention reads:
The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual property rights may have
an influence on the implementation of this Convention, shall cooperate in this regard subject to
national legislation and international law in order to ensure that such rights are supportive of and
do not run counter to its objectives.
Id. art. 16(5), at 829. Further, Article 19 appears to require extensive foreign participation in
biotechnological research without regard to protection of intellectual property or confidential business
information. For a discussion by the lawyer for the U.S. delegation, see Melinda Chandler, The
Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the International Lawyer, 4 COLO . J. INT ’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 141, 162-64 (1993).
Even after signing the convention, the Administration expressed concerns about protection of
intellectual property rights when transmitting the convention to the Senate. See Message from the
President of the United States Transmitting the Convention on Biological Diversity, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 103-20 (1993), available in 1993 WL 796847 (stating that the Administration will “strongly resist
any actions taken by Parties to the Convention that lead to inadequate levels of protection of intellectual

43
developed states, however, have ratified the Convention, taking the view that intellectual property rights
are preserved under the Convention, 88 an interpretation that most U.S. biotechnology companies
eventually reached as well.89 After taking office in 1993, President Clinton signed the convention and
submitted it to the Senate for advice and consent.90 The transmittal package included a letter from the
Department of State asserting that

with respect to technology subject to patents and other intellectual property rights, the
Convention requires all Parties to ensure that access to or transfer of technology is consistent
with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights. The United States will
strongly resist any actions taken by the Parties to the Convention in derogation of this
obligation.91

property rights, and will continue to pursue a vigorous policy with respect to the adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights in negotiations on bilateral and multilateral trade agreements”).
See generally OECD REPORT , supra note 36, at 30 (technology transfer under the
Convention “will usually include the licensing of some form of propriety right obtained either under an
established statutory form of intellectual property or deriving from the possession of secret know-how
and/or proprietary biological material.”) It has been noted that for Article 16 to be interpreted as
requiring involuntary transfer of technology from developed states to developing states, it must also be
the case that Article 15 must be interpreted as requiring involuntary transfer of genetic resources from
developing states to developed states, an outcome no developing state would be prepared to accept.
See Michael A. Gollin, The Convention on Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property Rights, in
BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 289,
295 (1993).
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See S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-20 (1993).

91

Id., at VI-VII.
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As of October 2000, the U.S. Senate has not provided its advice and consent, thus leaving the United
States (and U.S. companies) outside the scope of its terms.
The Convention represented an important step in the development of the transnational
biotechnology regime, but it has been criticized as containing very general provisions that leave much
unsaid.92 As was the case with the TRIPS Agreement, the negotiators were unable to confront squarely
the competing interests of states and private actors, resulting in ambiguous treaty norms that may
influence transnational behavior, but fall short of regulating it. With respect to the sharing of benefits
derived from genetic resources of a developing state, the Convention largely leaves the matter to private
contracting between the relevant actors, without providing any framework, guidelines, or principles for
how such contracting should proceed, nor for grappling with certain problems. For instance, the
transaction costs involved in such arrangements can be quite high, in terms of identifying potential
sources of genetic material, negotiating and concluding agreements, and then waiting for the long timelag before research and development on a genetic resource yields economic benefits. Further, while it
may be possible for a developing state to negotiate a contract for the provision of a genetic resource
located within its state, any given genetic resource (such as a plant or several varieties of it) may exist in
multiple states or in existing ex situ collections. If so, which states have rights to compensation? What if

See, e.g., David R. Downes, New Diplomacy for the Biodiversity Trade: Biodiversity,
Biotechnology, and Intellectual Property in the Convention on Biological Diversity, 4 TOURO J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1993); Ashish Kothari, Beyond the Biodiversity Convention: A View From
India, in BIODIPLOMACY: GENETIC RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 67 (V. Sanchez &
C. Juma eds., 1994) (“[E]ven with its weak and inadequate terminology, it provides some basis for
action, some possibilities of reversing many historical inequities between and within countries. For this
possibility to become manifest, however, a considerable effort at re-interpreting and looking beyond the
Convention is necessary.”).
92
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states underbid each other to obtain the contract with the bioprospecting company? Should a multistate contract be developed? If so, will the transaction costs harm the economic viability of
biotechnology research? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, developing states (or their indigenous
groups or poor) are apt to sell rights to genetic resources cheaply, not because they attribute a low
value to such resources, but because they are poor. Moral or equitable arguments may be made that
the market, in this context, is not an effective instrument for serving either present or future generations.
Thus, there are various equitable concerns regarding the patenting of genetically modified
products, concerns that existing international law and structures do not fully address. Indeed, there is
considerable tension between the regulatory regime envisaged by the TRIPS Agreement and that
envisaged by the Convention on Biological Diversity. At the same time, there are various interests of
both state and non-state actors involved. While developing states, and their farmers and indigenous
groups, worry about “bio-colonialism” and development of substitute goods through biotechnology,
biotechnology exporting states and their companies worry about developing states denying access to
genetic resources and denying protection for intellectual property rights in biotechnology applications
once developed. While biotechnology companies are largely profit-driven, they cannot be immune to
calls from non-governmental groups, including relief organizations and other activists, for broader
recognition of the inequity in failing to pursue and to make available on a low-cost/no-cost basis
biotechnology applications of critical importance to the developing world. Indeed, failure to heed such
calls may very well affect a company’s profit margin by leading to boycotts, more stringent government
regulation, denial of intellectual property protection, or closing down of a foreign market.
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Transparency Regarding Exports of Genetically Modified Products

A second problem of biotechnology in the transnational sphere concerns the appropriate level
of transparency when genetically engineered products are exported from one state to another. Here,
too, may be seen sharply competing interests of states and private actors, along with an effort to
regulate such interests though development of new treaty norms, ones that ultimately fall short of fully
addressing those interests.
To assess the risk of genetically modified products to human health or the environment (or for
other reasons),93 a state can develop national laws regulating the development and application of such
products originating in its territory.94 In the case of products imported from abroad, however, the state
either needs a sophisticated system for identifying such products at the port of entry95 or needs to
receive notification from the exporter or the exporting state. Notification of genetically modified content
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For instance, certain religious groups (Jewish, Muslim) will wish to know if food products
contain genes from animals, such as swine.
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Under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Parties are obliged, as far as possible and
appropriate, to:
Establish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control the risks associated with the use and
release of living modified organisms resulting from biotechnology which are likely to have
adverse environmental impacts that could affect the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity, taking also into account the risks to human health.
Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 8(g), at 826.
95

For instance, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and other methods have been developed to
detect novel DNA and proteins contained in products. For a description of PCR, see SMITH , supra
note 4, at 44-46.
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could be achieved through a labeling system whereby genetically modified products are clearly marked
as such. A labeling system could be mandated through enactment of national legislation by the importing
state. For instance, beginning in 1997, the European Union passed legislation requiring labeling for
certain products composed of or containing genetically modified products.96 In 1999, bills were
introduced in both houses of the U.S. Congress that would require labeling of foods made with
genetically engineered material.97
There are, however, difficulties in developing a sensible labeling scheme. States must establish
standards for determining (and detecting) genetic content and, unless harmonized, those standards may
differ, causing disruptions in trade flows. Further, especially for bulk shipments of commodities, it may
be difficult to avoid ubiquitous labels of “may contain genetically modified material,” making the labeling
scheme essentially meaningless. If greater precision is mandated (or driven by consumer preference), it
will be costly, consumers may have difficulty processing the information,98 and greater segregation of

See Parliament/Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 1 (requiring in Article 8(1)(d)
that consumers be informed of whether foodstuffs contain “the presence of an organism genetically
modified by techniques of genetic modification.”); see also Commission Directive 97/35, 1997 O.J. (L
169) 72 (requiring labeling for living genetically modified organisms produced or imported for purposes
of introduction into the environment or incorporation into a product); Council Regulation 1139/98,
1998 O.J. (L 159) 4 and Commission Regulation 1813/97, 1997 O.J. (L 257) 7 (regarding labeling of
food and food ingredients derived from previously approved, genetically modified soy and maize);
Commission Regulation 50/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 6) 15 (removing an exemption for food additives and
flavorings); Commission Regulation 49/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 6) 13 (providing a 1% labeling threshold for
“adventitious” or accidental commingling for approved varieties of soy and maize). Directive 97/35
amended an Annex III to Directive 90/220, see infra note 123.
96
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See H.R. 3377, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 2080, 106th Cong. (2000).

See Gillian K. Hadfield & David Thomson, An Information-Based Approach to Labeling
Biotechnology Consumer Products, 21 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 551, 569 (1998).
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genetically modified products from non-modified products will be necessary.99 Further, absent an
extensive “plow-to-plate” monitoring system (i.e., from the time a genetically modified organism is
planted to the time it is integrated into processed foods), it may be unclear to a producer whether a
product derived from numerous sources contains genetically modified content. Thus, any successful
labeling system may require an extensive and expensive monitoring system.
In part to promote transparency, parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity negotiated
over the course of five years and then adopted on January 29, 2000, the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety (Biosafety Protocol).100 The Biosafety Protocol consists of 40 articles and three annexes, and
is an important achievement in many respects. As a general matter, it creates an international framework
for addressing the environmental risks and effects of some genetically modified products, setting as its
objective contributing
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For instance, many of the grain elevators and other storage depots used in the United States
do not have multiple bins, nor the necessary capacity to segregate engineered and non-engineered
varieties. See Rick Weiss, Food War Claims Its Casualties, WASH . POST, Sept. 12, 1999, at A1.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted Jan.
29, 2000, Montreal <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/protocol/html> [hereinafter “Cartagena Protocol”].
As of October 2000, 75 states and the EU have signed the Protocol. The convention must be ratified
by 50 states before it will enter into force, a process expected to take about two years. See SixtySeven Nations, EU Sign Protocol on Biosafety to U.N. Biodiversity Treaty, 23 Int’l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) 441 (June 7, 2000). The Convention on Biological Diversity had called upon the Parties to
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consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate procedures, including,
in particular, advance informed agreement, in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of
any living modified organism resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 19(3), at 830.
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to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field the safe transfer, handling and use of
living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to
human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary movements.105

Specifically, the Protocol allows trade in genetically modified products to proceed essentially
unhindered, subject to two conditions. First, living modified organisms (LMOs) shipped in bulk as
commodities (e.g., soy or corn) and that are intended to be used as food, feed, or for processing must
be accompanied by documentation stating that such shipments “may contain” LMOs and are not
intended for intentional introduction into the environment. Shipments of LMOs destined for “contained
use” (e.g., in a laboratory) or for intentional introduction into the environment (e.g., microorganisms for
bio-remediation, seeds for planting or live fish for release into lakes) must be accompanied by
documentation clearly identifying them as such.106
Second, for exports of LMOs that are intended to be introduced into the environment of the
importing state, the exporter must also provide detailed information to the importing state in advance of
the first shipment, after which the importing state must acknowledge receipt and then provide or deny
authorization for the shipment (this is known as the “advanced informed agreement” procedure).107 If
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Cartagena Protocol, art. 1.
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Id., art. 18(2).

Id., arts. 7-10. The minimum information that the exporter or exporting state must provide is
set forth in Annex I.
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authorized, subsequent shipments of the same type of LMOs need not seek authorization, at least until
such time as there is a change in the importing state’s consent. In what may prove to be its most
important legacy, the Protocol further requires the state of import, in deciding whether to authorize the
shipment, to undertake “in a scientifically sound manner” a risk assessment “to identify and evaluate the
possible adverse effects of living modified organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health.”108 To that end, the importing state is
obliged (or is obliged to require the exporter) to conduct a risk assessment based on certain general
principles and methodological steps set forth in the Protocol before authorizing or denying the import
and, if authorized, thereafter engage in risk management.109 The Protocol also establishes an Internetbased “Biosafety Clearing-House,” intended to assist states in the exchange of scientific, technical,
environmental, and legal information about LMOs.110
The Protocol has its limitations. The Protocol only covers living modified organisms111 and is
concerned only with their effects on conservation of biological diversity. Efforts to regulate other
genetically modified products, such as inanimate foodstuffs (e.g., cookies made from genetically
modified grain) and other products (e.g., blue jeans made from genetically modified cotton), were
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Id., arts. 10(1) & 15(1).
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Id., arts. 15-16 & annex III.

Id. art. 20. There already exists a Biodiversity Convention Clearing-House Mechanism,
containing links to several thousand Internet pages and documents on biological diversity, located at
<http//www.biodiv.org/chm>.
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A living modified organism is defined as any biological entity capable of transferring or
replicating genetic material—including sterile organisms, viruses and viroids—that possesses a novel
combination of genetic material obtained through the use of modern technology. Id., art. 3(g)&(h).
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turned back on the grounds that the Protocol was to focus on the protection of biological diversity,
taking into account human health, rather than encompass an exhaustive range of matters, spanning
paper goods, textiles, and food safety. Further, all pharmaceuticals are excluded from coverage,112
while other applications in the medical field also fall outside the scope of the Protocol. Even with
respect to LMOs, the advanced informed agreement procedure only applies to LMOs intended for
introduction into the environment of the importing state; it does not cover LMOs (live fish or seeds)
intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, although there are no controls on how the
products are in fact used by the importer. The Protocol does not require importing state consent for
bulk shipments of LMOs not intended for “introduction into the environment.” Such shipments need not
be segregated from non-LMOs and need not contain any consumer product labeling; they need only be
accompanied by the shipping documentation mentioned above. Further, the advanced informed
agreement procedure does not apply with respect to states that are being transited.113 Thus, while the
Biosafety Protocol is a tremendous step forward in creating transparency for the highest risk category
of biotechnology exports—LMOs specifically intended to be introduced into the environment—looking
at the issue of transnational biotechnology as a whole, there are considerable gaps in its coverage.
As was the case in the prior sub-section, there are various state and non-state actors concerned
about the level of transparency regarding exports of genetically modified products. Here, the divide is
less “North/South” oriented; instead, Europe is leading the way in creating mandatory labeling schemes.
In Europe, consumer groups find common cause with developing states, relief organizations, and other
112

Id., art. 5.
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Id., art. 6.
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activists in seeking greater controls over biotechnology companies, albeit for different reasons.
Biotechnology companies and exporters of genetically modified products would rather avoid such
labeling schemes, but have incentives to cooperate if the scheme is feasible economically and necessary
in order to market their products.
One central uncertainty about such schemes is their relationship to treaties obliging free trade.
For instance, the Protocol provides that a state may prohibit the import of a LMO that is intended for
introduction into the environment,114 and make “take a decision on” (presumably either to permit or to
prohibit) the import of LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing under its
national regulatory framework.115 Further, the Protocol provides that decisions shall not be prevented
by a “[l]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge
regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import.”116 On the other hand, the Protocol
provides that each state’s right to regulate the import of LMOs is subject to existing international
obligations, which includes those arising under World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. In
fiercely negotiated preambular language, the Protocol provides that the provisions of the Protocol and
of WTO agreements are to be “mutually supportive,” that the “Protocol shall not be interpreted as
implying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing agreements,” while at the
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Id., art. 10(3)(b).
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Id., art. 11(4).

Id., arts. 10(6) & 11(8). For other references to precaution, see Biosafety Protocol, pmbl.
cl. 4; art. 1; annex III, para. 6. On the precautionary principle, see infra note 150.
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same time such statements are “not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international
agreements.”117 The Protocol thus leaves unclear the relationship between the standards set in the
Biosafety Protocol and, to the extent that they may differ, the standards that would otherwise operate
under trade agreements. The concern with such import bans is addressed in the next sub-section.

Import Bans on Genetically Modified Products

Perhaps the most notorious contemporary concern about transnational biotechnology is
whether states may ban or restrict imports of genetically modified products for reasons of human health,
environmental protection, or consumer preferences. Biotechnology exporting states charge that such
bans or restrictions are inconsistent with obligations imposed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade118 and associated agreements, including the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures119 and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.120 The prospects for
117

Cartegena Protocol, pmbl.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. Relevant GATT obligations include the most-favored nation
principle (calling for non-discrimination against imported goods on the basis of their national origin), the
national treatment principle (calling for non-discrimination between foreign and domestic goods), and
the prohibition on quantitative restrictions for imports or exports.
The GATT has been amended several times, most recently as part of the Uruguay Round, and
is now known as GATT 1994. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994). For U.S. implementing legislation, see
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
118
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Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. ___;
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numerous trade disputes in this area are readily apparent from the current impasse between the United
States and the EU concerning genetically engineered products.
Europeans during the 1990's developed strong concerns about the health effects of imported
food, driven largely by the outbreak of “mad cow disease,”121 and those concerns apply equally to
genetically modified products.122 Although until 1998, the European Union approved the imports of

33 I.L.M. ____ (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. Under this agreement, a member state has the
right to take necessary sanitary measures (i.e., measures protecting human or animal health) or
phytosanitary measures (i.e., measures protecting plant life or health) within its territory that affect trade,
but only if they are “based on scientific principles, . . . and not maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence” (art. 2(2)). Moreover, members must “take into account the objective of minimizing negative
trade effects” (art. 5(4)) and must “avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers
to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade” (art. 5(5)).
120

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. ___; 33 I.L.M. ____ (1994)
[hereinafter TBT Agreement]. Under this agreement, states agree not to create unnecessary barriers to
international trade, or to unjustifiably or arbitrarily discriminate against imports, through their packaging,
marketing, and labeling requirements. A key question that often arises is whether a new regulation is
substantially equivalent to that imposed by other states in the objective it seeks, even if by different
means.
Thus, while the SPS Agreement covers trade barriers to genetically modified products that
were enacted for sanitary or phytosanitary purposes, the TBT agreement covers any such barriers that
were not enacted for those purposes.
121

The European Union in 1996 imposed a ban on imports of U.K. beef when it became
known that U.K. beef tainted with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (or “mad cow disease”) could
lead to a variant of the fatal Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. That ban was lifted in 1999, but the crisis
contributed to a loss of European confidence in the safety of foreign foods and the ability of
governments to adequately gauge threats to human health. European states have no analogue to the
U.S. FDA, although the European Commission has proposed the creation of an all-European food
safety agency, consisting of a small advisory body of scientists. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Europe
Plans Advisory Unit on Food Safety, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 13, 2000, at A16.
122

The aversion in Europe is not just to foreign grown genetically modified products, but to
European grown as well. See, e.g., Rick Weiss, In Europe, Cuisine du Gene Gets a Vehement
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some genetically modified crops under its Directive 90/220,123 beginning in March 1998 the European
Union suspended any further approvals. Upon the release of a study indicating that pollen from Bt corn
was a potential threat to monarch butterflies,124 the European Commission on May 20, 1999, froze the
EU approval process for Pioneer Hi-bred’s genetically modified corn seed, even though EU scientists
Thumbs Down, WASH . POST, Apr. 24, 1999, at A1.
See Council Directive 90/220 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically
Modified Organisms, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15; see also Council Directive 90/219 on Contained Use of
Genetically Modified Micro-Organisms, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 1, as amended, Council Directive 98/81,
1998 O.J. (L 330) 13 (relating to the use of microbes in closed systems, such as research centers or
laboratories). Under Directive 90/220, to obtain approval for the release of a genetically modified
organism into the environment (i.e., before being placed on the market in the EU or made available for
incorporation into a product), the manufacturer or importer must submit a notification to the competent
authority of the member state where the product will be placed on the market, providing details on the
organism, the conditions and environment in which the release will take place, and an assessment of the
possible hazards for human health and the environment. The application is then reviewed by scientists
and by regulatory officials of the member state. After consultation by the member state with the EU
Commission and other member states, a written consent is issued by the EU Commission and affected
member states. Although the directive sets minimum standards, each individual member state must enact
its own law that implements the directive. If the regulatory officials do not agree that a genetically
modified organism product should be approved, the matter is sent to the EU Council of Environment
Ministers for approval. It is this final step that was suspended in 1998.
Directive 90/220 establishes the legislative framework for handling living genetically modified
products, but does not itself apply to processed or derived products. The directive provides for the
development of sectoral legislation concerning novel food types, in the anticipation that such legislation
would be adopted as the technology advances. Such sectoral legislation was introduced in 1997,
covering foods and food ingredients not previously used for human consumption “to a significant degree
within the Community.” See Council/Parliament Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 1. That directive
requires that foods be subjected to a full safety assessment before being placed on the market, as well
as compulsory labeling, as noted supra note 96.
The legal basis of the EU to enact environmental legislation arises from Articles 130(r)-(t) of the
Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) (amending the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3). It should be noted that Article 130(t) provides that
member states may maintain or introduce their own protective measures so long as they are compatible
with the EU constituent treaties.
123
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See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
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had already approved of the seed as posing no threat to human health or the environment.125 Then, on
June 25, 1999, the EU Council of Environment Ministers in essence ruled out the approval of any new
genetically modified organism applications until a revised version of Directive 90/220 was approved by
the European Parliament and implemented by the 15 member states.126 Consequently, the sixteen
genetically modified products already approved for production within and export to the European
Union may continue, while those not approved are banned, including where the genetically modified
product is mixed with non-modified products. Already, the volume of U.S. corn exports to the
European Union has fallen dramatically (by more than 90 percent in 1998).127 Further, the European
labeling scheme described in the previous sub-section is viewed by some as a non-tariff barrier,
designed to protect EU producers from lower-priced, genetically modified U.S. products.128
Is the heart of the U.S.-EU dispute old-fashioned protectionism (or anti-Americanism), with
European farmers and other producers seeking to maintain traditional forms of production in the face of
new and threatening U.S. technologies? Or does the dispute highlight differences in attitudes toward

See Commission to Halt Approval Process for Bt Maize Seed in Light of New Study,
22 Int’l Env’t Rep. (BNA) 436 (May 26, 1999). The EU did not, however, take any action against two
other Bt corn seeds that had already been approved, those engineered by Novartis and Monsanto.
125

See EU Environment Ministers Strengthen De Facto Ban on GMOs; WTO Fight
Looms, 22 Int’l Env’t Rep. (BNA) 567 (July 7, 1999).
126

See Nicole Ballenger et al., Biotechnology Implications for U.S. Corn and Soybean
Trade, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Apr. 2000, at 24, 24-25,
<usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/erssor/economics/ao-bb/2000/ao270.pdf>.
127

See John Stephen Fredland, Note, Unlabel Their Frankenstein Foods!: Evaluating a
U.S. Challenge to the European Commission’s Labeling Requirements for Food Products
Containing Genetically-Modified Organisms, 33 VAND . J. TRANSNAT’L L. 183 (2000).
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health and environmental concerns of U.S. and European consumers?129 In either event, reconciling
these differences may prove difficult under existing international trade agreements and seem likely to
lead to a “train wreck” in the not too distant future absent better structures for dealing with them. 130
An example of the manner in which future disputes will arise over genetically modified products
may be seen in the recent dispute over U.S. exports of beef from cattle treated with genetically
engineered growth hormones.131 On April 29, 1996, the European Union decided to maintain a ban
first enacted in the late 1980's on the import of meat derived from cattle treated with certain growth-
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Factors found to influence consumer attitudes toward biotechnology include: consumers’
philosophies, values, and ethics; their understanding of objective information pertaining to biotechnology
and genetic engineering; their trust of specific information sources, such as information received from
their government; nationality; and other socio-demographic variables. See Lee, supra note 68, at 63
(“Many consumers have a general, though often ill-defined and difficult to articulate, set of concerns that
relate to processes and products which defy easy or intuitive understanding.”); Thomas J. Hoban,
Consumer Acceptance of Biotechnology: An International Perspective, 15 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 232 (1997). Some commentators have noted that Europeans are less urban in their
lifestyles and thus more closely tied to the agricultural environment, are more interested in quality than
quantity, and are more sensitive to environmental problems caused by one state against another, such as
the pollution of the Rhine River. See Martin Kettle, A World of Difference, WASH . POST, Aug. 8,
1999, at B1.
130

The timing of such a train wreck is unclear. Trade disputes of the future in this area “are
likely to arise out of the unique concentration and strategic outlook of various corporate interests
engaged in national and international commerce.” See Pepa, supra note 49, at 416. In part to head off
such trade disputes, the OECD in 1995 established a working group on harmonization of regulatory
oversight in biotechnology. See OECD, Report of the Working Group on Harmonisation of
Regulatory Oversight in Biotechnology, OECD Doc. C(2000)86/ADD2 at 6 (May 25, 2000).
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The cows themselves are not genetically engineered; rather, they are exposed to a
genetically engineered hormone for purposes of accelerating and enhancing their growth. See supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
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promoting hormones.132 Canada and the United States challenged the import ban as a violation of the
European Union’s obligations as a member of the WTO.133 On August 18, 1997, a WTO dispute panel
found that the ban violated provisions of the SPS Agreement and therefore should be lifted.134 On
January 16, 1998, the WTO Appellate Body affirmed these findings, concluding that the risk
assessments that had been performed did not support the ban on imports.135
Since the parties could not agree on a deadline for EU compliance, an arbitrator was
appointed, who decided that the European Union must comply by May 13, 1999.136 The European
Union failed to lift the import restrictions by that date, so Canada and the United States requested the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body to authorize suspension of the application to the European Union and
its member states of Canadian and U.S. tariff concessions and related obligations, in an amount of $202

See Council Directive 96/22 Concerning the Prohibition on the Use in Stockfarming of
Certain Substances Having a Hormonal or Thyrostatic Action and of Beta-Antagoists, and Repealing
Directives 81/602/EEC, 88/146/EEC and 88/299EEC, 1996 O.J. (L 125) 3. For background on this
dispute, see Implementation of WTO Recommendations Concerning EC–Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), 64 Fed. Reg. 14,486 (1999).
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63% of all cattle and 90% of feed cattle in the United States are treated with growth
hormones. See Elizabeth Olson, $253 Million Sanctions Sought in Beef Fight With Europe, N.Y.
TIMES , June 4, 1999, at C4.
See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Docs.
WT/DS26/R/USA & WT/DS/48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) at para. 9.1
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See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (AB-1997-4) WTO
Docs. WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); David A. Wirth, International Decisions,
92 AM . J. INT ’L L. 755 (1998); Dale E. McNiel, The First Case Under the WTO's Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement: The European Union's Hormone Ban, 39 VA . J. INT'L L. 89 (1998).
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See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)—Arbitration Under
21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO
Docs. WT/DS26/15 & WT/DS48/13 (May 29, 1998) at para. 48.
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million for the United States and $51 million for Canada.137 The European Union contested the amount
of the U.S. request, so the matter was referred to arbitration by the original dispute resolution panel,
which issued a decision on July 12, 1999.138 The panel found that the EU’s ban on hormone-treated
beef resulted in annual U.S. beef export losses of $116.8 million, and that the United States and
Canada were entitled to $125 million in sanctions against the European Union.139 Therefore, effective
July 29, 1999, the United States imposed one-hundred percent tariffs on a range of foodstuffs from the
European Union.140
The Beef Hormones case not only illustrates the manner in which a dispute over exports of
genetically modified products might unfold, but also certain shortcomings in the existing global trade
regime for handling disputes over such exports. States and private actors concerned with exports of
genetically modified products likely will find that the values embedded in national standards that restrict
the imports of genetically modified products are anathema to the trade-oriented values embedded in the
GATT regime.141 While the GATT has always contained exceptions allowing states considerable
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See Olson, supra note 133.

See Elizabeth Olson, U.S. and Canada Get $125 Million Ruling on Europe Beef Ban,
N.Y. TIMES , July 13, 1999, at C4.
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See European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones)—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
WTO Docs. WT/DS26/ARB & WT/DS48/ARB (July 12, 1999).
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See Paul Blustein, Europe Hit By Tariffs In Battle Over Beef, WASH . POST, July 20,
1999, at E1.
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On the need to strike a balance between trade and non-trade values, see Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and the Protection of the Environment, 86 AM . J. INT ’L L.
700 (1992).
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regulatory discretion on matters relating to health and the environment, the widespread perception
outside the trade community is that GATT panels have struck a balance strongly favoring trade over
non-trade values.142 If EU laws or regulations banning imports of genetically modified products are
challenged on grounds that they purport to be a “sanitary” measure but are not scientifically justified,143

142

Article XX of the GATT 1994 provides exemptions, including for measures “necessary to
protect human, animal, or plant life or health” and for measures “relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption.” So far, these exceptions have been narrowly construed by
GATT dispute resolution panels. See, e.g., United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT,
B.I.S.D., 39th Supp. 155 (1993), 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991); United States—Restrictions on Imports
of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS29/AB/R (1994), 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994); United States—Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, GATT Doc. DS58/AB/R (1998), 38 I.L.M.
118 (1999). The first WTO panel to uphold a trade-restrictive measure under Article XX involved a
1996 French ban on imports of chrysotile (or white) asbestos from Canada. European
Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS/135/R (2000). Even here, certain environmental groups criticized the panel’s reasoning, which
found in the first instance that France had violated the national treatment principle because the asbestos
was “like”domestically produced, non-toxic substitutes. For environmental groups, asbestos is not
“like” a non-toxic substitute, and thus France should not have had to justify its action on the basis of
Article XX. See Environmental Groups Criticize WTO Ruling on Asbestos Ban, 17 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1432 (Sept. 21, 2000).
See generally Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in the
WTO: Lessons and Future Directions, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 81 (2000). Alternatively, a challenge
might arise under the TBT Agreement. For instance, if a law or regulation requiring labeling of
genetically modified products was enacted not to protect human health but, rather, purportedly to
inform consumers, it might be challenged on grounds that the law or regulation is really a disguised
means of protecting a national industry that is incapable of competing with foreign genetically modified
products. If so, the state imposing the ban would need to show that the labeling requirement meets
international standards or, if it exceeds them, that those standards “would be an ineffective or
inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued.” TBT Agreement, art. 2.42.5.
A further challenge might arise if a state refuses to allow imports of genetically modified
products not just for health, environmental, or consumer reasons but, rather, to prevent potential harm
to the state’s culture or economy (a matter that arose during the negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol,
but that was left unaddressed).
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it seems likely that the challenge would succeed. WTO rules ultimately would place the burden of proof
on the EU either to show either that its import restriction was consistent with international standards144
or to present scientific evidence that genetically modified products are unsafe. None of the relevant
existing international standards would support such an import ban, such as the food safety and pesticide
residue standards set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission,145 the animal health standards set by the
International Office of Epizootics,146 the plant health standards set by organizations operating within the
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The Codex Commission is a subsidiary body of the FAO and the WHO created in 1962,
with currently more than 160 member states. The Codex Alimentarius contains some 200 food
commodity standards, 45 codes of practice on hygiene and technology, 700 food additive evaluations,
and more than 3,200 limits for pesticide residues. The Codex Commission meets regularly and takes
decisions by consensus. Although those decisions serve only as recommendations (they are not
binding), the WTO agreements use them as reference standards when considering the permissibility of a
national law or regulation. See ROGER W. MILLER, THIS IS CODEX ALIMENTARIUS (1993); Lewis
Rosman, Note, Public Participation in International Pesticide Regulation: When the Codex
Commission Decides, Who Will Listen? 12 VA . ENVTL. L.J. 329 (1993); see also GA Res. 39/248
(Apr. 16, 1985) (adopting guidelines for consumer protection). A Codex committee on food labeling is
current working on a standard for labeling proposals for foods derived from biotechnology. See Codex
Committee on Food Labeling to Spend Year Developing GMO Proposals, 17 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 827 (2000).
NAFTA states are also expected to use international standards, such as the Codex standards,
as a guideline when considering compatibility of a national law or regulation under the NAFTA. See
North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-U.S.-Mex., entered into force Jan. 1, 1994, arts. 712713, 32 I.L.M. 289, 368-82.
See International Agreement for the Creation at Paris of an International Office for
Epizootics, Jan. 25, 1924, 26 U.S.T. 1840, 57 L.N.T.S. 135. The Office was established to track and
study animal diseases and harmonize international regulation related thereto. Like the standards set by
the Codex, the standards set by the Office are supposed to foster international harmonization in sanitary
measures, so as to prevent their use as unjustified barriers to trade.
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framework of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC),147 or other international
standards.148. An EU measure in excess of such international standards must be scientifically justified,
meaning that, after analyzing available scientific data, the EU must determine that the international
standard is insufficient to attain its “appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.”149 Until
See International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), Dec. 6, 1951, 150 U.N.T.S. 67
(revised Nov. 28, 1979). Administered by the FAO, the IPPC was established to address international
control of pests and diseases affecting plants and products generated from plants. The IPPC calls for
phytosanitary measures to be based on a pest risk analysis, which covers both economic and
environmental factors, including possible detrimental effects on natural vegetation. The IPPC also
provides for the prohibition or restriction of the transboundary movement of biological control agents
and other organisms of phytosanitary concern. Thus, any genetically modified organism that could be
considered a pest of plants falls within the scope of the IPPC.
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An influential standard-setting entity is the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO). The ISO—a non-governmental organization established in 1947 and based in Geneva—is a
worldwide federation of the national standards bodies from some 130 countries. The mission of ISO is
to promote the development of standardization and related activities in the world with a view to
facilitating the international exchange of goods and services, and to developing cooperation in the
spheres of intellectual, scientific, technological and economic activity. ISO's work results in transnational
agreements within the business community, which are published as “International Standards.” For
instance, tens of thousands of businesses are implementing “ISO 9000,” which provides a framework
for quality management and quality assurance. The “ISO 14000" series provides a similar framework
for environmental management. See generally W.M. VON ZHAREN , ISO 14000: UNDERSTANDING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS (1996); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The
International Organization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the
Environment, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479 (1995). For the ISO’s Internet site, see <http://www.iso.ch>.
On the emergence of standards in the field of international environmental law, see PETER H. SAND ,
TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LA W : LESSONS IN GLOBAL CHANGE 11-41 (1999).
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Standards to Protect the Local Environment—the GATT and the Uruguay Round Sanitary and
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such time as states reach a consensus on the risks of genetically modified products, EU states have no
scientific basis for arguing that genetically modified products are unsafe. Rather, they are left arguing on
the basis of consumer preferences or on more heightened risk standards that may exist in customary
international law or general principles of law,150 which are not adequate independent grounds under
WTO rules.151 In the end, some states, and consumer and environmental groups, will see themselves as
dominated by an institution and rules that is intolerant to their more risk-adverse concerns. More
National Standards Under WTO Law, 8 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 137 (1999).
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For instance, various formulations of the precautionary “principle” or “approach” may be
found in other international instruments, such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1
(1992), 31 I.L.M. 876 (1992), although there appears no universally agreed formulation as to its
import. See INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Timothy O’Riordan & James Cameron
eds., 1994); James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental
Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT ’L &
COMP. L. Rev. 1 (1991); Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53
WASH . & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996); Pascale Martin-Bidou, Le principe de précaution en droit
international de l’environnement, 103 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 631
(1999). On its application in the WTO and NAFTA, see David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the
Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT ’L L.J. 817, 840 (1994).
To argue both sides of such a challenge, one might try to extract a variety of relevant
“principles” from existing international agreements. See Peter Drahos, Genetically Modified
Organisms and Biosafety: The Global Regulatory Issues, BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 40, 47-48
(1999/2000) (citing to “principles” of “risk assessment,” “information exchange,” “familiarity or
substantial equivalence,” “non-discrimination,” “harmonization,” “private property,” “informed consent,”
“benefit sharing,” and “labeling”).
For instance, in the Beef Hormones case, the appellate body affirmed the panel’s
conclusion that the SPS Agreement already incorporated the precautionary principle, such that it could
not be raised by the European Union as an independent legal argument separate from the SPS
Agreement. See Appellate Report, supra note 135, at para. 253(c); Panel Report, supra note 134, at
para. 8.249. The appellate body found that the precautionary principle is reflected in some provisions
of the SPS Agreement, but that “the principle has not been written into the SPS Agreement as a ground
for justifying SPS measures that are otherwise inconsistent with the obligations of Members set out in
particular provisions of the Agreement.” Appellate Report, supra note 135, at para. 124.
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broadly, it seems that the post-Cold War rush towards economic globalism, paired with the 1994
expansion of trade agreements into non-traditional areas such as intellectual property; services,
investment, has exceeded the means by which global politics can keep pace. As such. various state and
non-state actors perceive that the excesses of global trade are unchecked, thus leading to demands for
greater transparency and inclusion in WTO processes. Absent new means to defuse such perceptions,
they might ultimately destablilize the trade regime itself. Efforts by the WTO to launch a “millennium”
round of trade talks in Seattle collapsed in December 1999 amidst concerns of this nature, even though
one of the objectives of the Clinton Administration was to make the WTO more open and responsive
to environmental, labor, and consumer concerns.152
Further, the global trade regime may have difficulties coping with export bans on genetically
modified products due to conflicts with norms embedded in other treaty instruments. For instance, as
noted at the end of the last sub-section, the inter-relationship between the Biosafety Protocol and the
GATT and its associated instruments is unclear. If the United States challenged an EU import ban on
genetically modified products, the EU might respond that its import ban is based on a risk assessment
that conforms with the Biosafety Protocol. A WTO panel confronted such a case might regard the

See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 93 AM . J. INT ’L L. 491 (1999). The collapse was presaged by a week of protests
in Seattle against the WTO, principally by environmental, labor, consumer, and public interest groups,
interspersed with riots by various factions. Environmental groups accused the WTO of ignoring the
environmental impact of its decisions, such as the decision calling upon the United States to amend its
import ban on shrimp caught with nets harmful to sea turtles. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 AM . J. INT ’L L. 375 (2000). For a
somewhat polemical but nonetheless engaging treatment of the environmental, labor, and consumer
concerns with the WTO, see LORI WALLACH & MICHELLE SFORZA , WHOSE TRADE
ORGANIZATION?: CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY (1999).
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Protocol as essentially a global standard that LMOs are particularly dangerous, that scientific certainty
of potentially adverse effects from LMOs is not necessary, and that therefore states have great
discretion in erecting national trade restrictions preventing or minimizing imports of LMOs. However,
the panel would have to confront the fact that the United States is not a party to the Biosafety Protocol
in considering whether the standards it sets are appropriate for the dispute.153 Further, in assessing the
exact risk assessment undertaken to support the EU import restriction, the panel might find that the
standard of risk assessment used under the Protocol differs from that called for under a different treaty
regime, such as the IPPC (to which the United States is a party).154 The thrust of the risk assessment
under the IPPC is relatively narrowly in that it is designed to ensure the protection of plants, while the
thrust of the risk assessment under the Biosafety Protocol seems designed to protect biological diversity
generally.
No doubt the contours of these varied treaty obligations will only be developed over time
153

One might argue that the standard set in a global environmental treaty constitutes a
customary rule of international law that is properly used to interpret the GATT even if one of the states
is a non-party to the environmental treaty. See Philippe Sands, Sustainable Development: Treaty,
Custom, and the Cross-Fertilization of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 39 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone eds., 1999). On the other hand,
traditional interpretation of customary international law allows for a state to claim the status of a
persistent objector to an emerging customary rule, such that a WTO panel would need to decide
whether failing to ratify the Protocol constitutes an implicit rejection of the emerging standard. Compare
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LA W 10 (4th ed. 1990) (noting the strength
of the persistent objector rule), with Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the
Development of Customary International Law, 1985 BRIT . Y.B. INT ’L L. 1 (doubting the efficacy of
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See John H. Barton, Biotechnology, the Environment, and International Agricultural
Trade, 9 GEO . INT ’L ENVTL. L. REV. 95, 113-14 (1996).
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through repeated interactions among states (and other actors) as particular cases arise, with
considerable cross-fertilization among a panoply of existing regulatory regimes. The WTO dispute
resolution process can usefully contribute to this development, but there are reasons to doubt whether it
alone can handle the task. One might debate whether panel decisions handed down on a case-by-case
basis are suitable for filling in the gaps of WTO agreements.155 Yet the problems noted above go
beyond even such gap-filling; they relate to conflicts with agreements outside the traditional realm of the
WTO, and involving constituencies who do not view the WTO as the appropriate body for resolving
the conflicts. Moreover, even states and other actors favoring trade in genetically modified products
may find the WTO process unsatisfactory given the difficulty of even successful complainants (at least in
the Beef Hormones case) in obtaining compliance from the importing states. If so, such states might
begin resorting to aggressive unilateral sanctions, which may coerce compliance with WTO rules, or
may just make matters worse.156
Compare JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO 187 (2000)
(doubting the gap-filling ability of the dispute resolution process), with Raj Bhala, The Precedent
Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication, 9 FLA . ST . U.L. REV. 1 (1999) (noting the
emergence of a procedural and substantive common law from WTO adjudication).
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Under U.S. Trade Act of 1974 §301, 19 U.S.C. §2411 (1994), the U.S. Trade
Representative can investigate alleged unjustifiable or unreasonable trade practices of other states and
impose unilateral sanctions if the allegations are correct. The EU challenged the existence of this
“Section 301” procedure as a violation of Articles 3, 21, 22, and 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding. See United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc.
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). The panel found that the language of Section 301 on its face is
inconsistent with the United States’ WTO obligations. However, the panel concluded that Section 301
provides USTR with adequate discretion to comply with WTO rules in all cases. Further, assurances
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panel, as well as in the U.S. adherence to WTO instruments. In particular, the panel noted the
statements made in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Action, which
was submitted by the President to the Congress on September 27, 1988, and approved as part of the
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A further problem for the WTO regime is its tendency to view trade problems as bilateral in
nature and as soluble through dispute proceedings controlled by states. Yet potential trade bans relating
to genetically modified products have wide-ranging ramifications for different groups of states and
involving trade in a variety of directions and affecting a variety of actors. Thus, the potential for trade
disruptions in this area is by no means limited to trade between the United States and Europe.
Monsanto’s effort to sell genetically modified, herbicide-resistant soy seeds through its subsidiary in
Brazil were blocked due to protests from environmental groups.157 Major Japanese and Mexican
companies have announced that they will no longer import genetically modified grain for their products
(such as beer and corn tortillas).158 Public protests have occurred around the world, including in places
as diverse as New Zealand and South Korea.159 This backlash, in turn, has discouraged some U.S.
farmers from investing further in genetically modified crops and to consider ways of segregating
genetically modified crops from conventional crops.160 Yet the backlash is not uniform among citizens in
different states. Environics, a Toronto-based public environmental policy firm, surveyed citizen
reactions in 25 developed and developing states and found favorable attitudes toward genetically
modified products in several of them, at least when the questions concerned the use of biotechnology to

Uruguay Round Agreements Act. See 19 U.S.C. §3511(a) (1994).
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grow pest-resistant crops that require less farm chemicals or to develop new medicines and treatments
for human diseases.161
Indeed, there is an important link between the concern with trade bans and the concern
discussed above regarding equitable sharing of the benefits of biotechnology applications with the
developing world. If a backlash largely among developed states leads to severe restrictions on trade of
genetically modified products, it will affect developing states even if, in their view, the risks are worth
the benefits. As the Nigerian Minister of Agricultural and Rule Development has noted:

It is possible to kill someone with kindness, literally. That could be the result of the wellmeaning but extremely misguided attempts by European and North American groups that are
advising Africans to be wary of agricultural biotechnology. They claim to have the environment
and public health at the core of their opposition, but scientific evidence disproves their claims
that enhanced crops are anything but safe. If we take their alarmist warnings to heart, millions of
Africans will suffer and possibly die.

....

To deny desperate, hungry people the means to control their futures by presuming to
know what is best for them is not only paternalistic but morally wrong. Certainly, those with
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fertile lands and an abundance of food have every right to decide how they would like to grow
their crops and process their foods. Organic farming, sophisticated methods of distributing food
and other approaches are well and good for those who can afford to experiment. Starving
people do not have this luxury. They want food and nourishment, not lectures . . . .162

At the same time, one can imagine reasons why developing states might ultimately resist imports
of genetically modified products, for reasons having nothing to do with human health or the
environment. For instance, there were severely adverse consequences for the developing world from
the so-called “green revolution” of past decades,163 involving rapid alterations in farming practice and
profitability due to the advent of new crop varieties, pesticides, and herbicides that increased crop
yields. A biotechnology revolution for developing states may well bring more of the same, running more
small farmers out of business and shifting rural populations to already crowded cities. If so, there may
be pressures upon those states to restrict imports of genetically engineered products.
The trade issue also is not limited to exports from developed states to the developing world.
Advances in biotechnology may increase the ability of developing states to generate products for

Hassan Adamu, Editorial, We’ll Feed Our People As We See Fit, WASH . POST, Sept. 11,
2000, at A23; see also Gregg Easterbrook, Editorial, Food for the Future, N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 19,
1999, at A31; Paarlberg, supra note 57, at 30 (“[T]he most important stakeholders in the fight over
GM foods have not been heard. It is among poor farmers and poor consumers in developing countries
that the potential gains from this technology are most significant.”).
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export, an outcome that would be inhibited by trade bans.164 Yet, even here, there may be perils for the
developing world from the biotechnology revolution.165 The primary concern of developing states
regarding biotechnology is probably not related to human health or the environment but, rather, the
potential trade shifts due to the development of substitute goods and processes for those in which
developing states currently have a comparative advantage. For example, the development by the United
States of high-fructose corn syrup in the 1970s led to a radical decline in U.S. sugar imports from
developing states.166
Thus, the law and processes available in the context of the WTO are useful, but may fall short
in providing a means for comprehensively addressing the range of concerns that arise in the area of
transnational biotechnology. By its nature, the WTO has trouble appealing to non-trade constituencies,
and the transparency and state-oriented nature of its processes for dispute resolution and for
amendment remain problematic. The ability of developing states to participate meaningfully in these
processes is uncertain. The potential for conflicts with other treaty regimes is significant. And perhaps
most important, the increasing complexity of trade concerns—involving various blocs of states and non-
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state actors and trade flows in various directions capable of provoking considerable fear and
insecurity—calls for fresh thinking about transnational structures for incorporating new values into the
global trade regime.

Liability for Damage by Genetically Modified Imports

Implicit in the concerns previously mentioned about biotechnology is the possibility that harm
will occur from a genetically modified product to human health or the environment. When such harm
occurs, should someone be held liable and, if so, who and for what damage? For instance, a U.S.
company engineered soybeans to be more nutritious by using genes from Brazilian nuts, but discovered
prior to marketing that the soybeans were capable of triggering allergic reactions in humans.167 Had the
product been marketed nationally, what liability would ensue and for whom?
The question becomes even more complex when genetically modified products are marketed
worldwide. Although the science of biotechnology is an astounding testament to the creative intelligence
of humanity, there remains an enormous amount of the science that is unknown. Among this is “gene
expression,” or how a particular modified gene in fact will operate when exposed to different
environmental factors. There is an unquantifiable risk of adverse secondary effects on eco-systems,
including damage to non-targeted species, which in turn can cascade to other species. For instance,
scientists at Oregon State University engineered a soil bacterium to produce ethanol, so that the

See J.A. Nordlee et al., Identification of a Brazil-Nut Allergen in Transgenic Soybeans,
334 NEW ENG. J. MED . 726 (1996).
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residues of crops grown in the soil could be used to produce fuel. However, the scientists discovered
that the bacterium killed off fungi that are important for plant nutrient intake, such that if the bacterium
had been released and spread widely, it might have severely harmed plant life.168 While the risk of gene
expression might be handled by careful assessment of the eco-system of a state (or region of a state)
where the genetically modified product is to be released, the ability to manage such risk increases
considerably when organisms are exported globally to numerous different eco-systems.169
Moreover, there is a risk of “gene flow,” whereby the genetically manipulated genes of one
organism (such as a plant) are inadvertently transferred (such as through pollen) to another plant. Gene
flow typically occurs only between closely-related species. Studies in one state showing that gene flow
is unlikely for a particular plant may not be accurate for another state. For instance, while the likelihood
of gene flow in the United States of a genetically manipulated potato may be low since the potato is not
indigenous to North America, the likelihood of gene flow in South America may be much higher, since
that is the environment in which the potato originated and evolved (many crops have a “center of
diversity” where they originally developed or have grown for centuries).170 In other words, the
168
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likelihood of the gene of the genetically manipulated potato transferring to some other organism may be
higher in South America, since there are other, potato-like plants in South America.171 Why should that
matter? In theory, an insect resistant gene in a potato plant in Peru could transfer to some other potatolike plant that is actually an undesirable weed, resulting in massive spreading of that weed due to the
inability of insects to feed upon it.
National authorities are currently grappling with how to handle liability for damage by
genetically modified products.172 Over the course of the next several years, the parties to the
Biodiversity Convention intend to pursue a “process with respect to the elaboration of international
rules and procedures in the field of liability and redress for damage resulting from the transboundary

contrast, Spain is a major centre of natural genetic diversity, with 8,000 plant species of which
3,000 are endemic and with many crop relatives. For Spain, consideration of interpollination
with wild species will be a major factor. For Norway, with strong economic dependence on
native trees, it would be important to ensure that introduction of traits into related tree species
does not adversely influence the long-term reliability of an important natural resource.
OECD, FIELD RELEASES OF TRANSGENIC PLANTS, 1986-92: AN ANALYSIS 24 (1993).
171

See Gates, supra note 165, at 188.

See Richard A. Repp, Comment, Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for Genetically
Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 585 (2000); Celeste Marie Steen,
Note, FIFRA’s Preemption of Common Law Tort Actions Involving Genetically Engineered
Pesticides, 38 ARIZ . L. REV. 763 (1996); Note, Designer Genes that Don’t Fit: A Tort Regime for
Commercial Releases of Genetic Engineering Products, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1086 (1987). The
European Parliament on February 11, 1999, passed new restrictions on the import of genetically
modified organisms, including a demand that exporters take on legal liability for environment-damaging
genetic accidents. The legislation must be passed by the European Council of Ministers before it
becomes law. For a discussion of European liability regimes, as well as an argument that biotechnologyspecific liability rules are not necessary, see Lucas Bergkamp, Allocating Unknown Risk: Liability
for Environmental Damages Caused by Deliberately Released Genetically Modified Organisms
(2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
172

74
movements of living modified organisms.”173 Like the Biosafety Protocol itself, this process will be
limited to adverse effects caused by LMOs. While establishment of rules and procedures through such
a process would be a welcome development, the prospect for successful conclusion of an international
instrument on liability are slight without widespread support not just from biotechnology-importing
states, but from biotechnology exporting states and their companies as well. 174 Many international
agreements contain provisions calling for the development of liability regimes, but so far few regimes
have been developed.175 The regimes that have developed, such as in the context of nuclear energy,
have limited numbers of states as parties.176

173

Biosafety Protocol, art. 25.

174

For a discussion of potential corporate transnational liability, see Stephen Kelly Lewis,
Comment, "Attack of the Killer Tomatoes?" Corporate Liability for the International
Propagation of Genetically Altered Agricultural Products, 10 TRANSNAT'L LA W . 153 (1997).
175

For a recent study of liability for environmental damage under international law by a
respected private association of international law scholars, see Institut de Droit International
Resolution on Responsibility and Liability Under International Law for Environmental Damages,
Sept. 4, 1997, 67:1 ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 347 (1997); see also
Christian von Bar, Environmental Damage in Private International Law, 268 RECUEIL DES COURS
(HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LA W ) 291 (1997); Rüdiger Wolfrum, Means of Ensuring
Compliance with and Enforcement of International Environmental Law, 272 RECUEIL DES COURS
(HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LA W ) 77-100 (1998); Sean D. Murphy, Prospective
Liability Regimes for the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 88 AM . J. INT ’L L. 24
(1994).
176

The nuclear liability regime developed by the OECD currently has 14 parties and does not
include the United States. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29,
1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251, reprinted in 55 AM . J. INT ’L L. 1082 (1960) (subsequently amended). The
nuclear liability regime developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency has 14 parties (several of
which have no nuclear installations) and does not include the United States. Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 727
(subsequently amended). The two regimes were linked in the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application
of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, Sept. 21, 1988, reprinted in 42 NUCLEAR L.

75
There are multiple difficulties unrelated to biotechnology in developing such a legal regime,
covering both procedural issues (such as which courts have jurisdiction over the claims and the parties,
which parties have standing to bring the claims, and whether judgments are enforceable in another
nation’s courts) and substantive issues (such as the burden of proof and limitations on liability). But
there are additional difficulties linked with some of the concerns discussed in prior sub-sections. If a
developing state is entitled to joint benefits when a biotechnology company develops a product using
the genetic resources located in the state, arguably liability should be joint if the product causes damage.
To the extent equitable concerns argue in favor of distributing biotechnology applications on a lowcost/no-cost basis, arguably a biotechnology company should not be liable or should be minimally liable
for ensuing damage. If fully liable, presumably the biotechnology companies will be inhibited from
engaging in altruistic behavior. Moreover, high exposure to liability may inhibit biotechnology companies
from marketing their products in states where profit margins are low, such as in Africa. Further, if the
risk of damage is known, and fully disclosed to an importing state, but the state decides that the risk is
far outweighed by the potential benefits to its economy and people, presumably that is relevant in
considering the liability of the biotechnology company. And if a state refuses to grant intellectual
property protection to a genetically modified product, so that it can be freely reproduced within the
state, but then damage ensues, presumably that too is relevant to any liability of the patent holder. One
must ask whether resolving these complex issues is this best done through a global treaty/protocol,
through national legislation, or through private contracting? Perhaps the only means for successfully
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navigating these issues is to devise new means for achieving a high level of common understanding and
consensus among the relevant actors in the field of transnational biotechnology.

Liability for Extraterritorial Damage by Genetically Modified Products

Once products are genetically modified, they may have adverse effects on the human health or
environment of adjacent states, even if wholly produced and consumed in one state. Concerns about
the emergence of “superweeds” or “superbugs” in the national setting are equally applicable in the
transnational setting, since weeds and bugs do not respect national boundaries. To the extent that
genetically modified animals and plants are released into national environments, it is inevitable that they
will turn up in the territory of adjacent states. Thus, one can imagine that Brazil, which to date has
resisted use of genetically modified crops, could adversely affected by the use of genetically modified
crops in Argentina, which shares a lengthy border with Brazil. Even states distant from the user of
genetically modified products could be affected. For instance, salmon have been genetically engineered
in the laboratory to be about twice as large as regular salmon; once approved for widespread breeding
in the United States or Canada, some scientists fear that engineered salmon will escape from their net
pens causing adverse effects on wild salmon,177 thereby affecting all salmon-harvesting states.

See Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Altered Salmon Leading Way To Dinner Plates, but Rules
Lag, N.Y. TIMES , May 1, 2000, at A1. The adverse effects on wild species could occur if wild females
are attracted to the larger, engineered males but, due to genetic differences, are unable to produce
viable off-spring. See William M. Muir & Richard D. Howard, Possible Ecological Risks of
Transgenic Organism Release When Transgenes Affect Mating Success: Sexual Selection and the
Trojan Gene Hypothesis, 96 PROC. NA T ’L ACAD. SCI. 13,853 (1999) (studying mating and
177
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Genetically modified products might have even more subtle effects on adjacent states.
Laboratory studies conducted at Cornell University indicate that corn crops in the United States
genetically modified to contain Bt might indirectly kill monarch butterflies that migrate from Mexico
through the United States to Canada and back.178 The corn, which is used in about one-fourth of all
U.S. corn crops, has been modified to exude a Bt that kills corn-boring caterpillars. The problem arises
if pollen from the corn drifts by wind onto milkweed plants adjacent to the cornfields. Monarch
butterflies migrating from their winter breeding grounds in Mexico through the primary corn-producing
areas in the U.S. Midwest (Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio), lay their eggs on the milkweed; if the
larvae hatch and begin feeding on the milkweed, the poisonous pollen could kill them. From these
laboratory studies, we do not yet know whether monarch populations in their natural habitat are actually
affected by the toxic pollen,179 yet similar results may occur in places where endangered species are

survivorship in normal and genetically engineered versions of a fish known as a medaka).
See John E. Losey et al., Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, NATURE, May 20,
1999, at 214; but see C.L. Wraight et al., Absence of Toxicity of Bacillus Thuringiensis Pollen to
Black Swallowtails Under Field Conditions, 97 PROC. NA T ’L ACAD. SCI. 7,700 (2000) (field study
finding no adverse affects on butterflies from genetically modified corn pollen); see also Marc Kaufman,
2nd Study Links Gene-Altered Corn, Butterfly Deaths, WASH . POST, Aug. 22, 2000, at A2. For
similar adverse affects of Bt on bees, see M.W. See Ho et al., The Biotechnology Bubble, 28:3
ECOLOGIST 146-153 (1998).
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See Carol Kaesuk Yoon, No Consensus On the Effects Of Altered Corn On Butterflies,
N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 4, 1999, at A15; Rick Weiss, Gene-Altered Corn’s Impact Reassessed, WASH .
POST, Nov. 3, 1999, at A3. Monsanto, the producer of Bt corn, notes that the “natural habitat for
milkweed is prairies, fields, and roadsides, not the middle of full grown and pollinating corn fields” and
thus “the exposure of milkweed to corn pollen is very low.” See Monsanto Press Release on Bt Corn:
Environmental Safety And A Recent Report On The Monarch Butterfly (May 19, 1999),
<http://www.monsanto.com/monsant/mediacenter/background/99may19_Monarch.html>.
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closely associated with agricultural landscapes, such as Europe.180 Thus, while it is not clear to what
extent monarch butterflies are being affected by Bt corn, the possibility of such transboundary harm is
clear.
There are general principles of international law, including international environmental law that,
while recognizing the rights of states to exploit their national resources, call upon states not to allow their
territory to be used for activities that cause damage to the environment of other states.181 While these
principles are useful in framing discussions in any given area of international intercourse, standing alone
they are not sufficient for addressing complex issues of state responsibility for transnational damage
from biotechnology applications. The International Law Commission has for years been trying to
elucidate in greater detail the rules to apply when states cause transboundary damage, either in
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See Weiss, supra note 61 (quoting a University of Minnesota insect ecologist).

See, e.g., Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M.
1416 (1972). Principle 21 provides:
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States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
See also 1992 Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5 (1992), Principle 2 (which adds “and developmental” before “policies”). This
customary rule emerged from various strands of international law, including: the doctrine of sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas (one must use his own so as not to injure others); the doctrine of abuse of
rights; the principle of good neighborliness; the decision of the International Court of Justice in the
Corfu Channel Case, 1949 ICJ REP . 4, 22 (Merits), which notes “every State’s obligation not to
knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states”; and, of course,
the well-known Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1963-66).
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situations where a wrongful act has occurred or where no wrongful act has occurred. So far, those
efforts have not borne fruit.182 Moreover, rather than building liability regimes for compensation ex post
facto, many believe that greater emphasis should be placed on regulating the emission of pollutants ab
initio before they cause damage to adjacent states, as done in most international environmental
agreements.
At present, a similar effort in the field of transnational biotechnology is premature, given the lack
of any strong scientific evidence of transboundary harm to one state of genetically modified products
wholly produced and consumed in an adjacent state. Yet, as was the case for the prior sub-section, to
the extent that such evidence emerges, there may be calls for the development of a legal regime capable
of identifying and addressing the origins of such harm and facilitating the payment of compensation. If
so, consensus among a wide range of potentially affected state and non-state actors will be critical in
developing such a regime.

Long-term Decline in Global Biological Diversity

The fruits of biotechnology are possible because of the wide diversity of the global gene pool.

See Ninth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, II:1 Y.B. INT ’L L. COMM ’N 187 (1993); Alan Boyle,
Codification of International Environmental Law and the International Law Commission:
Injurious Consequences Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 153, at 61, 84 (“It is easier to identify what the ILC has not contributed to the evolution of
international environmental law than what it has.”). For information on the ILC and its work, see
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm>.
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This global biological diversity is already declining at an alarming rate; indeed, agriculture today relies on
just a handful of crops (corn, rice, rye, wheat) concentrated in a relatively small number of varieties.183
In some ways, the biotechnology revolution may slow down the decline in biological diversity.
Insecticides currently sprayed on crops kill many non-targeted, beneficial species. If new
biotechnologies lead to decreased use of such insecticides, those species will be better off. Further, the
single largest threat to biological diversity stems from the conversion of native lands to agricultural use in
order to feed increasing populations.184 Most genetically modified products likely to affect biological
diversity are new crop cultivars designed to sustain or increase yields without expanding the size of
croplands.
The biotechnology revolution, however, may also accelerate the decline of biological diversity.
When large companies such as Monsanto export seeds of a genetically modified plant, such as Bt corn,
the idea is that farmers in the importing state will stop using their traditional crop varieties (referred to as
landraces) in favor of Monsanto’s seeds. In so doing, those native varieties are lost, and along with
them what may be the sole repositories of certain genes.185 Further, the existence of widespread,
genetically uniform crops means they are also uniformly susceptible to the emergence of a new pest or
disease, which can only be combated genetically by modifying the crop through the use of genes from

See Reed Karaim, Variety, the Vanishing Crop, WASH . POST, Apr. 11, 1999, at B1; see
generally CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS AND THE LOSS OF GENETIC
DIVERSITY (1990).
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Approximately five million hectares of forest are lost each year in sub-Saharan Africa,
principally to clearance for low-yield agriculture. See Paarlberg, supra note 57, at 33.
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See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 195, 221 (1989).
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the very landraces and wild varieties that are becoming increasingly less available.186 Loss of this
diversity may decrease the options, particularly in developing states, of maintaining nutritional diets from
wild and domesticated plants.187 This overall tendency is reinforced by strong international intellectual
property protections for genetically modified products yet weak international law protections for
biological diversity.188 While it is possible to store genetic material (germ plasm) in “gene banks,” those
gene banks are frozen in time, and are not readily accessible to traditional innovators (e.g., the farmer in
Ethiopia) for experimentation.
For years, the global community has been concerned with the impact of biotechnology on
biological diversity. The non-legally-binding action plan developed in 1992 at Rio–Agenda 21–contains
a chapter dealing with environmentally sound management of biotechnology189 and the Convention on

See JANE RISSLER & MARGARET MELLON, PERILS AMIDST THE PROMISE: ECOLOGICAL
RISKS OF TRANSGENIC CROPS IN A GLOBAL MARKET 69-71 (1993); JACK DOYLE, ALTERED
HARVEST: AGRICULTURE, GENETICS AND THE FATE OF THE WORLD ’S FOOD SUPPLY (1985).
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187

See HO, supra note 165, at 126-30.

See Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International Intellectual Property
and Environmental Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 76 WASH . U.L.Q. 255, 269
(1998) (“[T]raditional agricultural innovation may be threatened, along with the very biodiversity that it
has helped maintain, by a system of intellectual property protection that tends to reward the
development of new and genetically improved, but highly uniform, and therefore potentially vulnerable,
monocultures.”).
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See Chapter 16 of Agenda 21: Program of Action for Sustainable Development, Rio de
Janeiro, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (3 vols. 1992). That chapter set forth the following goals:
increasing the availability of food, feed and renewable raw materials; improving human health; enhancing
protection of the environment; enhancing safety and developing international mechanisms for
cooperation; and establishing enabling mechanisms for the development and the environmentally sound
application of biotechnology. The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) designated UNIDO
as the task manager for that chapter. For UNIDO’s 1995 review of the progress in implementing the
chapter, see UNIDO, ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND MANAGEMENT OF BIOTECHNOLOGY (1995).
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Biological Diversity focused on this issue as well.190 The most salient provisions of the Convention,
however, simply call upon states “as far as possible and as appropriate” to pursue general measures
concerning conservation of biological diversity. That general guidance is useful, but actual
implementation is left to governments at the national level, where sufficient resources to do so may or
may not exist. For developing states to avoid the long-term decline in biological diversity threatened by
biotechnology, they will have to rely on assistance from various quarters, such as: programs operated
by the Biodiversity Convention on Biological Diversity secretariat; sharing of information by, and
transfers of technology and financial resources from, developed states; and initiatives in the nongovernmental sector (research institutes, environmental groups, and other private sector actors).
Additional transnational structures that help foster and coordinate these disparate forms of assistance to
the developing states, as well as promote assistance from other quarters (such as biotechnology
companies) should be fully considered.

IV. THE JURISGENERATIVE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LA W

The global community would do well to consider whether the current transnational regulatory
structure is adequate for addressing biotechnology concerns and, if not, how to improve it. The
discussion in the prior section reveals diverse regimes containing disparate provisions for addressing the
Chapter 16 of Agenda 21 is on environmentally sound management of biotechnology, but other
chapters are of relevance as well, such as Chapter 15 on the conservation of biological diversity and
Chapters 23-32 on strengthening the role of major non-state actors.
190

See supra note 84.
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principal concerns about biotechnology in the transnational sphere. These provisions range from very
general provisions in the Biodiversity Convention, to more specific provisions directed at particular
conduct in the Biosafety Protocol, to provisions that seek to regulate the application of relevant
intellectual property laws among states, to specific trade provisions plus process-oriented structures for
dispute resolution at the WTO (linked to standard-setting entities such as the Codex Alimentarius).
Global regulatory efforts have addressed some of the concerns about transnational biotechnology, but
they by no means have resolved all these concerns, and it remains unclear whether they have resulted in
a process for the sensible and timely resolution of emergent biotechnology concerns in the future.
Indeed, one might wonder whether existing law could possibly keep pace with the rapid changes in the
field of biotechnology.
Yet there is another dimension of the transnational biotechnology regime that must be
appreciated as well: the “jurisgenerative” nature of international law.191 International law in this area is
not generated solely or even primarily through treaties; rather, it emerges from a more complex system
of law creation, clarification, interpretation, and implementation that can be viewed as involving three
fundamental processes. First, international law is clearly driven in many respects by the self-interest of
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The term “jurisgenerative”—meaning a law-creating process—was coined by Robert Cover
to describe a process in which interpretive communities create and give meaning to the law through their
narratives and precepts. See Robert M. Cover, Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV.
4, 40 (1983). Professor Harold Koh has applied the term to the process of transnational law. See
Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L.
REV. 623, 641 (1998); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?
106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV.
181 (1996). The following analysis has benefitted from Professor Koh’s work on compliance in
international law, in which he has identified categories of interaction, interpretation, and internalization
similar to those used in this article.

84
states. Second, international law develops through the social interaction of state and non-state actors.
Finally, international law is often defined, refined, and made effective upon being grounded in national
law and society. The purpose of this section is to highlight the salient features of each of these lawcreating processes and to relate each to current efforts to regulate biotechnology. By doing so, it is
hoped that the transnational biotechnology regime depicted in Part III will be seen in the context of an
emergent, dynamic interaction among relevant regime actors, which in turn will point the direction for
next steps by the global community, as outlined in Part V.192

International Law as Driven by the Self-Interest of States

International law is clearly driven in many respects by the self-interest of states: two states
seeking peace will both find it in their interests to conclude and maintain a peace treaty viewed by both
as legally binding. Yet our understanding of what it means for a state to act in its “self-interest” must be
a robust one. States have multiple interests in multiple areas, as well as general interests in stability and
efficiency in relations with other states, which can often be met by the creation of wide range of
international rules and institutions that will be adhered to over the long-run, even if short-term gains
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The broad categorizations set forth below cannot possibly capture the sophistication of the
theories or theorists discussed. Indeed, while particular theorists might be placed within a broad
category or school of thinking, upon close reading of their works there is considerable cross-over
among categories. Further, in their works, different theorists focus on different aspects of transnational
law—its sources, its structure, or its ability to compel compliance—making comparisons inexact.
Nevertheless, the following broad groupings are helpful in understanding the contemporary structures
effecting biotechnology in the global arena.
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could be achieved by deviation. Further, states are represented by persons, who by general nature
would rather avoid breaking rules that would lead to condemnation by others. And states are not simply
unitary actors, but actors whose decision-making is in many respects circumscribed by the interests of
non-state actors. International lawyers and political scientists have posited various theories about how
law is generated from the self-interest of states. This section will briefly discuss these theories, with
particular attention to their relevance to transnational biotechnology.
As is well-known, in the post-World War II era, the whole concept of international law (at
least in the United States) came under attack by Cold War realists, who viewed with great doubt, if not
disdain, the idea that global rules could possibly “suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of
governments.”193 For these realists, states inexorably seek to pursue maximization of their power,
security and wealth vis-à-vis other states; they “abide” by international rules that advanced such
interests and ignore those that did not unless faced with military or economic coercion by other, more
powerful states.194 For hardened realists, viewing international law as a set of rules that dictate the
behavior of states is both naive and dangerous utopianism. Such realism is a constant reminder of the
limits of international law (as well as national law for that matter) in certain areas and the fact that a core
feature of interstate behavior is the advancement by governments of what they perceive as their
interests.
See GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950 at 95 (1984); see also Henry
A. Kissinger, The Nature of Leadership, in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 27-43 (1969).
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“Neo-realists” follow this tradition, but focus less on the desire for power embedded in
human nature, and more on systemic or structural causes of conflict and cooperation in international
relations (e.g., scarcity of resources). See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ , THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
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In the field of transnational biotechnology, realism helps explain on a general level why states
declined to include in the Biodivesity Convention intrusive and costly obligations to conserve biological
diversity, and why the United States has resisted both joining the Biodiversity Convention and the
creation of a Biosafety Protocol. 195 Other states, to a greater or lesser degree, have interests that are
coincident with the United States on transnational biotechnology, but differ on some matters, such as
the extent to which environmental concerns should ameliorate trade obligations. Those differences may
turn on the other states’ national interests in promoting greater protection for the environment or may
turn on those states’ assessment of their comparative advantage/disadvantage in the trade of genetically
modified products. Many developing states view their national interests in biotechnology very differently
from the United States and other developed nations, embracing treaty provisions that they believe will
promote the transfer of financial resources, technology, and other assistance to their states. The
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As a bastion of free-market capitalism, the United States has long been a strong proponent
of treaties that promote free trade so as to open foreign markets for U.S. goods and services;
concomitantly, the United States has been wary of altering these treaties to address unproven risks to
the environment, believing that to do so could lead to disguised restraints on trade. Similarly, as a
bastion of innovative science and creative information, the United States has long been a proponent of
strong global treaties for protecting intellectual property protection so as to reward U.S. innovation,
most recently brought to fruition in the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement; concomitantly, the United
States has been wary of altering such treaties to account for the difficulties faced by developing nations
in paying for emergent technologies. As the leading nation in development of biotechnology
applications, the United States helped launch the negotiation of the Biodiversity Convention, welcoming
provisions that would promote access to and preservation of genetic resources in states. Yet the United
States thereafter sought to minimize, if not eliminate provisions, that would compel sharing of benefits
from intellectual property derived from those resources or that would otherwise ameliorate intellectual
property rights. Likewise, the United States resisted incorporation of provisions restricting international
trade in genetically modified products, successfully pushing the matter into a subsequently-negotiated
protocol, and then joining with like-minded states to narrowly tailor the provisions of that protocol.
Instead, the United States repeatedly urged that trade matters be resolved within the context of the
GATT.
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negotiations of the Convention on Biological Diversity and, more recently, of the Biosafety Protocol,
demonstrated the complexity and diversity of these national interests. In the case of the Biosafety
Protocol, various factions of states emerged in the negotiations: the European Union; the eastern and
central European states; a “Like-Minded” group of developing states; a “Miami Group” of major
agricultural exporters (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the United States, and Uruguay), and a
“Compromise” group (Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland).
The inability of these factions to broker an acceptable compromise led to a breakdown in negotiations
in February 1999, and a one-year suspension before a protocol acceptable to all factions could
emerge.196
Yet a hard-core realist paradigm that views norm-creation as driven wholly by immediate selfinterest goes too far; states do not and cannot seek on a day-to-day basis simply to maximize their
short-term interests. States have long-term interests in the stability and efficiency of the system in which
they operate, interests best served by establishing rules and institutions that promote predictability and
reliability. Even prominent realists find it hard to deny that international law exists as a system of binding
legal rules (in the sense that states habitually conform their behavior to the rules), even if in some areas
and in some situations the rules are of doubtful efficacy.197 That binding system is a manifestation of the
self-interest of states in developing efficient means for cooperation over the long-term, even if that

See Gareth W. Schweizer, The Negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 6
ENV. LA W . 577, 585-90 (2000); John Burgess, Trade Rules Set on Food Genetics, WASH . POST,
Jan. 30, 2000, at A1; Andrew Pollack, 130 Nations Agree on Safety Rules for Biotech Food, N.Y.
TIMES , Jan. 30, 2000, at 1.
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See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 265 (4th ed. 1967).
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means being held to rules that in the short-term do not serve their interests. The creation of the WTO
and its system of binding dispute settlement is an example of such cooperation; states typically comply
with WTO decisions that are adverse to their short-term interests (e.g., striking down a national
program that subsidizes exports) so as to serve their long-term interests in being part of and benefitting
from a global trading regime. Sometimes states fail to comply, but non-compliance results in the
removal of some of the benefits of the trade regime in the form of WTO-blessed retaliation, as occurred
in the Beef Hormones case.198 Because of economically-powerful constituencies, the WTO is a
sophisticated regime with extensive treaties containing detailed rules and credible dispute resolution,
whereas other regimes relating to intellectual property or environment are weaker. Nevertheless, all
these regimes are essentially the means by which utility-maximizing states use legal norms (strong or
weak) to coordinate behavior and facilitate optimal outcomes.
To overcome the shortcomings in the realists’ utilitarian premise, contemporary international law
and international relations theorists have sought a more complete explanation of international norm
creation principally by observing and analyzing the manner in which states were increasingly engaging in
cooperation through international organizations and other “regimes” over the course of the twentieth
century.199 From an international lawyer’s perspective, Louis Henkin acknowledged the utilitarian
198
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See Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory:
A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM . J. INT ’L L. 367 (1998); Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM .
J. INT ’L L. 205 (1993); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus
for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT ’L L. 335 (1989). International law theorists refer to
“international law” while international relations theorists refer to “international regimes,” but to a large
extent the two disciplines have drawn similar conclusions using different methodologies.
199

89
premise of the realists when he noted that “nations will observe international obligations unless violation
promises an important balance of advantage over cost.” 200 Yet Henkin delved deeper into the nature of
this cost and advantage analysis, finding of significance various external factors–such as the desire of a
state for orderly international relations, to maintain a reputation of principled behavior, and to avoid
adverse communal responses to its actions—as well as internal factors—such as a state’s national law,
history, tradition and values.201 International relations theorists preferred to speak in terms of “regimes,”
which they defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”202
While states and their government leaders are important actors, regime theory envisions a broad
spectrum of interests and preferences of non-state actors, such as international institutions, business
groups, public interest groups, and individual citizens, that condition and influence state behavior. To the
extent that policymakers seek effective and efficient transnational regimes so as to maximize the gains of
all these actors, regime theory aspires to point the direction, by showing why cooperation fails in some
instances and works in others.203
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See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); see
generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Andreas Hasenclever et al.
eds., Cambridge Studies in International Relations No., 55, 1997).
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Different schools and sub-schools of thought have emerged in this field. Some international
relations theorists emphasize game theory, economics, industrial organization theory, and other
disciplines as tools for identifying the conditions that prevent states from realizing potential gains from
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One strand of regime theory, for example, pursues models grounded in economic theory as a
means of illuminating cooperation among states. Under this approach, international cooperation on
issues such as arms control or environmental protection is essentially viewed as a public good, in that
the states cooperating to achieve an objective (e.g., reduction in emission of greenhouse gases) incur all
the costs in doing so, while the resultant benefit flows to all states, even those that do not cooperate.
When faced with matters concerning the global welfare of states, a rational state would therefore chose
not to cooperate (to “free ride”), thereby obtaining some benefits with no costs. Regime theorists look
to various economic models to try to explain under what conditions states would seek to cooperate or
seek to “defect” from cooperation, and what factors might be altered to induce cooperation. 204 By
cooperation, and then study how institutions (or rules) can ameliorate those conditions. Other theorists
are more broadly interested in the effects of formal cooperation on private, governmental, and
supranational actors.
See Bruce M. Russett & John D. Sullivan, Collective Goods and International
Organization, 25 INT ’L ORG. 845 (1971). For instance, one might try to explain the likelihood of
cooperation on issues of biotechnology among trade-oriented states and environmentally-sensitive
states in game theory terms. In a simple 2x2 game, the explanation might argue that the conditions for a
“Prisoner’s Dilemma” game exist. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN , LAW AND ECONOMICS 3438 (3d ed. 2000). While the two sets of states could achieve the most optimal outcome by cooperating
so that scientifically-based, global, and enforceable regulations are placed on the biotechnology
trade—presumably allowing most of its benefits while eliminating most of its perils—the dominant
strategy of each set of states may be not to cooperate for fear that the other set would “defect,” leading
to a highly adverse outcome to the other set (thus, the biotechnology trade-oriented states would fear
that cooperation in creation of a thorough and effective regime might actually lead down a slippery
slope to complete bans, while the environmentally sensitive states would fear that doing so might lead to
essentially unrestricted trade). Instead, the strategy of each set of states would be not to cooperate
regardless of whether the other set decides to cooperate. If both follow their dominant strategy and fail
to cooperate, a sub-optimal outcome (as compared to the situation where the two sets cooperate) is
reached (e.g., largely unregulated bioprospecting and trade goes forward, but amidst an incoherent
patchwork of unilateral bans or restrictions exist). Neither set is entirely happy (for the pro-trade states,
there are limitations and uncertainty about trade; for the pro-environment states, there are still significant
risks for human health and the environment), but neither has fallen into their worst case scenario.
204
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identifying those factors, such as reducing transaction costs and increasing information flows among
states, these theorists seek to show how effective legal rules can be generated.
There are, however, considerable difficulties in using such models to describe accurately
complex multilateral problems. As public choice theory has demonstrated, even rational actors often
experience difficulty in cooperating, leading to sub-optimal outcomes that cannot be cured by greater
information flow. Moreover, analytic devices such as game theoretic formulation or Edgeworth box
diagrams205 are far too abstract. On an issue such as transnational biotechnology, there are far too
many participants in the negotiating process, whose identities may or may not be known at the outset,
and whose positions and preferences on issues and sub-issues are determined and redetermined only
over long periods of time and in response to changing events.206 As Oran R. Young notes, “mapping
Observing all this, the international relations theorist might posit that by promoting a greater flow of
information between the two sets of states, they would be motivated—as rational utility maximizers—to
cooperate and thereby realize feasible joint gains. The theorist would then look for ways to promote
such information flow. In the transactions costs context, the theorist might posit that the costs to tradeoriented states to combat trade bans unilaterally and the costs to environmentally-sensitive states in
trying unilaterally to prevent identified risks from biotechnology applications are such that both would
prefer the relatively lower costs of bargaining within a shared regime. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER 167 (1989) (“whenever the costs of
communication, monitoring, and enforcement are relatively low compared to the benefits to be derived
from political exchange,” international institutions appear). On the application of game theory generally
to international relations, see Andrew Kydd & Duncan Snidal, Progress in Game-Theoretical
Analysis of International Regimes, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 112
(Volker Rittberger & Peter Mayer eds., 1993).
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An Edgeworth box diagram depicts a well-defined contract curve, typically between two
parties and on two issues. By charting the indifference curves of the two parties in “issue space,” the
diagram seeks to show where combinations of the two issues are of equal utility to the two parties, and
define where no agreement is possible and where there is a “bargaining set.”
206

Theorists following such utilitarian models might see different outcomes or “payoffs” in the
field of transnational biotechnology, leading them to describe the “game” as something other than a
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the contours of real-world collective-action problems in terms of such analytic models is seldom a
feasible proposition, and our ability to foresee the consequences, unfolding over time, which result from
the choice of specific options is particularly limited in connection with ongoing arrangements such as
international regimes.”207
Nevertheless, these models have reinforced a further critical element in understanding the selfinterest of states, which is that it is a mistake to view states as operating within just a “single-level
game.” Although both traditional international law and international relations theorists have focused on
the role of governments in resolution of international problems or issues, game theoreticians have
demonstrated through their models why governments should not be viewed as unitary, rational actors
but, rather, as actors whose decision-making is severely circumscribed by internal bargaining at the
national level. “Two-level game theory” postulates that an effective means of ensuring that a viable
range of outcomes acceptable to relevant actors (a “win-set”) exists is to pay attention to the value of
side-payments to reduce opposition to a particular outcome by a recalcitrant actor within the national

Prisoner’s Dilemma game (such as a “Stag Hunt” game, “Chicken” game, “Tender Trap” game,
“Hawk-Dove” game, and “Battle of the Sexes” game). On the variety of possible “games,” see Jack
Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies,
in ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR IN ADVERSITY 223 (1987). Thus, even the simplistic parties and issues
posited supra, note 204, may better apply to some other type of “game,” given uncertainties about the
likely payoffs for cooperation or defection.
See Oran R. Young, The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing
Natural Resources and the Environment, 43 INT ’L ORG. 349, 359 (1989); see also Duncan Snidal,
Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and
Regimes, 79 AM . POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985); R. Harrison Wagner, The Theory of Games and the
Problem of International Cooperation, 77 AM . POL. SCI. REV. 330, 331 (1983).
207
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coalition.208 Such side-payments need not be monetary; they can occur through linkages to other issues,
such that the recalcitrant actor receives a benefit that might not otherwise have arisen in the course of
the negotiations of the issue at hand.209
This more robust perception of the “self-interest of states” captures key aspects of the field of
transnational biotechnology. In advancing their long-term interests, states have come together to create
fairly complex regimes to regulate particular sectors of relevant behavior: trade, environment, intellectual
property, distribution of resources, and so on. Each of these regimes is a system of norms which
translates a long-term interest in promotion of trade, protection of intellectual property, protection of the
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In particular, Robert Putnam has pursued the concept of “two-level” games so as to provide
a model for understanding the implications of national politics for international negotiations. See Robert
D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games, 42 INT ’L ORG. 427
(1988). For Putnam’s models, the range of possible agreements among the relevant governments at the
international level as mapped onto the range of agreements acceptable to a majority of relevant actors
at the national level of a state constitutes the “win-set” for that state. Putnam then formulates certain
hypotheses from this approach, such as that states with small “win-sets” have a bargaining advantage
over states with larger “win-sets,” because the former can demonstrate that they have little negotiating
flexibility. Others have refined these hypotheses, such as by noting the relevance of complete
information among relevant actors, see Keisuke Iida, When and How Do Domestic Constraints
Matter? 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 403 (1993), and the effect of a veto by one actor on the formation of
majority national coalitions. See Jongryn Mo, The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous
Domestic Coalitions, 38 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 402 (1994).
Of course, two-level game theory also has limits when being applied to complex transnational
problems. See, e.g., Robert J. Schmidt, Jr., International Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic
Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission, 26
ENVTL. L. 95 (1996) (engaging in an extensive discussion of the models, but essentially concluding that
the solution to resolving the salmon depletion in the north Pacific lay in paying Alaskans to harvest less).
Yet it focuses attention on the fact that, in promoting the development of a sensible and effective regime
for transnational biotechnology, one must pay attention to the building of national coalitions and, this
article suggests, transnational coalitions.
See Frederick W. Mayer, Managing Domestic Differences in International
Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments, 46 INT ’L ORG. 793 (1992).
209
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environment, and the equitable advancement of states into a code of conduct by which states can
assess each other’s behavior and fidelity to the system in the short-term. Yet, while these regimes were
established by states, they are of great interest to non-state actors—including non-governmental
organizations, multinational organizations, indigenous groups, and others—and in many respects these
regimes are directed at the behavior of private actors.210 Those actors play a key role in conditioning
the attitudes of governments, by informing governments officials about the nature of a particular problem
and about the private interests that might be affected in resolving the problem, and by persuading
government officials to adopt a particular position. Paying attention to the interests of these non-state
actors across a range of issues is important in understanding how international cooperation has
developed in the field of transnational biotechnology. Thus, in pursuing international negotiation of these
regimes, the U.S. Executive Branch has held hearings and maintained advisory committees to obtain

See Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in
International Decision-Making Institutions, WASH . Q., Winter 1995, at 45, 47 (“This explosion in
nongovernmental activity reflects the dramatically heightened permeability of national borders and
improvements in communications that have allowed territorially dispersed individuals to develop
common agendas and objectives at the international level.”). Kenneth Abbott notes that the
revolutionary development of having non-state actors participate in international politics and the
development of international law is appealing for various reasons: promotion of democracy generally;
inclusion of the most affected groups in decision-making; exchange of information; ability of non-state
actors to monitor state compliance; and development of public support for international agreements.
See Kenneth W. Abbott, “Economic” Issues and Political Participation: The Evolving
Boundaries of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 1007-09 (1996); see also Julie
Mertus, Considering Nonstate Actors in the New Millennium: Toward Expanded Participation in
Norm Generation and Norm Application, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT ’L L. & POL. 537 (2000); Kal Raustiala,
States, NGOs and International Environmental Institutions, 41 INT 'L STUD. Q. 719 (1997); Paul
Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civil Politics, in GREEN
PLANET BLUES : ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS FROM STOCKHOLM TO KYOTO 118, 130 (Ken Conca &
Geoffrey D. Dabelko eds., 2d ed. 1998).
210
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information and advice from private entities, has been pressured to respond to private sector needs
through the filter of Congress, and has allowed private sector representatives to participate as delegates
on U.S. Government negotiating teams.211 U.S. non-governmental organizations in this area range from
industry organizations, such as the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO)212 and the American
Biological Safety Association (ABSA)213 to environmental organizations, such as the World Wildlife
Foundation, to consumer groups, such as the Consumer’s Choice Council, 214 and so on. In addition to
lobbying activities, BIO has produced its own self-regulation in the form of guidelines on the protection
of health, safety, and the environment in the use of biotechnology products.215
Finally, non-governmental organizations are often themselves transnational in nature. They form
transnational networks of experts and activists in a variety of key states all organized to push for the
objectives of the organization, and thus arguably transform the “two-level” game into a “multi-level
game”. These “transnational norm entrepreneurs” are readily apparent in the field of transnational
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The Seattle trade summit failure prompted the U.S. government to pursue even further
procedures for advice from non-governmental organizations on trade issues. See USTR Press Release
on USTR Charlene Barshefsky and Secretary of Commerce William M. Daley to Establish New
Procedures for Advice from Non-Governmental Organizations (Jan. 11, 2000),
<http://www.ustr.gov>.
212

For information, see <http://www.bio.org>.
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For information, see <http://www.absa.org>.
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For information, see <http://www.consumerscouncil.org>.
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See BIO, Statement of Principles, <http://www.bio.org/laws/principles.html> (visited July

20, 2000).
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biotechnology. Environmental groups such as the Netherlands-based Greenpeace International216 and
U.K.-based Friends of the Earth217 have been highly active in lobbying states on global rules for
restricting or banning genetically modified products. Conversely, European biotechnology companies
have banded together to form EuropaBio 218 to prevent such restrictions, which in turn has joined with
Canadian, Japanese, and U.S. biotechnology trade associations and companies to form the
International Bioindustry Forum (IBF).
Fully addressing the “two-level” or “multi-level” game would take account of possibilities for
including in the development of treaty regimes greater involvement of private actors from different areas
of interest or expertise. Greater participation of non-state actors in the negotiating process through
consultation and status as observers or even delegation members is one approach. Another would be to
focus on the development of fora for non-state actors to present and negotiate their positions separate
from the formal treaty-making process. Non-state actors have held major conferences of their own, but
to date the vast majority of organizations taking part in these conferences are all of the same general
type, resulting in positions unacceptable to other non-governmental organizations and ultimately to
states.219 Consequently, as discussed in Part V, other approaches should be considered.
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For information, see <http://www.greenpeace.org/~geneng>.
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For information, see <http://www.foe.co.uk>.
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For information, see <http://www.europa-bio.be>.
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See Abbott, supra note 210, at 1009.
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International Law as Driven by Social Interaction Among Transnational Actors

Focusing exclusively on the self-interest of states and non-state actors, however, misses part of
the dynamism of international law. States and other transnational actors do not operate in a vacuum;
they operate as part of a transnational social structure, meaning that they are constantly interacting in
ways that shape those interests, thereby altering the creation, interpretation, and implementation of
international law. International lawyers and political scientists have posited various theories about how
law is generated from the interactions of states and transnational actors. This section will briefly discuss
these theories, with particular attention to their relevance to transnational biotechnology.

Some international law theorists have developed this notion by exploring the internal nature of
law, principally as a means of explaining why the law “binds” or at least influences state behavior.
Thomas Franck argues that effective international law is grounded in notions of “fairness;” fairness both
in the process by which the law is created220 and fairness in the substantive law itself.221 Though Franck
does not put it in quite these terms, the way in which international law becomes effective turns on the
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Franck’s touchstone for procedural fairness is the concept of the “legitimacy” of rules.
Legitimacy arises when a rule exhibits certain features: clarity; validation by the global community;
conceptual coherence; and conformity with the normative hierarchy of the international rule system.
Where a rule is “legitimate,” it exerts a “compliance pull” on those addressed. See generally THOMAS
M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
221

Franck’s touchstone for substantive fairness is the concept of the “justice” of rules. Justice
requires the balancing of different variables, including traditional notions of equity in international law.
Where a rule is “just,” it, too, exerts a “compliance pull” on those addressed. See generally THOMAS
M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
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states and non-state actors interact with one another so as to create the law and take account of the
views of one another in setting the law’s content. On a different track, adherents to the
McDougal/Lasswell “policy-oriented” jurisprudence222 view international law as a discrete part of the
social process at large, a part that involves an ongoing process of authoritative and controlling decision.
The decision process involves ascertaining the policy goals of the community, goals that should be
guided by a set of scientifically-derived, globally-applicable normative values surrounding the notion of
human dignity. In assessing the effects of social interaction on international law, other international law
scholars have focused on the political nature of states themselves223 or the nature of treaty regimes.224
222

This jurisprudence (also known as the “New Haven School”) derives from the writings of
Professors Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell. See generally HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S.
MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LA W , SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992).
For them, law is essentially “decisions that are made by the persons who are expected to make them, in
accordance with criteria expected by community members, in established structures of authority, with
sufficient bases in effective power to secure consequential control, and by authorized procedures.”
Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights
Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM . J. INT ’L L.
316, 319 (1999).
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT ’L L. 503 (1995); Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and
the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM . L. REV. 1907 (1992) (arguing that transnational legal norms
tend to develop among liberal democratic states).
223

224

For instance, Chayes and Chayes depict international law as principally a series of complex,
treaty-based regulatory regimes that do not rely on sanctions for enforcement, since sanctions are
costly, erratically imposed, and therefore deficient in legitimacy. Instead, states create and comply with
the rule system of a treaty-based regulatory regime because it is efficient to do so and because it
promotes the long-term interests of the states (at least if it is well-negotiated), but also because
representatives of states instinctively are drawn to compliance with rules. To the extent that states do
not comply, the reasons lie less in a pathological promotion of short-term self-interest and more in
ambiguities present in the rules, the limitations on the capacity of states to comply with the rules, and the
difficulties in adapting the rules to changing conditions. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES , THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
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While these legal theories differ in many ways, they are all oriented toward explicating the social
relationships of states as a key element in transnational norm generation. Non-state actors play an
important role in this social interaction; direct political involvement of non-governmental organizations
enhances the interaction of governments so as to promote what some would call a “global civil
society.”225
Similar reasoning exists in the works of some international relations theorists, particularly those
regarded as “constructivists.” For them, regime theory is useful not just in assessing the power and
interests of states, but also the way in which they conceive themselves as interacting with other states. In
particular, constructivists have noted that states define their interests “in the context of internationally
held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate.”226 Thus, the norm-generating
behavior of states, and other transnational actors, is not driven just by national interests; it is also driven
by how states identify themselves, by deeply embedded values they possess, and by beliefs that they

1-28 (1995). Adherents to the “international legal process” school focus on how and why decisionmaking competence is allocated in given area of international affairs, the ways in which particular
institutions in that area (and the system as a whole) restrain and organize national and individual
behavior, and the conditions under which those institutions emerge. This school of scholarship has its
origins in ABRAM CHAYES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN
INTRODUCTORY COURSE (1968).
This notion of a global civil society is sometimes referred to as Grotian liberalism. See Gerry
J. Simpson, Imagined Consent: Democratic Liberalism in International Legal Theory, 1994
AUSTL. Y.B. INT ’L L. 103, 107-08; Dianne Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations in the United
Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil Society, 18 HUM . RTS . Q. 107, 132-33
(1996); see also Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets
Land Mines, 52 INT ’L ORG. 613 (1998).
225

See MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 2 (Cornell
Studies in Political Economy, 1996).
226
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share or do not share with other states. Depending on their nature, some states may follow Hobbes and
view each other as enemies, but others will follow Locke and view each other as friendly competitors
or follow Kant and view each other as friends, leading to the development among them of transnational
legal rules and the pacific settlement of disputes.227 Transnational norms, then, are part of the basic
cognitive structure of the international system which defines the identities of the relevant actors.
The importance of this social interaction may be reinforced by reference to game theoretic
formulations, which note that an indeterminate series of interactions among the relevant actors of the
regime can lead to the evolution of cooperative strategies, since cooperatively inclined actors have a
relative advantage over less cooperative actors.228 Direct application of such analysis to real-world
multilateral cooperation on complex issues is problematic and even regime theorists concede that infinite
iterations of such a game do not guarantee that cooperation will evolve. The lesson, however, is that an
indeterminate series of interactions by the relevant actors in the regime can help overcome obstacles
that might otherwise exist in achieving cooperation. As such, regime theorists look for methods of
See generally ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(1999); JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONALIZATION (1998).
227
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In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the players involved in a single game readily defect from
cooperation, but players involved in the repeated game tend to alter their strategy, first selecting
cooperation and thereafter deciding whether to continue cooperating based on the strategy selected by
the other actor. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Elliott
Sober, Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoners’ Delimmas, 8 ECON. & PHIL. 127 (1992). In
essence, the players value the prospect of future cooperation (future “payoffs”), and are willing to risk
short-term loss from the other player’s defection in the hope of obtaining long-term gains. Reverting to
the 2x2 game discussed supra note 204, the preferable outcome for both sets of actors—one that
allows optimal uses of biotechnology to continue, while placing global (or perhaps a series of regional)
restraints on those uses deemed of highest risk—might best be achieved if the two sets of actors are not
engaged in a one-time negotiation but, rather, involved in recurring iterations of negotiations
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lengthening the “shadow of the future” (i.e., increasing the likelihood of future payoffs) so as to increase
the prospects for cooperation. 229
This social interaction of states in the field of transnational biotechnology is readily apparent.
Within each of the regulatory treaty regimes previously discussed, such as the WTO, WIPO, or the

See, e.g., Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226, 232-34 (1985). For interesting
applications of iterative theory to international law, see John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and
International Law, 40 VA . J. INT ’L L. 193 (1999); John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on
Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT ’L
L.J. 139 (1996).
The presence of “iterated games,” at least to a certain extent, may be discerned in various
existing international environmental regimes. While international environmental regimes developed in the
1960's and 1970's tended to aim for static, one-time solutions to an existing transnational problem,
more recent regimes have pursued the “framework-protocol” approach, whereby a regime is
established that envisages repeated negotiations among states to resolve a given problem-area over
time. The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature June 4, 1992, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), the Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-10 (1987), 26 I.L.M. 1541
(1987), and Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Agreement (LRTAP), Nov. 13, 1979, TIAS
No. 10541, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217, are all examples of such an approach. Although states are incapable
of reaching a cooperative solution as part of a single negotiation, over time they can be induced to
cooperate (by amending or revising prior agreements) as they perceive pay-offs from the continued and
increasing cooperation of other states. (Other factors are also in play, such as improved understandings
over time of the underlying science concerning the problem.) Even within existing regimes that do not
follow the framework-protocol approach. regimes can be seen to evolve and increase in strength due to
repeated interactions of the state parties. Typically this occurs as part of the periodic meetings of the
state parties at which decision on strengthening the implementation of the regime may be taken.
However, some scholars question whether the treaty-protocol approach is preferred, noting
that there may be greater value in concluding a fully developed regime at the start among those states
that are prepared to undertake serious obligations, allowing others to follow later when they are
prepared to accept the regime. See George W. Downs et al., The Transformational Model of
International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM . J. TRANSNAT’L L.
465 (2000).
229
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Biodiversity Convention—and other organizations as well230—there is constant interaction among
diplomatic representatives and (perhaps more importantly) experts of states on issues concerning
biotechnology that condition state attitudes. Although formally meant to serve as the instrument of
states, the secretariats of these organizations are also extremely important in synthesizing the attitudes
and expectations of states, and using that information to set the agenda for future work of the institution.
Certain secretariats, such as that of the Convention on Biological Diversity, have it as part of their
mission to engage in training and education programs, principally for developing states. States, of
course, continue to interact bilaterally with one another, often through cooperative activities of nondiplomatic regulatory officials.231
Such social interaction may ultimately affect U.S. Government resistance to joining the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Biosafety Protocol. That resistance may weaken due to a
combination of U.S. self-interest and the perception that the rules set forth in those treaties are fair.
Self-interest may arise from the fact that even if the United States does not join these treaties, the
United States will need to abide by their rules when trading genetically modified products, since the
230

For instance, the FAO has established a Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (CGRFA), which serves as a permanent forum where governments discuss and negotiate
matters relevant to genetic resources for food and agriculture. The main objectives of the CGRFA are
to ensure the conservation and sustainable utilization of genetic resources for food and agriculture, as
well the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from their use. The Commission aims to reach
international consensus through negotiations on areas of global interest. Information is available at
<http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa>.
231

For instance, regulatory officials of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS) and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency meet regularly to compare and harmonize the
molecular genetic characterization components of their regulatory review processes for genetically
modified plants. See Canada and United States Bilateral on Agricultural Biotechnology (July 15-16,
1998), <http://www.cfia-acia.agr.ca/english/plaveg/pbo/usda01_e.shtml>.
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Protocol’s rules will be applied by state parties to which the U.S. exports or from which it imports such
organisms. Hence, the United States will either face a shrinking pool of trading partners or will need to
abide by the Protocol’s rules, in which case it may be motivated to join the Convention and its Protocol
so as to influence future developments (such as the development of liability rules). The perception of
fairness may arise from the fact that the rules of these conventions were negotiated and adopted by a
large number of states based on compromises among a wide variety of viewpoints. Yet even if the
United States does not join the Biodiversity Convention, the social interaction of states within that
regime, and other regimes relevant to transnational biotechnology, are inescapably affecting the attitudes
of the global civil society on how best to regulate transnational biotechnology.
The social interaction of non-state actors concerned with biotechnology issues may be less
apparent, but such interaction does occur since non-state actors are involved in negotiations of new
treaties, in conferences of the states parties to existing treaties, and as parts of associated working
groups, typically as observers. Further, the Biological Diversity Convention and the Biosafety Protocol
seek to harness the power of the Internet as a means for helping states and non-state actors exchange
scientific, technical, environmental, and legal information about genetically modified products in a
manner calculated to be neutral, accessible, cost-effective, and transparent.
Social interactions of actors trans-regime occurs but remains problematic. As discussed
above, WTO agreements make use of international standards from organizations such as Codex
Alimentarius, and the Biosafety Protocol made somewhat tortured efforts to explain its connection to
the WTO. Further, various relevant international organizations have sought to create cooperative
structures among them, such as the informal working group on biosafety formed by UNIDO, UNEP,
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WHO, and FAO.232 In November 1999, the WTO and UNEP concluded a cooperative arrangement
which may be a harbinger of others to come.233 However, these cooperative arrangements are uneven
and, in any event, do little to promote social interaction of private actors across regimes. In the absence
of clear direction from existing international regimes, private actors have begun hesitantly engaging in
associations and bargaining across borders in efforts to advance their interests. Several examples exist
in the field of transnational biotechnology.
For instance, while much blood was spilt in inter-state negotiations over treaty language on
whether there should be a transfer of biotechnology from the developed world to the developing world,
in fact several U.S. and U.K. companies (including Novartis, AgrEvo, Monsanto, Zeneca, and Pioneer
Hi-Bred) are transferring without charge their biotechnology for some projects in some developing
states, often with the assistance of governmental or non-governmental associations. In some situations,
the relevant company may have reached a conclusion that deployment of the biotechnology application
in the developing state is not commercially feasible and therefore donates it. Thus, an nongovernmental, non-profit organization called the International Service for the Acquisition of Agribiotech Applications (ISAAA)—based in the United States but with offices in Kenya, the Philippines,
and the United Kingdom—has brokered the transfer of such technology from U.S. companies mainly to
See UNEP, Background on Biosafety (visited July 2, 2000),
<http://irptc.unep.ch/biodiv/bakgd01.html>.
232

See WTO Press Release on Elements of Cooperation Between the WTO and UNEP,
WTO Doc. Press/154 (Nov. 29, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/ddf/ep/D5/D5142e.doc>. Under the
arrangement, the two organizations pledged to foster cooperation through sharing of information,
participation in each other’s meetings, and working together on capacity building for developing states
and states in transition, so as to build awareness of linkages between trade, environment, and
sustainable development
233
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address the needs of small scale and resource poor farmers, such as virus-resistant melons to a Costa
Rican research center. Similarly, the Rockefeller Foundation sponsors a Rice Biotechnology Network,
that has been instrumental in assisting states such as the Philippines in receiving cost-free genetically
engineered rice germ plasm for development. Monsanto has collaborated with the U.S. Agency for
International Development (AID) to provide a virus-resistant sweet potato to the Kenya Agricultural
Research Institute, while at the same time offering royalty-free licenses for all of its technologies that can
help further development of "golden rice" and other pro-vitamin A-enhanced rice varieties.234 In some
situations, the motivation of the biotechnology company is more complex. According to the Executive
Director of the ISAAA, the rationale “is that appropriate regulations, seed distribution systems, and
trust and confidence have to be built both for humanitarian reasons and as a pre-cursor for licensing
arrangements and the building of various forms of alliances and joint ventures . . . . ”235
Conversely, while much attention was paid by developed states to the need for access to
genetic resources in developing states, quasi-private structures are at the forefront of controlling such
access. For instance, in 1971 the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
was established as an informal association of fifty-eight public and private sector donors of developed
See Joel I. Cohen & John Komen, Research Collaboration, Management and
Technology Transfer; Meeting the Needs of Developing Countries, in PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES , supra note 30, at 253, 263, tbl. 19.3; Monsanto Press
Release on Monsanto Adds Support For "Golden Rice"; Opens Its Genome Sequence Data To
Worldwide Research Community (Aug. 4, 2000),
<http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/mediacenter/2000/00aug4_goldenrice.html>.
234
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ANATOLE KRATTIGER, THE IMPORTANCE OF AG- BIOTECH TO GLOBAL PROSPERITY at 6
(ISAAA Briefs No. 6, 1998) <http://www.isaaa.org/brief6.htm>; see also ANATOLE F. KRATTIGER,
INSECT RESISTANCE IN CROPS: A CASE STUDY OF BACILLUS THURINGIENSIS (BT ) AND ITS TRANSFER
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 24 (ISAAA Briefs No. 2, 1997) <http://www.isaaa.org/brief2.htm>.
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states, supporting sixteen international research centers, located mostly in developing states, some of
which have sixteen ex situ collections of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture held in trust for
the international community and available in accordance with CGIAR policy.236 Distribution of the
genetic resources to private parties, including universities and research centers, typically take the form
of “material transfer agreements.”237 However, because of the strong movement toward reducing
genetic resources to intellectual property rights, some centers and other entities controlling access to
genetic resources have reacted by patenting newly developed varieties and conditioning access to the
genetic material on agreements for the sharing of benefits. For example, the International Maize and
Wheat Center, a nonprofit agency located in Texcoco, Mexico, is shifting from allowing free access to
its vast genetic material to instead patenting the new varieties it develops and otherwise conditioning
access.238 Such restrictions, in turn, have prompted biotechnology companies to pursue cooperative
arrangements for uncovering useful genetic material. Thus, Merck & Co. has undertaken a cooperative
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The World Bank, the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the U.N.
Development Programme (UNDP), and the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP) are cosponsors of
the CGIAR. Information on CGIAR may be found on the Internet at <http://www.cgiar.org>. In 1974,
CGIAR established the International Board for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR) to coordinate this
network of seed banks. The seed banks concentrate on conserving plants for agricultural use. See N.C.
Brady, Modern Biotechnology at International Agricultural Research Centers, in PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES , supra note 30, at 245. The FAO and
CGIAR concluded an agreement on Oct. 26, 1994, making clear that the plant genetic resources in
CGIAR gene banks are held in trust for the international community.
See OECD REPORT , supra note 36, at 8-9, 24-25, annex IV; see generally W. LESSER,
SUSTAINABLE USE OF GENETIC RESOURCES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
(1998).
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See Anthony DePalma, The “Slippery Slope” of Patenting Farmers’ Crops, N.Y.
TIMES , May 24, 2000, at A4.
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research program in Costa Rica, promising to share profits should it uncover an economically viable
drug.239 The ISAAA is pursuing possibilities for joint ventures between selected Asian states and U.S.
companies for the Asian supply of rice germ plasm in exchange for U.S. companies supplying rice
genetically modified to resist disease.240 The U.S. National Cancer Institute has undertaken contractual
agreements, called a Letter of Collection Agreement, with numerous developing states, whereby the
NCI screens extracts of plants from, and shares its findings with, the source state. If a commercial
product results, the NCI obtains a patent, and a licensee is sought who would enter into an agreement
with the source state concerning royalties and purchase of the source material.241 When agreements are
concluded between a party possessing genetic resources and a party seeking to conduct research and
development of the resource for commercial use, they are referred to as “bioprospecting” or “material

See Michael D. Coughlin, Jr., Recent Development, Using the Merck-INBio Agreement to
Clarify the Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 COLUM . J. TRANSNAT’L L. 337 (1993). But see
Joan Martinez-Alier, The Merchandising of Biodiversity, in JUSTICE, PROPERTY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 194, 201-03 (Tim Hayward & John O’Neill, eds.,
1997) (criticizing agreements such as exist between Merck and Costa Rica). See generally WALTER
V. REID ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC
RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1993); DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFIELD ,
BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TOWARD TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES (1996).
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See KRATTIGER, THE IMPORTANCE OF AG- BIOTECH TO GLOBAL PROSPERITY, supra note
235, at 18-19. Rice is arguably the world’s most important food, upon which almost two billion people
rely for nourishment, and yet is susceptible to numerous destructive diseases, insects, fungi, and
bacteria. See Pamela C. Ronald, Making Rice Disease-Resistant, SCI. AM ., Nov. 1997, at 100.
For a general discussion of the work of ISAAA as of mid-1994, see K.V. Raman,
Facilitating Plant Biotechnology Transfer to Developing Countries, in PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES , supra note 30, at 267.
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For an sample of the NCI Letter of Collection, see OECD REPORT , supra note 36, at annex
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transfer” agreements, which typically provide for payment for the genetic samples as well as royalty
payments if a successful commercial exploitation is achieved.242 Unfortunately, as a general matter there
is inadequate dialogue among the relevant actors regarding access to genetic resources, attributable in
part to the limited opportunity for interaction.243
Finally, while much attention has been paid in international negotiations to the conditions under
which intellectual property must be protected, even in the absence of such protections (making private
licensing arrangements unlikely), there are options for transferring biotechnology applications. If nonstate actors can identify particular biotechnology applications that are of interest to an importing state
(e.g., fruits engineered as edible vaccines), they may be able to work with the public institutions of the
exporting and importing states to conclude contractual agreements regarding transfer of particular
biotechnology applications where the rights of the producer are protected. A key problem, however, is
that certain non-state actors typically do not have their interests adequately represented in relevant fora
so as to promote such transfers. For instance, in the debate over export bans on genetically modified

See Daniel M. Putterman, Model Material Transfer Agreements for Equitable
Biodiversity Prospecting, in ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES : STRATEGIES FOR SHARING BENEFITS
299 (John Mugabe et al. eds., Afr. Ctr. for Tech Studies Envtl. Pol’y Ser. No. 8, 1997); Daniel M.
Putterman, Model Material Transfer Agreements for Equitable Biodiversity Prospecting, 7 COLO .
J. INT ’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 149 (1995). An analogue to this solely within the United States is the
bioprospecting agreement concluded by Yellowstone National Park with a San Diego corporation,
whereby the latter will pay a lump sum payment to the National Park Service, as well as a percentage
of any royalties from commercially viable, genetically modified products derived from microbes found in
Yellowstone’s geysers and hot springs. See Andrew Pollack, Yellowstone-Biotechnology Deal Is
Suspended by a Federal Judge, N.Y. TIMES , Mar. 26, 1999, at A17; see also John R. Adair, The
Bioprospecting Question: Should the United States Charge Biotechnology Companies for the
Commercial Use of Public Wild Genetic Resources? 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 131 (1997).
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products, the voices of U.S. biotechnology companies, European consumers, and environmentalists are
heard, but those of farmers and consumers in developing states are not.
These examples are not meant to suggest that isolated social interactions of private actors are
generating clear rules of international law. They are meant to suggest, however, that in the absence of
clear rules of international law emanating from relevant treaty regimes, private actors are left interpreting
and clarifying those rules on their own and, in a sense, implementing them. Indeed, while treaty regimes
developed by states to serve their long-term interests provide a backdrop for regulation of transnational
biotechnology, many of the concerns discussed in Part III ultimately are being handled through private
or quasi-private contractual arrangements among non-state actors. As discussed in Part IV,
international law could be strengthened by finding ways of better coordinating both state and non-state
actors social interactions, as well as allowing those interactions to help inform the decisions of states,
including the crafting and amending of treaty commitments.

International Law as Grounded in National Law and Society

While states and other actors may be motivated by advancing their self-interests, and may
define and redefine those interests as entities embedded in the transnational system, some scholars see
international law as only fully crystalized when it becomes part of the internal normative system of the
state. This section will consider such “internalization” as a component of the jurisgenerative nature of
international law.
For Harold Koh, the transnational legal process is one in which “an international law rule is
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interpreted through the interaction of transnational actors in a variety of law-declaring fora, then
internalized into a nation’s domestic legal system.”244 Under Koh’s theory, a norm might be internalized
through social, political, or legal processes by means of various potential mechanisms: transnational
norm entrepreneurs, such as non-governmental organizations or individuals; governmental norm
sponsors; transnational issue networks or “epistemic communities” consisting essentially of networks of
professionals with expertise in a particular domain; interpretive communities and law declaring fora;
bureaucrats charged with ensuring that national law comports with international obligations; and issue
linkages, whereby failure to internalize a norm can have adverse cascading effects on other matters of
concern to a state.245 Philip Trimble carries the notion of internalization to the point of saying that there
is no single, unitary system of international law applicable across the world community, but only “a
series of parallel systems, more or less convergent depending on the subject, separately applicable
within the various nations of the world.”246 Treaties and customary international law standing alone may
or may not have significance depending on the constitutional structures of those systems.247
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See Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 191, at 626.

Id. at 646-655; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN
AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183.
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See Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order and Critical Legal Studies, 42
STAN. L. REV. 811, 835 (1990).
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On customary international law in the U.S. law, compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997), with Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really
State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998). On treaties in U.S. law, see John C. Yoo, Globalism
and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM .
L. REV. 1955 (1999) and the subsequent responses.
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Examples of such internalization of international law in national law abound in the field of
biotechnology. In the wake concluding the Biodiversity Convention, most developed states and many
developing states moved to develop national laws and regulations, or to modify existing laws and
regulations, to address access to genetic resources and the safe development and commercialization of
genetically modified products.248 To do so, many developed states are using procedures recommended
by the WHO or the OECD, 249 and are being helped by international institutions such as the World
Bank and the Biodiversity Convention secretariat, as well as non-governmental organizations. A
common approach in developed states for creating such a system is through the use of a national
technical advisory committee, charged both with coordinating various regulatory ministries, as well as
developing and applying appropriate guidelines, such as Australia’s Genetic Manipulation Advisory

See Commission on Sustainable Development, Report of the Secretary-General, Overall
Progress Achieved Since the United Nations conference on Environment and Development, Addendum
on Environmentally Sound Management of Biotechnology, para. 6, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.17/1997/2/Add.15 (1997); see also David W. Altman, Issues and Problems in the Transfer
of Biotechnology, in PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES , supra note
30, at 21, 29.
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Most OECD states have adopted the OECD guidelines on safety of biotechnology, either
into their existing regulatory framework or through passage of specially-designed laws. See Anne
Kathrine Hvoslef-Eide & Odd Arne Rognli, Environmental Issues for Plant Biotechnology
Transfer: A Norwegian Perspective, in PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES , supra note 30, at 37, 42. The essence of the guidelines is to encourage states to follow a
principle of information exchange, to develop national regulation in a manner that does not hinder the
development of biotechnology, and to develop risk assessment procedures for the industrial,
agricultural, and environmental applications of biotechnology. For links on the Internet to national
programs of OECD (and some non-OECD) states concerning biotechnology or biosafety, see
<http://www.oecd.org/ehs/biolinks.htm>.
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Committee.250 Where the Convention on Biological Diversity was ambiguous or vague about issues
such as access to genetic resources or the transfer of financial assistance and technology, these national
laws and regulations are providing far greater content, and in the process interpreting and clarifying the
Convention.
As an example of the importance of this internalization of norms, one might consider the United
States position on the Convention on Biological Diversity. Although the United States has not ratified
the Convention, it is nevertheless confronted by the reception of the Convention’s rules into the national
law of other states. In the wake of entry into force of the Convention, many states (particularly
developing states that had no laws in this area) passed national laws that accomplish the Convention’s
essential objectives, such as laws requiring foreign researchers to sign contracts to pay “bioroyalties” on
any income they derive from locally acquired plants.251 For instance, in 1995, the Government of the
Phillippines issued a presidential executive order (1) requiring prior informed consent by the
government, as well as local and indigenous communities, before an entity may bioprospect in the
Phillippines; (2) establishing a regulatory framework for conducting bioprospecting, which calls for
bioprospectors to enter into mandatory “research agreements” with the government on sharing of
genetic materials, technology and benefits; and (3) creating a regulatory body to ensure implementation
See Gaye Middleton, Australia; Gene Technology: Proposed New Regulatory Regime,
3 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 104 (1999/2000). Most developing states, however, are not yet in a position to
operate such committees and look to developed states for assistance.
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In addition to the Philippines, states such as Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru,
and Venezuela have all adopted laws controlling access to genetic resources and requiring
compensation. See Andrew Pollack, Biological Products Raise Genetic Ownership Issues, N.Y.
TIMES , Nov. 26, 1999, at A1. For a discussion of Brazil’s law, see Anthony Faiola, Amazon Cash
Crop: Brazil Seeks ‘Bioroyalties’ from Western Drug Firms, WASH . POST, July 9, 1999, at A21.
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of these steps.252 A variant of such a law requires the foreign researcher to conduct its research with a
local partner to ensure a sharing of the fruits of the research.
Further, some developing states have even considered enacting laws that would compel foreign
companies present in their territory to license biotechnology applications at low rates. This possibility
was anathema to developed state negotiators of the Convention on Biological Diversity, but because
the issue was glossed over with ambiguous provisions, it left open the possibility of national laws
compelling transfers of technology.253 While the United States has traditionally opposed such laws,254
the extraordinary value of biotechnology for alleviating hunger, disease, and suffering in the developed
world may even induce shifts in U.S. law for protection of intellectual property rights for at least some
biotechnology applications. For instance, on May 10, 2000, President Clinton issued an executive

See Charles Victor Barber & Antonio La Vina, Regulating Access to Genetic Resources:
The Philippines Experience, in ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES , supra note 242, at 115.
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Other conventions are open to the possibility. The Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property itself recognizes that party states “shall have the right to take legislative measures
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.” See Paris
Convention, art. 5(2). Further, the TRIPS Agreement sets forth in some detail standards under which a
government can authorize compulsory licensing of patented technology. See TRIPS Agreement, art. 31.
Further, Article 27(2) provides that states need not extend protection to a patented invention if
preventing commercial exploitation is necessary to protect human health.
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The prospect of compulsory licensing of U.S. intellectual property to developing states has
troubled U.S. companies, but it should be noted that compulsory licensing is a part of U.S. law in
various contexts. For instance, under the Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §2404 (1994), the
government may compel a plant breeder to license a novel plant variety to others at a reasonable
royalty if necessary to ensure an adequate supply of fiber, food or feed, when the owner is unwilling or
unable to meet public demand at a reasonable price. Similarly, in the patent context, there are instances
where the government can compel licensing to promote sustainable development. See 42 U.S.C.
§1857f-1 (1994) (compulsory licensing of clean air technology).
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order declaring that the United States would not pursue enforcement of intellectual property rights
concerning patented AIDs drugs where infringements make the drugs more readily available in subSaharan Africa at lower prices.255
Yet internalization in national systems has occurred not just from the top-down, but from the
bottom-up as well. European environmental and consumer groups, as well as certain individuals, looked
at the relevant treaties and saw insufficient means for protecting their interests, but also lacunae that
could be exploited through national laws and regulations that would protect those interests. Such nonstate actors were the engines for forcing governments, through aggressive protests and boycotts
coordinated on a transnational scale, to take a much more cautious approach in regulating the
development and marketing of genetically modified products.256 For instance, in the United Kingdom
such protests prompted the U.K. government and life science companies to agree to a moratorium on
the commercialization of genetically modified crops in the United Kingdom pending research into their

See Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (2000). The principal trade
organization for the U.S. drug industry immediately responded by asserting that the executive order
“sets an undesirable and inappropriate precedent by adopting a discriminatory approach to intellectual
property laws, and focusing exclusively on pharmaceuticals.” See Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Tries to
Expedite AIDS Drugs Into Africa, N.Y. TIMES , May 11, 2000, at A7. On the following day (May
11), however, several pharmaceutical companies announced a willingness to cooperate with the Joint
U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) to find ways for broadening access to care and treatment
of HIV/AIDS, including affordable and effective use of drugs for HIV/AIDS-related illnesses. See
UNAIDS Press Release on New Public/Private Sector Effort Initiated to Accelerate Access to
HIV/AIDS Care and Treatment in Developing Countries (May 11, 2000),
<http://www.unaids.org/whatsnew/press/eng/geneva1110500.html>.
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See Matthew Stilwell & Brennan Van Dyke, An Activist’s Handbook on Genetically
Modified Organisms and the WTO (Center for International Environmental Law, March 1999); see
generally Warren Hoge, Britons Skirmish Over Genetically Modified Crops, N.Y. TIMES , Aug. 23,
1999, at A3; T.R. Reid, Altered Crops on Trial in Britain, WASH . POST, Apr. 16, 2000, at A31.
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environmental effects.257 “Networks of experts” joined in the debate, such as the British Medical
Association, which issued a report stating that all genetically modified foods should be labeled as such,
and processed separately from conventional crops, although stopping short of finding that such foods
were dangerous.258 Ultimately, the U.K. government ordered restaurants, cafes, delicatessens, fastfood outlets, and caterers to inform customers if their meals contained genetically modified products.259
By contrast, Swiss voters have twice rejected by large margins referenda calling for a ban on all genetic
research and for a ten-year moratorium on field trials or sales of genetically modified organisms.260
The U.S. Government has not been immune to public agitation, as may be seen in recent
changes undertaken by the three principal agencies responsible for regulating biotechnology
applications. In the early 1990's, when first faced with how to regulate genetically modified foods, the
FDA decided that they could be regulated in the same way as conventional food varieties.261 Thus, the
FDA did not itself undertake testing of biotechnology food products, nor require consultation from

See Ehsan Masood, UK Holds Up Applications of Genetically Modified Crops, 395
NATURE 830 (1998).
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See Rick Weiss, British Report: Label Gene-Modified Food, WASH . POST, May 18,
1999, at A2.
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See National Reports: United Kingdom, BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 10, 110-11 (1999/2000)
(describing the U.K. food labeling regulations which came into force in September 1999).
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See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Protests on New Genes and Seeds Grow More Passionate in
Europe, N.Y. TIMES , Mar. 14, 2000, at A1.
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Internal documents released by the FDA in response to a lawsuit by a non-government
group, the Alliance for Bio-Integrity, see infra note 264, show that there were conflicting views within
the FDA as to whether this approach was appropriate. See Marian Burros, Documents Show
Officials Disagreed on Altered Food, N.Y. TIMES , Dec. 1, 1999, at A15.
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companies intending to market genetically modified food or food ingredients. Yet the strong reaction
among European consumers that genetically modified foods were not adequately regulated, which in
turn led both to threatened trade restrictions and to increased concerns among U.S. consumers,
prompted the U.S. biotechnology industry by the late 1990s to seek greater regulation by the FDA.
Consequently, beginning in May 2000, the FDA altered its policy so as to require consultation from
companies intending to market genetically modified food products.262 In essence, U.S. manufacturers
saw greater government regulation as a means of assuaging consumer concerns. At the present time,
additional pressures remain. Several U.S. consumer organizations are lobbying for changes in U.S. law
to require labeling of foods to reflect their genetic origin, particularly since absent labeling, consumers
cannot evaluate personal risks in eating a product.263 Consumer groups such as the Center for Food
Advocacy and the Alliance for Bio-Integrity have even sued the FDA to force it to reclassify genetic

262

Prior to May 2000, most companies voluntarily consulted with the FDA to avoid
unexpected FDA regulation after marketing had occurred. These consultations simply involved
assurances from the company of origin that the food was safe, which critics charged was often based
on inadequate and self-serving studies. In May 2000, the FDA announced that it would change its
policy so as to require such consultations. See FDA Press Release on FDA to Strengthen Pre-Market
Review of Bioengineered Foods (May 3, 2000),
<http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/new00726.html>; see also White House Press Release on
Clinton Administration Agencies Announce Food and Agricultural Biotechnology Initiatives:
Strengthening Science-based Regulation and Consumer Access to Information (May 3, 2000),
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Special labeling is only required when a food’s nutritive value is significantly altered or when
consumers need to be informed about a safety issue. Although “additives” to foods must be disclosed to
consumers through labeling, genetic information added to food generally is not regarded by the FDA as
a food additive since it does not significantly alter the structure, function, or amount of substances
otherwise found in the food.
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modification as an additive that would require labeling.264
Within the USDA, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is charged with
regulating the introduction of genetically modified products into the environment and food system.265
When initially faced with biotechnology applications, APHIS decided simply to review data supplied by
the producer to determine whether the new plant exhibited pathogenic properties, was more likely to
become a weed than its non-modified parent, was likely to increase the weediness potential of other
plants with which it might interbreed, could cause damage to processed agricultural commodities, or
was likely to harm other organisms (e.g., insects or worms) that are beneficial to agriculture.266
However, the transnational backlash of complaints principally by environmental organizations about the
lack of testing for long-term effects ultimately led to a proposal by the USDA in July 1999 to establish

See, e.g., Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, No. 1:98CV01300 (D.D.C. filed May 27,
1998). The suit by the Alliance cites for support both the First Amendment’s protection of religious
freedom and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (1994), which
requires that federal laws and regulations not impede the free exercise of religion.
264

265

USDA regulations provide for a petition process to determine whether a product is
regulated at all. If found not to be regulated, the product requires no APHIS review before its release
into the environment.
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APHIS requires producers to notify or to obtain permits for field tests of genetically
modified organisms considered potential risks, which may proceed if APHIS issues a “determination of
non-regulated status.” See 7 C.F.R. § 340(a) note 1 (2000). APHIS then monitors the thousands of
field releases of genetically engineered plants that have occurred to date in the United States, although
critics have charged that the data collected are too sketchy and incomplete to be useful in assessment of
ecological risks. See, e.g., Snow & Palma, supra note 46, at 94. The USDA has set up a National
Biological Impact Assessment Program to collect, store and retrieve data on field tests, thereby
allowing it to develop risk assessments.
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regional centers throughout the United States to evaluate biotech products over a long period of time.267
The EPA requires that it be notified of all field testing, which cannot proceed unless EPA
determines that the field test will not cause an “unreasonable adverse effect” on the environment and
issues an experimental use permit. Based on the experiment’s results, EPA may then register the
product for commercial sale. The EPA, however, considers most foods, such as the genetically
modified potato, as safe for the environment because the two genetic organisms (the potato and the
natural soil bacterium Bt) are safe in their normal conditions, and therefore are presumed safe when
genetically combined. Like the FDA and USDA, however, EPA has reacted to concerns by non-state
actors regarding genetically modified products. For instance, in the wake of complaints by
environmentalists about harm to monarch butterflies and other ecological risks, EPA placed restrictions
in early 2000 on the cultivation of genetically modified corn, requiring that farmers plant 20 to 50
percent of their acreage in conventional corn.268
The jurisgenerative structure of international law is such that—despite the fragmentation of
international law in this area—a transnational biotechnology regime is emerging based on the selfinterest of states and non-state actors, on the social interaction among those actors through international
institutions and non-governmental organizations, and on the national law, regulations, and policies that

See Marian Burros, U.S. Plans Long-Term Studies on Safety of Genetically Altered
Foods, N.Y. TIMES , July 14, 1999, at A16; Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman, New Crops, New
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clarify, interpret and implement international law. The United States cannot simply opt out of this regime
by failing to join key treaties; international law reverberates so as to affect the United States and even
alter U.S. laws and regulations. Yet, as discussed next, to address sensibly the myriad transnational
concerns that have arisen and will arise in this area, the United States and the global community as a
whole need to move away from reliance principally on government-negotiated, sector-specific treaty
regimes as a means of managing transnational biotechnology, and to consider ways of fostering more
elaborate and repeated cooperation and bargaining among the most relevant non-state actors.

V. TOWARD AN EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY

Part III clarified and analyzed six specific concerns about biotechnology in the transnational
sphere and associated international law and structures. There is no single treaty regime addressing these
concerns but, rather, a segmented and at times conflicting network of intellectual property, trade, and
environment treaties, accompanied by ambiguous customary law or principles. Part IV emphasized that
international law develops and regulates transnational behavior in a manner that goes well beyond the
development treaty regimes; while the self-interest of states remains at the core of the transnational legal
process, the social interaction of states and non-state actors is a key element, as is the need to ground
transnational rules in national laws and society. Thus, while Part III emphasized the need for
coordination across different treaty regimes, Part IV emphasized the need for coordination at different
levels of state and non-state behavior as the law develops over time. This section argues that the
principal emphasis of the global community on episodic and segmented intergovernmental negotiations
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as a means for addressing these concerns is misplaced, especially since the science in this area is
changing rapidly, the behavior to be regulated is highly commercial and private in nature, and
transnational regulation affects a wide variety of state and non-state actors who have complex
motivations that change over time. Rather, the transnational community should develop a means for
coordinating behavior across sectoral regimes and across transnational legal processes.

Developing an Epistemic Community

Studies of well-functioning international regimes suggest that regimes are, at the outset, relatively
informal and non-binding, yet “rooted in a normative community generating common standards of
legitimation.”269 Consequently, when pursuing an effective, binding international regime, there is value in
first fostering a relatively informal, non-binding regime as a means of creating shared understandings
among knowledgeable actors about the substance and process of the desired binding regime. These
shared understandings aid in shaping processes of authoritative decision, establishing the language by
which the relevant actors will engage in discourse, establishing what kinds of discourse are relevant to
the discussion, and determining whose interests are truly at stake such that they may participate in the
discussion. This informal, non-binding regime may be characterized as an “epistemic community”270
See Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater
Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM . J. INT ’L L. 26, 31-32 (1997) (referring to such
informal, non-binding regimes as “contextual”).
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and, if successful, would operate in a manner that depoliticizes the identification of problems and
priorities because it has no inherent power to impose its views on anyone. Yet, once these shared
understandings crystalize, the time is ripe for development of a more binding regime that will be
perceived as legitimate by the relevant actors, and thus can be an effective regime. Absent this shared
understanding, a purportedly “binding” regime that does develop will likely be either highly general in
nature and full of ambiguity, or will be unacceptable to one or more of the relevant actors, or both. In
any event, it will likely not be effective.
The current regimes relevant to biotechnology are limited in their effectiveness in large part
because of the absence of an epistemic community of relevant actors. At one time, the GATT
represented a fairly effective regime because it was driven by certain shared understandings among
principally Western states and non-governmental actors interested in economic and trade matters. The
conclusion of the Uruguay round brought an increasing number of states into the GATT and brought
significant reform to the GATT dispute resolution system under new WTO procedures. Yet this
broader membership of the WTO and its greater capacity to unsettle national decisions has
simultaneously led to a fracturing of earlier shared understandings. Increasingly, developing states
demand that their interests be addressed and non-governmental actors previously uninterested in trade
matters—such as labor, consumer, human rights, and environmental groups—have emerged seeking a
voice in WTO decisions. These groups distrust WTO rules and the WTO process, charging that it is
secretive and insensitive to the adverse environmental affects of trade, and their attitudes affect the

capable of discussing intelligently the issue of biotechnology from a variety of perspectives: economic,
environmental, ethical, and so on.
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functioning of WTO rules. The Beef Hormones case is an example of this influence; while the United
States won the case, the EU has refused to abide by the decision and instead regards the loss of free
trade as a preferred outcome. As occurred at the Seattle summit, it appears likely that any future trade
talks will be highly controversial and, if they follow their traditional approach, will have difficulty taking
account of claims by non-governmental actors. Absent a change in the regime, similar results are likely
in the upcoming era of transnational biotechnology.
The regime of the Biodiversity Convention is also an example of limited effectiveness. Although
it has been ratified by an extraordinary number of states in a short period of time, the provisions
contained within the Convention are extraordinarily broad, vague, and full of ambiguity; a result not just
of difficult disputes among states over core issues surrounding sustainable development, but also of the
speed with which the Convention was negotiated, which provided no time for the development of
shared understandings among states, let alone among private actors, that might have generated a more
sophisticated legal regime. The Convention is helpful in creating a standing Secretariat that can assist
developing states in establishing laws to help preserve biological diversity, but the Convention does not
direct states toward any specific policy approaches. With respect to issues of biotechnology, the
Convention sets down certain broad principles—states cannot deny access to their genetic resources,
while at the same time they are entitled to share in the benefits that flow from those resources—but the
details about how these principles should be implemented is left largely to private actors, without
providing any means for those actors to overcome the difficulties of coordination and other transaction
costs. Just as environmentalists are wary of the WTO, corporations are wary of the structures
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associated with the Biodiversity Convention.271
The Biosafety Protocol was negotiated over the course of five years, after several rounds of
negotiation, including a “final” round that was postponed for a year in order to allow more time for
positions between the “Miami group” and the rest of the participants to mature.272 As a consequence of
the lengthier process, the Protocol succeeded in developing certain binding rules that are likely to be
more effective, such as the advanced informed agreement procedure regarding exports of LMOs
intended for release into the environment. At the same time, many genetically modified products are not
covered by the Protocol and one may question whether the one-time notification-and-consent
procedure will prove effective in the long-term. Thus, some static rules emerged from the highlycharged negotiations, but others were left unaddressed. Unfortunately, static, incomplete rules can have
the effect of institutionalizing inequalities or of deflating further efforts at regime building that are in fact
desirable.
Rather than rely principally on these piecemeal negotiations in different legal arenas (along with
the occasional WTO panel decision) as a means for resolving problems in the field of transnational
biotechnology, an effort should be made to develop an epistemic community concerning transnational
biotechnology that spans different sectors (trade, environment, intellectual property, and so on). Such a
community would permit relevant actors to interact repeatedly over extended periods of time, thereby
promoting cooperative behavior and bargaining of interests, and might lead to an epistemic consensus,
See TEN KATE & LAIRD, supra note 80, at 296 (two-year survey of corporate opinion
revealed that many companies have come to believe that the implementation of the Convention has
gone badly wrong).
271
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See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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one that overturns the existing knowledge of those actors by providing a persuasive and superior
approach for addressing the promise and perils of biotechnology.273 Moreover, such a consensus could
lead to successful development of superior legal rules and institutions.274 If a common perspective can
be freely developed among the relevant actors, and if this in turn leads to convergent policies, then the
subsequent legal regime will be stronger, will contain more complete and more precise rules, is more
likely to promote state compliance, will attract public support, and is more likely to adapt effectively
over time.275
Creation of such a community entails its own difficulties and likely would not solve all of the
problems identified in Part III. The issues described there are complex ones which have no obvious
solution. Yet an epistemic community of diverse interests, if properly devised, could avoid the problem
of being captured (or being perceived as captured) by a single constituency, such as trade interests or
environmental interests, and thus solutions it reaches should have broad appeal. Further, by having
actors participating equally from different sectors, the problem of the fragmentation of different treaty
regimes might be overcome, allowing greater reflection on coordinating, amending or supplementing
those regimes. By having both state and non-state actors participating, the likelihood of developing
solutions that can achieve the fullest and most effective implementation in international law should be
273

For a discussion in the context of the global regulation of pesticides, see PETER HOUGH , THE
GLOBAL POLITICS OF PESTICIDES 158-62 (1998).
See ORAN R. YOUNG & GAIL OSHERENKO, POLAR POLITICS: CREATING INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 240-45 (1993).
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See Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean
Pollution Control, 43 INT ’L ORG. 377, 377-80 (1989); Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for
International Regimes, 36 INT ’L ORG. 325, 334 (1982).
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enhanced. And if the community is structured so as not itself to create binding commitments, then the
focus will not be on static and incremental high stakes treaty negotiation but, rather, on an ongoing
dialogue for resolving problems by cooperatively inclined actors, whose positions can be defined and
redefined over time as the prospects and problems of biotechnology unfold.

The Structure of a Transnational Forum

What transnational structure is best suited to create such an epistemic community? The
emergence of the potentially revolutionary science of biotechnology is not the first time that the
economic potential of new technologies has clashed with other values. An interesting analogue is the
emergence of the industrial revolution in Europe in the nineteenth century, during which economic
opportunities, ambitions, and problems caused enormous upheavals in the structure of the largely
agrarian societies and altered irreversibly a wide variety of relationships (most notably that of the
laboring class to those possessing capital), as well as prompted rapid increases in economic intercourse
among European states. Concomitantly, the industrial revolution allowed the development of cheap and
rapid transport and communication across Europe (and ultimately the globe), which broke down
barriers that previously existed for transnational cooperation among actors in different states. Thus, it is
no surprise that one can chart the emergence, principally in Europe, of hundreds of transnational nongovernmental organizations with increasing frequency during the period 1815 to 1914.276 These
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See F.S.L. LYONS, INTERNATIONALISM IN EUROPE 1815-1914 at 14 (1963). Lyons writes:
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organizations came in many shapes and sizes, but most had the following attributes: (1) membership
from different nationalities; (2) membership open to all persons desiring to join provided they fulfilled
certain conditions (such as payment of a membership fee); (3) promotion of a general or world aim, and
not a purely commercial motive; and (4) a permanent nature. Moreover, many of these transnational,
non-governmental organizations ultimately led to the establishment of international organizations, such as
the International Labour Organization,277 some of which involved representatives from not just
governments, but certain non-government constituencies as well.278
[U]sually what happened was that associations of private individuals pursuing similar aims in
different countries began to hold international conferences and to form international
associations. These entirely private bodies then became pressure-groups functioning over a
wide area and, if they were important or effective enough, ended by attracting the attention of a
government, or governments, which then took over the particular issue in question and made it
the subject of a public international conference.
Id. at 20. This trend, of course, has continued. See Steven Weber, Institutions and Change, in NEW
THINKING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 229 (Michael W. Doyle & G. John Ikenberry eds.,
1997).
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In the wake of the industrial revolution, national labor organizations banded together by the
end of the nineteenth century to form an International Association for the Protection of Labour.
Governed by an international committee on which the national sections were represented, the functions
of the association were to collect and publish labor laws, reports and other relevant documents, to
further the study of national labor laws and consider means of harmonization, and to maintain close
relations among labor reformers in various states. Because of the seriousness and credibility of its work
(e.g., gathering extensive scientific evidence concerning hazards to workers), governments began
sending representatives to its meetings. During the course of its twenty year life, the association served
as the engine for the development of international treaties on night work for women and on phosphorus
in matches, and ultimately the creation of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1919, which
took over its duties. See Lyons, supra note 276, at 150-54.
278

Thus, in establishing the ILO, it was recognized that having only government representatives
at the table for discussions and negotiations was insufficient. The ILO Governing Body and the ILO
Conference, which meets for a few weeks every year, consist not just of government representatives,
but representatives from labor and business groups. See Constitution for the International Labor
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Contemporary global society, of course, has numerous non-governmental organizations that
are, among other things, interested in transnational biotechnology. Yet, like the contemporary
international legal regimes that touch on transnational biotechnology, most of these organizations are
highly fragmented and are principally focused not on close interaction with other non-governmental
organizations that have differing views but, rather, on lobbying governments as part of the
intergovernmental negotiating process. To the extent that these organizations meet at a global forum, the
forum is typically a single meeting held in tandem with an intergovernmental meeting at which nongovernmental organizations of largely the same type are represented.279 Instead of such a model, what
is needed is a sustained dialogue through an association of all the principal actors in the field of
biotechnology. Such an association might be formed purely among private actors or among private
actors but with assistance of governments.
In areas other than biotechnology, there are some examples of associations formed purely
among diverse private actors to tackle particular transnational problems. For instance, when it became
increasingly clear that unregulated market forces on a global level were leading to rapid depletion of
global forest resources, and that unorganized boycotts and labeling schemes were simply confusing and
Organization, art. 3, as amended, Oct. 9, 1946, 62 Stat. 3485, 15 U.N.T.S. 35; see also C.W. Jenks,
The Significance for International Law of the Tripartite Character of the International Labour
Organization, 22 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 45 (1936); John McMahon, The
International Labour Organization, in THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 177
(Evan Luard ed., 1966); THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (James T.
Shotwell ed., 1934). Article 3 provides that the representatives should reflect the widest range of views
within their groups.
279

Examples would be the non-governmental conferences held in tandem with the 1992 Rio de
Janeiro U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the 1995 Beijing U.N.
conference on population, and the 2000 Warsaw conference on democracy.
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even misinforming consumers, a diverse group of representatives from environmental and conservation
groups, the timber industry, the forestry profession, indigenous peoples' organizations, and other
organizations joined together in 1993 to form the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). The FSC is an
independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization headquartered in Oaxaca, Mexico, that has
some 300 members from more than 50 states. The purpose of the FSC is to promote responsible forest
management by encouraging the development of national and regional forest management standards, by
evaluating and accrediting independent, third-party “certifiers,”and by providing public education and
information about certification as a tool for ensuring that the world's forests are protected for future
generations. In essence, consumers buying products carrying an FSC label can be assured that their
purchase comes from a forest which has been responsibly managed according to FSC principles.280
Similar non-governmental stewardship councils or other associations are being developed to address
specific problems.281
280

For information on the FSC, see <http://www.fscoax.org>. The FSC is funded by its
accreditation fees, membership dues, royalties for use of its logo, and from charitable donations. The
FSC does not prohibit or endorse any particular forestry practice. Instead, certification under the FSC
requires that the overall health and integrity of the forest ecosystem be conserved and maintained. This
means ensuring that the forest is regenerated, that the biological diversity of the forest is conserved, and
that the natural cycles of the forest (such as nutrient recycling) are maintained, in order to protect the
long-term health and productivity of the forest. These objectives can be reached through a variety of
silvicultural practices.
281

For instance, in 1996 the multinational conglomerate Unilever teamed up with the World
Wildlife Fund to create an independent, non-profit, non-governmental body called the Marine
Stewardship Council (MSC). The MSC has developed a set of principles and criteria for sustainable
fishing and has launched the first certified fish products in London. As stated in a Unilever press release,
the company's intention to purchase solely from certified sources by 2005 arises from three key
concerns. “First, as one of the world's largest buyers of frozen fish it seeks continuing business success.
Second, as a consumer focused business Unilever must respond to consumers’ needs and concerns. . .
. Finally, Unilever believes that its future depends on the well-being of the communities it serves around
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Perhaps one solution to the problem of export bans outlined in Part III would be to consider an
FSC-type solution, where a non-governmental association is formed from groups interested in the
transnational export of genetically modified products to develop mutually agreed guidelines for
development and risk assessment of such products (which, unlike the Biosafety Protocol, would not be
limited to living modified organisms). If such guidelines were developed and followed by exporters,
environmental and consumer groups would refrain from seeking to inhibit or boycott such exports. Yet
reference to the FSC example is not principally to suggest that a non-governmental association on
transnational biotechnology would necessarily develop a scheme for certifying or labeling biotechnology

the world, which in turn means that Unilever must itself act in a sustainable manner.” Unilever Press
Release on Important Steps Towards Certification of Fish Products (Mar. 3, 2000),
<www.unilever.com>.
In response to concerns about “sweatshop” conditions of factories in developing states, human
rights groups, 135 educational institutions, and U.S. shoe and apparel companies, such as Nike and
Levi Strauss, formed a coalition in 1996 called the Fair Labor Association (FLA). The FLA developed
a code for apparel factories anywhere in the world, including rules against forced labor and child labor,
and favoring freedom of association, minimum wages, and maximum working hours, and requiring a
system of independent monitoring. Companies whose factories comply can sew an FLA label into their
clothing.
The world leader in linking business initiatives with sustainable development is probably the
World Business Council for Sustainable Development, a coalition of some 140 transnational companies
formed in 1995 and based in Geneva.
For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates:
Nongovernmental Organizations and the “Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957,
958-62 (1996) (“If a voluntary code of conduct becomes an industry standard for, say, the use of
“sweatshop” labor, and that standard is monitored by non-state actors who command sympathetic
constituencies, then that standard might as well be the law—supranational law, to boot, because it is not
applied on a territorial basis.”); see also Thomas L. Friedman, Knight Is Right, N.Y. TIMES , June 20,
2000, at A31 (“The best way to create global governance—over issues from sweatshops to the
environment—when there is no global government is to build coalitions, in which enlightened
companies, consumers and social activists work together to forge their own rules and enforcement
mechanisms.”).
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products. Rather, it is to note that cooperation among disparate groups in a non-governmental setting is
possible to resolve issues concerning trade and environment, at least where it is in the interests of the
relevant non-state actors to do so. It is in this spirit that U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999
initiated a U.N.-sponsored forum for encouraging and promoting good corporate practices in the area
of human rights, labor and the environment, known as the “Global Compact.”282
Alternatively, a quasi-private, quasi-governmental association consisting of key actors from
both governments and non-governmental organizations could be developed. A recent example that
takes account of the two-level structure of international business transactions is the establishment in
1998 of the Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue. That group consists of representatives of consumer
organizations and of governments from Europe and the United States, and was created by the U.S. and
EU as a means of expanding on existing contacts among governments, regulators, and consumer groups
“to address the new consumer challenges in transatlantic relations posed by globalization,” an approach
“representative of a much broader trend toward the emergence of a global civil society.”283 The group
meets to develop recommendations that are then presented to the governments for consideration. 284
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For information on the Global Compact, see <www.unglobalcompact.org>.
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Alan Larson, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural
Affairs, Consumers and the Global Economy, Remarks at the Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue
Dinner (Feb. 10, 2000), <http://www.state/gov>.
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A further example of such an association—one that is science-oriented in nature—is the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The IPCC was highly instrumental in developing common
scientific agreement that global warming was occurring, while at the same time tempering radical
assertions as to what the effects of that warming will be, thereby allowing a consensus to emerge for the
creation of a framework convention. See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT ’L L. 451, 464-711993).

131
The nascent transnational pressures in the field of biotechnology have already stimulated in first
steps in this direction. On May 31, 2000, the United States and the EU agreed to establish a
“Consultative Forum” to review and assess the benefits and risks of biotechnology and report to the
December 2000 U.S.-EU Summit. This forum will include individuals from outside government with a
broad range of expertise, perspective, and interests.285 In November 1999, the OECD sponsored a
meeting with more than fifty representatives of scientific associations and non-governmental
organizations to discuss biotechnology and consumer concerns, environmental concerns and food
concerns.286 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has convened a Working Group on
Biotechnology from the private sector and governments of its Member States. The purpose of the
Working Group is to identify issues related to biotechnology and intellectual property rights, which may
be included in the WIPO work program beginning in the 2000-2001 biennium, as determined by its
Member States.287
A logical next step might be the creation of a global forum—perhaps entitled the “Transnational
Forum on Biotechnology”—which would operate across different sectors, would involve a wide variety
of non-state actors who have interests at stake in transnational biotechnology, and would meet regularly

See U.S. Dep’t of State Fact Sheet on U.S.-EU Biotechnology Cooperation Agreement
(May 31, 2000), <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/environ/latest/00053102.htm>; U.S. EU Agree
to Pursue High-Level Talks on Biotech Trade as New Group Is Set Up, 17 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA)
886 (2000) (providing the list of U.S. and EU members).
285

See OECD, OECD Consultation with Non-Governmental Organisations on
Biotechnology and Other Aspects of Food Safety, OECD Doc. C(2000)86/ADD4 (May 12, 2000).
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Biotech at the World Intellectual Property Organization,
<http://www.wipo.int/biotech/index-eng.html> (visited July 25, 2000).
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for an indefinite period of time. The forum could be organized initially by a particular state, such as
Switzerland, by inviting states to declare their willingness to send representatives to the forum. Each
state could then identify an appropriate representative from a discrete set of relevant groups, such as
scientific organizations, environmental organizations, biotechnology companies, trade organizations,
development-oriented organizations, intellectual property organizations, academia, labor organizations,
farm groups, indigenous groups, consumer organizations, and leaders in ethics and morals. Each state
could select the representative based on its ability to represent their constituency and their willingness to
pay a membership fee to support the forum. Thus, the U.S. government might select BIO288 to
represent U.S. biotechnology companies and Environmental Defense289 to represent U.S.
environmentalist groups. Representatives could be charged with informing potentially interested parties
within their group from their states of forum initiatives and with ensuring a concerted view of their group
is presented to the forum. While the forum could operate in plenary, perhaps chaired on a rotating basis
by representatives from each of the groups, there could also be a hierarchy of technical committees and
working groups at which specialists would address particular issues.
Representatives of significant global non-governmental organizations that have achieved
consultative status at relevant international organizations could be represented at the forum, such as
Consumers International, Earth Council, the International Chamber of Commerce, the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Third World Network, Women’s Environment and Development
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Organization, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.290 Representatives of
governments and of international organizations, such as WHO, FAO, UNEP, WIPO, World Bank, and
WTO, should be represented at meetings as well, either as full members or through associate member
or observer status. Particular attention would be paid to promoting participation by independent bodies
of scientific experts, such as the Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP), the
International Life Sciences Institute, the Food Biotechnology Council, and the U.N. International
Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB).291
Ideally, the host state would make available headquarters facilities for the forum and the
membership fees would sustain a forum secretariat. The secretariat could serve principally to organize
annual or biannual multi-week conferences of the members and to transmit documentation. Regular
meetings over an extended period of time would be essential, given the dramatic changes that likely will
be wrought in the “biotechnology age.” Benefits as well as risks may change dramatically, and regimes
created today, if static, could easily be irrelevant or outright unhelpful in years to come. Careful
attention should be placed on how the agenda of the forum is to be set, on the rules of order (such as
how members can speak and for how long), and the other procedures to be followed for conducting its
business.
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For the respective Internet sites of these organizations, see
<http://www.consumersinternational.org>; <http://www.ecouncil.ac.cr>; <http://www.iccwbo.org>;
<http://www.icftu.org>; <http://www.twnside.org.sg>; <http://www.wedo.org>;
<http://www.wbcsd.ch>.
See Agreement Establishing the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and
Biotechnology, Sept. 13, 1983, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1262 (1983). For information, see
<http://www.icgeb.trieste.it/>.
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To promote a full and thorough airing of concerns, two procedural devices should be seriously
entertained. First, the working conditions of the representatives should be designed to promote shared
understandings, rather than divergent rhetoric. To that end, consideration should be given to closing the
meetings to the press, although the results of meetings could be made public and freely discussed by
representatives outside the meeting room. This is difficult issue, since the idea is to promote of a useful
working environment, but not a clandestine one. Second, as is standard in international negotiations, it is
probably necessary that no substantive action be taken by the forum absent complete or virtual
unanimity among the representatives. The advantage of this procedural device is promote participation
by all interested actors in the forum and to force them to confront each others views and to seek
constructive solutions where they can. An obvious disadvantage is that such a device lends itself to
paralysis, particularly among such divergent groups. That risk is real, but the forum itself will have no
inherent power to change international law or institutions, so any paralysis that might occur will not itself
stymie efforts to grapple with transnational biotechnology through inter-state negotiations. Rather, the
power of the forum will derive from the ability to garner a consensus among all its representatives; once
that occurs, any product of the forum will have tremendous legitimacy and will serve as a norm
validated by key actors of the global community in this area.
While the above is just a sketch of the structure of such a forum, there are various existing fora
that can provide guidance, including fairly complex ones such as the ISO.292 At the same time, one can
anticipate potential objections to establishing a successful forum, which would need to be approached
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with some care. First, for some countries, non-governmental groups within a given category (e.g.,
environmental) are quite diverse in their views, such that finding a single organization capable of
representing the rest may be problematic. While doing so in some instances will undoubtedly be
challenging, a principal point of the effort (as discussion in the next sub-section) is to find common
ground among divergent views, which probably needs to start with the selection of representatives at
the national level. Where a single representative cannot be found, consideration may be given to use of
principal/alternative representatives or rotating representation.
Second, just as there are concerns about whether governments in inter-state negotiations are
legitimate proxies for the people they represent (e.g., does the government of Saudi Arabia truly
represent all the Saudi people?), non-governmental organizations themselves typically operate with
minimal regulation or accountability, raising questions about whose interests they are truly
representing.293 Indeed, scholars applying public choice theory have noted that the aggressive pursuit by
non-state actors of their own interests can result in a sub-optimal distribution of resources.294 Yet by

See Spiro, supra note 281, at 962-63. On the notion of greater public participation in the
formation of international law and standards, and some attendant difficulties, particularly in the
environmental context, see Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A
Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law? 93 AM . J. INT ’L L. 596, 617-19; Jonas
Ebbesson, The Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental Law, 1997 Y.B.
INT ’L ENVTL. L. 51 (1998).
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AND DECLINE OF N ATIONS : ECONOMIC GROWTH , STAGFLATION , AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982).
For an argument that such groups are harming the global economy through new forms of “rent-seeking”
global regulatory power, see John O. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the
Rise of the Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903 (1996); see also Paul B.
Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 NW . J.
INT ’L L. & BUS. 681 (1996-97).
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structuring this transnational biotechnology forum so as to encompass non-state actors from a range of
sectors, such problems might be blunted, if not avoided. Broad participation in the regime process by
all affected actors should reduce the concentrations of power within any particular non-state actor, and
may result in a non-state consensus that reflects the equilibrium outcome among the competing nonstate actors. Further, radical positions unsupported by other non-state actors would be exposed as
such, thereby diminishing the weight of such arguments.
Third, will relevant transnational actors see their interests as harmed by operating within the
scope of such a forum, such that they would prefer to continue their current activities, whether it be
lobbying governments and international organizations, pursuing advertising or protest campaigns to enlist
public support, or simply seeking to obfuscate or undermine development of the law in the area?
Several responses to this objection are possible. Some relevant actors probably will opt not to
participate in the forum, yet most credible actors should see it as a means for a constructive exchange.
Certainly, participation in the forum does not preclude relevant actors from undertaking any of their
current activities; rather, it is a means for seeking to influence other relevant actors of their views. At the
end of the day, a conclusive answer to the objection probably cannot be made unless an effort is made
to establish the forum. Yet there are reasons to believe that the time is ripe for the establishment of such
a forum.
A salient factor for the United States is that maintaining the status quo is not feasible. At a
minimum, the United States is under increasing pressure to manage its genetic resources according to
internationally agreed upon rules or risk losing foreign markets for an important segment of its goods
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and services.295 Although the United States is currently the largest producer of genetically modified
products for export, in the future there also may be significant imports to the United States of genetically
modified products produced abroad. Presumably it is in the United States’ interest to ensure that the
protections regarded as necessary for development of genetically modified products in the United
States are observed abroad as well, otherwise there could be repercussions in the United States
through exposure to toxins, allergens, or other adverse elements.296 As the current and likely future
leader in the development of biotechnology, the United States has a special role to play in framing the
goals of regulating biotechnology in the transnational sphere and in designing the means for achieving
those goals.
By the same token, it would appear that the other relevant actors concerned with biotechnology
in the transnational arena have incentives to cooperate and coordinate in structuring a sensible regime
that addresses their concerns. Biotechnology firms wish to continue pursuing biotechnology
development and application, including their ability to obtain genetic resources from developing states
and to market biotechnology goods and services transnationally. They fear outright bans and disguised
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For a series of essays on how national policies are increasingly answerable to international
environmental standards, see THE GREENING OF SOVEREIGNTY IN WORLD POLITICS (Karen T. Litfin
ed., Global Envtl. Accord Ser., 1998).
See Exec. Order No. 13,112 (Feb. 3, 1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 6,183 (Feb. 3, 1999) (invoking
legal authorities to prevent the introduction of invasive species in the United States). A general problem
of stringent regulation of biotechnology in one country is that a multinational corporation might simply
move its operations to another country. See Thomas O. McGarity, International Regulation of
Deliberate Release Biotechnologies, 26 TEX . INT ’L L.J. 423, 435-37 (1991). At the same time,
corporations may be inhibited from doing so by economic factors, such as the unavailability of highly
skilled personnel and equipment and the difficulty of exporting products to the highly regulated market.
Further, the highly regulated country may be able to engage in extraterritorial regulation if regards the
foreign biotechnology process as having effects on it.
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bans on their products, and will find unsatisfactory the case-by-case adjudication available at the WTO,
even if the end-result is favorable in striking down a particular ban. For purposes of capital investment,
biotechnology companies should welcome the ability to define (and thereby encourage acceptance of)
their future rights and obligations, and to be regarded as a good “corporate citizens.”297 Environmental
groups wish to address the uncertainty in the release of genetically modified products into the
environment, and fear that either minimal or no restraints will be imposed on biotechnology firms, or that
the restraints imposed will prove unenforceable. They will not wish to rely on the WTO to sort out
whether a ban on biotechnology products is permissible. Governments may be torn between conflicting
views, responding both to the need for economic development, equitable demands, and consumer
preferences. Consumer preferences, in turn, will differ. European attitudes of late have hardened against
genetically modified products; U.S. attitudes may be headed that direction. Yet consumers in
developing states may strongly favor such products as a means of combating poverty and sickness. In
any event, consumers will wish to see some level of regulation of biotechnology so as to address
transnational concerns. Most actors should see formal coordinated action as preferable to unilateral
action.298

297

For a discussion of corporate initiatives toward self-regulation in this area, see Thomas P.
Redick et al., Private Legal Mechanisms for Regulating the Risks of Genetically Modified
Organisms: An Alternative Pathway Within the Biosafety Protocol, 4 ENVTL. LA W . 1, 57-59
(1997).
See, e.g., John J. Sweeney, Editorial, Remember Seattle, WASH . POST, Jan. 30, 2000, at
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The Goals of a Transnational Forum

In considering the goals of a transnational forum on biotechnology, there will need to be some
ground rules upon which relevant actors will operate in seeking convergence as an epistemic
community. Brunnée and Toope set forth a series of factors as appropriate for “ecosystem-oriented
regime building” in the area of freshwater resources, which may be adapted when considering regime
building in the area of transnational biotechnology.299 The community must seek to take account of the
interests of all actors affected by the transnational regulation of biotechnology. The community must
emphasize the common interests of all actors in protecting and preserving their interests, rather than
their competing interests. In particular, the community must pursue only the elaboration of possible
rights and obligations addressing the common interests of the actors, and must not seek to promote the
rights of one set of actors to the detriment of another. The community must work from core principles
favoring sustainable development, fairness, justice, and transparency among the actors. The community
must seek to elaborate specific rules on individual issues, but must be sufficiently flexible so as to
accommodate new concerns and interests as they emerge. Finally, the community must be open to
crystallization of an ultimate legal regime in any number of different forms: as a new international
institution or treaty; as a transformation of an existing international institutions or treaty; as a coordinated
transformation of a series of existing international institutions or treaties; or as a harmonization of
national laws.
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The overall goal for the forum should be to help ensure that biotechnology is developed and
applied only in a manner that is safe and beneficial, an objective that should be acceptable to all
potential members. From this, several sub-goals may be pursued. First, at a minimum, the forum could
provide an opportunity for the various relevant actors to discuss, debate, and exchange information
about their respective concerns. This could be done in plenary sessions, but probably more effectively
in subgroups or on the margins of meetings. One desirable outcome of such exchanges might be the
reduction of general verbal formulations that appear in treaties and in judicial decisions300 (“sustainable
development,” “precautionary principle,” “equitable sharing,” etc.) to much more concrete meanings in
the context of the development of biotechnology.
Second, the relevant actors might find ground for “bargaining” their positions toward an
optimal, consensus-driven outcome on a wide range of issues. Though hard to articulate the
complexities of such bargaining, the idea would be to allow biotechnology companies, environmental
groups, indigenous groups, and others to see how their existing disagreements might turn into consensus
by trade-offs or “side payments” among the different groups. Part III noted how different groups have
different interests that are currently regulated in disparate treaty regimes. If these groups were brought
together at a forum that allowed continuous interactions among them, perhaps they might find that
environmental groups could support certain trade in biotechnology products in exchange for
biotechnology companies contributing funds to environmental impact studies in importing states;

See, e.g., Case Concerning the Gab íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997
I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 162 (1998) (recognizing the concept of “sustainable
development” as essentially a verbal reconciliation of concepts that point in the opposite direction).
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biotechnology companies might support funding for environmental impact studies as well as donations
of technology in exchange for strong intellectual property protections within developing states;301
developing states might support strong intellectual property protections if their indigenous populations
receive greater benefits from use of their biological heritage; in order to achieve these benefits,
indigenous groups might encourage environmental groups to be less “ban-oriented.” Presently these
kinds of linkages crudely occur through intergovernmental negotiation of treaties, but the negotiations
are so compartmentalized into the sector of any given treaty (environmental, trade, intellectual property,
and so on.) and are so government-driven that it is difficult for bargaining to occur across sectoral lines
and among all relevant actors.
Third, if sufficient common understanding (and trust) emerges within the forum, the forum could
try to develop an integrated view on many of the activities now undertaken and duplicated across a
variety of international institutions. For instance, the forum might try to develop a common position on
guidelines for the assessment and management of biosafety risk factors, to assist international
organizations, states, and themselves. Those guidelines would address, inter alia, physical and
biological control procedures appropriate to the level of assessed risk involved in relevant research,
development and application activities. There are already several guidelines that have been developed
by different organizations based on their own particular interests,302 such as the OECD Group of
See OECD REPORT , supra note 36, at 9 (“The measures required to induce the private
sector to transfer technology will include the creation of conditions in the recipient state that encourage
voluntary technology transfer from abroad.”).
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National Experts on Safety in Biotechnology,303 the UNIDO Biosafety Information Network and
Advisory Service (BINAS),304 the UNEP,305 and the World Bank,306 as well as by states.307 A sensible
integration of these guidelines developed by consensus of all relevant actors would provide a feasible
and flexible basis for assessing biosafety.
Other goals of the forum might include developing guidelines for innovative genetic manipulation
techniques; identifying and keeping under review classes of work that have undefined risk levels;
alerting national authorities to the existence of novel risk factors; providing specialist technical advice on
specific biosafety matters to international organizations, such as the WTO, and relevant state regulatory

<http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/pdf/bswg2-3.pdf>. Little integration exists among these instruments.
See OECD, SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY (1992); OECD,
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DNA TECHNIQUES (1986); see generally Seizo Sumida, OECD’s Biosafety Work on “Large-Scale”
Releases of Transgenic Plants, 45 FIELD CROPS RES . 187 (1996). On the importance of the OECD
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authorities; and establishing contact and maintaining a liaison with state regulatory authorities to ensure
that, as far as practicable, national guidelines and regulations are in harmony with international practice.
To assist in such tasks, agreement might be reached to establish a scientific and technical advisory
group, along the lines of the scientific groups associated with the Biological Diversity Convention or the
Antarctic treaty regime. Such a group would have to draw upon expertise from a variety of scientific
backgrounds, including molecular biology, genetics, cell biology, evolutionary biology, physiology,
population and community ecology, and ecosystem science. At a very advanced stage, this body could
even be called upon to evaluate the potential ecological consequences of the planned introduction of
genetically modified products into the environment of a proposed state of import, an evaluation that
might include several issues: the survival and reproduction of the introduced organism; interactions with
other organisms in the environment; and the effects of the introduced organism on the ecosystem
function. In such instances, careful attention would need to be placed on protecting confidential business
information.
While addressing issues concerning the risks of biotechnology, the forum could in tandem foster
better understanding regarding the economic, political, and moral value of the sharing of its benefits. In
this regard, participation at the forum of representatives from various national programs committed to
promotion of biotechnology for developed states would be important. Examples of national programs to
that effect are the Special Programme for Biotechnology and Development Cooperation of the
Netherlands308 and the programs of the Japan International Research Center for Agriculture Sciences

See Bert Visser & Hans Wessels, Plant Biotechnology for Small-Scale Agriculture, in
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES , supra note 30, at 213.
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(JIRCAS)309 and the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID),310 which aim to increase
developing states access to biotechnology and contribute to the solution of developmental problems. An
example of an international program is the Intermediary Biotechnology Service (IBS), a project
supported by an international group of donors, which advises national programs in developing states on
matters of biotechnology research management and policy.311 As discussed previously, often private
sector companies can collaborate with national or international programs to transfer technology to an
institute within a developed state.

Potential Crystallization of a Coherent Legal Regime

The development of a cohesive, epistemic community on issues of transnational biotechnology
would be a remarkable accomplishment. Indeed, in some instances there are sound arguments in favor
of engaging all relevant parties though voluntary structures rather than trying to impose on them a
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coercive, legislative regime.312 The speed with which technology in this area is developing argues in
favor of using “soft law” instruments or using existing international organizations more effectively as a
means of coordinating the behavior of relevant actors.
Yet, the success of a transnational forum might ultimately be measured by whether it leads to a
binding legal regime that effectively addresses the concerns discussed in Part III. Existing international
rules regarding intellectual property protection of biotechnology applications are not strong, nor are
rules regarding access to or equitable sharing of the benefits from genetic resources. Through stronger
rules, the beneficial aspects of biotechnology are more likely to be achieved. At the same time, while
biotechnology applications generally may be safe, at least some companies in some states are likely
engaged in risky commercial development of transgenic plants,313 suggesting that developing a legally
binding regime on how risk should be measured, and then restricting (or at least monitoring) high-risk
experiments and development would be in order.
A binding legal regime could crystalize in any number of different forms: as a new international
institution or treaty; as a transformation of an existing international institution or treaty; as a coordinated
transformation of a series of existing international institutions or treaties; or as a harmonization of
See Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental
Regulation, 87 GEO . L.J. 749, 793 (1999). An example of voluntary schemes that can emerge within
the non-governmental sector when relevant actors become convinced that it as in their interest to do so
is the development of voluntary liability and compensation schemes in the oil pollution context. See The
Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution, Jan. 7, 1969, reprinted in
8 I.L.M. 497 (1968) (TOVALOP) (amended several times); Contract Regarding an Interim
Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution, Jan. 17, 1971 (also amended several times).
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national laws. Should the global community move toward creation of a new treaty regime to regulate
transnational biotechnology?314 When the global community in the past has faced an extraordinary
scientific development, capable of yielding both great benefits and great harm to the global community,
establishment of a regime for transnational cooperation has been seen as a highly rational and useful
policy choice. For example, the advent of nuclear power as a source of energy in the 1940's soon
thereafter brought on the creation of the International Atomic Energy Commission, an organization
garnering members from across the East/West, North/South divides. The IAEA became a highly
effective institution in advising members regarding the safe, peaceful uses of nuclear materials, and in
inspecting facilities within member states. A principal objective of the new institution would be to
overcome the problem of having a multitude of international regimes all addressing pieces of the
biotechnology puzzle, yet having none capable of addressing the problem as a whole. However, the
likelihood (at least in the near term) of creating an entirely new institution seems low. The proliferation
of international institutions in recent years has left many states with “institution fatigue,” as well as “treaty
congestion.”315 Adding but one more institution addressing a particular area of transnational cooperation
would likely be seen as a misguided effort to solve a problem by throwing more resources and energy
into the creation of yet another transnational actor.
Transformation of an existing international institution or treaty might prove the most efficient
means of developing binding rules. At present, however, none of the existing regimes provides an
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especially good fit. The regime established by the Biodiversity Convention is charged with focusing
principally on the conservation of biological diversity, and while that permits it to address some of these
concerns, such as the balancing of access to genetic resources against transfer of benefits arising from
such access, other concerns, such as food safety and trade bans against genetically modified products,
are not within its purview. Moreover, even on the areas within its mandate, the provisions of the
Biodiversity Convention are very general and vague in nature, and thus susceptible to multiple
interpretations. The world leader in biotechnology, the United States, is not even a party to the
Biodiversity Convention, let alone to the proposed Biosafety Protocol. The regime of the WTO can
address the issue of trade bans, but has limited ability to assess the scientific basis of those bans. It is a
reactive regime, closely scrutinizing trade restrictions (and typically striking down those purportedly
based on environmental concerns), but unable to consider broader issues, such as the fairness of
developed states exporting genetically modified products derived from materials of developing states.
Other global regimes, embodied in the WIPO, the FAO, or the UNDP, have limited resources and a
limited mandate to effect change in this area.
Perhaps the most likely development of a new legal regime would occur either through the
coordinated transformation of a series of existing international institutions or treaties or through
harmonization of national laws. In essence, if a “forum” succeeded in achieving common understandings
or “bargains” about how to regulate transnational biotechnology, that agreement could either be grafted
onto existing international agreements or incorporated directly into national laws (or both). For
example, perhaps such understandings could lead to pilot projects for simultaneous regulatory approval
of genetically modified products among states, whereby scientists and other regulatory officials from
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different states would do risk assessment studies simultaneously. A transparent, scientific, consensusdriven process might avoid having a genetically modified product approved in one jurisdiction but not in
others.316 Such regulatory approval would likely require greater sensitivity than currently exists in
national structures to the risks arising from export of genetically modified products to other regions of
the world.
Bargaining within a transnational forum might ultimately lead to consensus on appropriate
approaches for future development of U.S. law in this area. For instance, harmonization of legislation
with other states might lead to mandating the DOC, USDA, FDA, APHIS, or the EPA (or perhaps an
entirely new entity) to collect data from the producer of a genetically modified product, as well as from
independent sources (such as peer reviewed journals), and to assess the data to determine that the
genetically modified product presents no safety concerns from gene expression, gene flow, or toxicity
or allergenic perspective with respect to proposed states of import. This would, of course, require
the producer (or the exporter) to conduct field tests in the foreign state. The tests would be to
determine the extent of areas the transgenic varieties will cover compared to the natural populations of
the plant, whether the transgene itself will confer a selective advantage to the natural population if
spread, and whether the introduced genes will be fixed in the natural populations or lost through genetic
drift or natural selection.317 Where there are safety concerns with respect to a particular state, the U.S.
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Government could bar engineered plants from being exported to that state.318
Even if bargaining within the transnational forum does not result in changes to U.S. law, such
interaction would sensitize U.S. actors to the potential benefits of legal reforms and harmonization in this
area, and to opportunities for assisting other states in development of their national laws and regulations.
Risk assessment in the area of biotechnology has become increasingly complex, relying extensively on
mathematical models, statistics, and computer modeling. The inadvertent spread of genetically modified
organisms may turn on the complex interaction of repressor genes, insertional mutation, or the creation
of new chromosome arrangements in existing organisms. Most developing state governments and their
national industries are ill-equipped to conduct such assessments. Exploring these difficulties amidst the
non-controversial setting of a transnational forum might help promote greater oversight by
biotechnology exporting states. Alternatively, exporting states (or perhaps exporters themselves
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directly, perhaps through creation of a industry-supported fund) might provide funds for establishing
and maintaining regulatory systems with developing states. A transnational forum would provide a place
for pursuing such ideas without the specter of immediate incorporation in a binding international
agreement.
An epistemic community of the kind called for here does not yet exist in the field of trade and
environment. Were one to be created and be successful, it might serve as a template for addressing
other complex problems of transnational regulation, particularly where different regimes are colliding
and need reconciliation. It might even help international society free itself from some of the “obsessions
and neuroses” that have led to international and internal conflict in the past.319 As the range of
transnational behavior grows ever deeper, the need for stronger transnational organization grows
deeper as well.

VI. CONCLUSION

Although we are in its formative stage, the science of biotechnology may well revolutionize
broad aspects of national and transnational behavior—from the food and drugs we consume, to medical
treatments for disease and aging, to means of identifying who we are and what we could be. Moreover,
biotechnology holds great promise for helping to eradicate hunger and disease among the poorest states
of the world. Yet already a wide range of transnational concerns about transnational biotechnology
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have emerged that severely challenge existing treaty regimes and that threaten to foreclose cooperative
strategies for obtaining the widest benefits from this new science at the smallest risk. Existing regimes as
well as difficulty in regulating a matter that spans areas of trade, intellectual property, environment,
health, and agriculture, and difficulty in promoting desirable interactions among those entities most
directly affected—non-state actors. Yet the structure of international law is such that non-state actors
have become key players in the formation of treaty regimes, in the social interaction within those
regimes, and in the internalization of transnational law in national law. Through formal creation of an
epistemic community of knowledgeable non-state actors representing a wide range of affected interests,
it is hoped that common perspectives and bargained positions can be freely developed concerning the
promise and perils of biotechnology. If this epistemic community can develop convergent policies and
expectations, then desirable cooperation of non-state actors may flourish, and any subsequent
transnational legal regime will be stronger, will contain more complete and more precise rules, is more
likely to promote state compliance, and is more likely to adapt effectively over time.

